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American Sociological Society

Volume XII
Social Control

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Social Control of Child Welfare . SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE
War as a Crisis in Social Control . . . . . CARL KELSEY
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Primitive Social Ascendancy Viewed as an Agent of Selection in Society . . . . . F. STUART CHAPIN
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JAMES ELBERT CUTLER
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UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

IDEALS AS A FACTOR IN THE FUTURE CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY. *George Elliott Howard* 1

GENERAL TOPIC: Agencies and Fields of Social Control

SOCIAL CONTROL OF CHILD WELFARE. *Sophonisba P. Breckinridge* . 11

WAR AS A CRISIS IN SOCIAL CONTROL. *Carl Kelsey* 27

DISCUSSION:

By Lucile Eaves 34
Charles W. Coulter 38
Edith Abbott 41

GENERAL TOPIC: Primitive Social Control

PRIMITIVE INDIVIDUAL ASCENDANCY. *Hutton Webster* 46

PRIMITIVE SOCIAL ASCENDANCY VIEWED AS AN AGENT OF SELECTION IN SOCIETY. *F. Stuart Chapin* 61

SURVIVAL OF PRIMITIVE CONTROLS IN FRONTIER OR RETARDED COMMUNITIES. *James Elbert Cutler* 75

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE NORTHERN ALGONKIAN. *Frank G. Speck* 82

DISCUSSION:

By Albert Ernest Jenks 101
Max Sylvius Handman 107
Rudolph M. Binder 110

GENERAL TOPIC: Social Control of Wealth

THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE ACQUISITION OF WEALTH. *Edward Cary Hayes* 111

MOTIVES IN ECONOMIC LIFE. *Carleton H. Parker* 131

DISCUSSION:

By Frank A. Fetter 152
Wesley C. Mitchell 155
E. C. Hayes 156

PAGE

GENERAL TOPIC: Social Control of Immigration

IMMIGRATION AS A PROBLEM IN SOCIAL CONTROL. *Henry Pratt Fairchild* 158

THE IMMIGRANT AS A PROBLEM IN COMMUNITY PLANNING. *Grace Abbott* 166

CONTROL OF IMMIGRATION BASED UPON THE TRUE DEMAND FOR LABOR. *Arthur J. Todd* 174

DISCUSSION:

By Hattie Plum Williams 184
Herbert Adolphus Miller 190
Warren S. Thompson 193
H. P. Fairchild 196
Francis Tyson 197
Edwin L. Earp 198
Mary C. Wiggin 199
Miss St. John Wileman 199

GENERAL TOPIC: Social Control of Political Relations

SOCIAL CONTROL IN A DEMOCRACY. *Franklin H. Giddings* 201

SOCIAL CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. *Charles Horton Cooley* 207

DISCUSSION:

By L. M. Bristol 216
Cecil C. North 221
L. L. Bernard 223
C. J. Bushnell 228
Edwin L. Earp 230
Frank D. Watson 231
D. W. Garrigues 231

PROGRAM OF THE TWELFTH ANNUAL MEETING 233

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY, FOR YEAR DECEMBER 20, 1916, TO DECEMBER 17, 1917 236

REPORT OF THE TREASURER 240

REPORT OF THE MANAGING EDITOR 243

MINUTES OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING, DECEMBER 28, 1917 246

MINUTES OF THE ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING, DECEMBER 29, 1917 . 247

CONSTITUTION OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY 249

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY, MEMBERSHIP LIST FOR THE YEAR 1918 251

CONTENTS OF PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY, VOLUMES I–XII 265

IDEALS AS A FACTOR IN THE FUTURE CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

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University of Nebraska

It is an accepted law among social psychologists, I believe, that crises in human affairs clear the way for change, often with a view to preventing or to ameliorating future crises. Is it not possible that the present world-war—so frightfully and cynically destructive of the most precious material and spiritual assets of civilization—may afford a unique opportunity for such a social reorganization as shall prove a guaranty of lasting world-peace? That such a catastrophe as this could occur in the twentieth century has to very many seemed incredible. The vision of some persons is still dazed from the shock. Bewildered by the apparent wreck of ideals, they are inclined to despair of the utility of all idealism. In particular, the dream of a world without wars is mocked and derided. Happily, on the other hand, there are many men and women with long vision, with true historic sense, who do not despair; who see clearly that the ideal of peace is not futile; who understand that the present cataclysm is due to the imperfection of the social order; to the sway of false ideals of human welfare and to wrong systems of social relations which may be replaced by truer ideals and better systems. For a negative result of every war is to justify the ideal of human brotherhood born in times of peace. Accordingly, as never before in war time, plans are maturing to take advantage of the opportunity which will come when the conflict ends. The economist is resolved to find out and remove the causes of antagonism which lurk in false economic theories and in selfish commercial systems; the political scientist seeks a remedy in broadening the franchise and in democratizing the government of states; while the publicist finds a

safeguard in an up-to-date, more thoroughly moralized code of international law or in a world-league to enforce peace.

Surely all this thought must have a precious value for the coming reconstruction of the social order. Possibly the sociologist may contribute his "bit" by attacking the problem from the viewpoint of creating a basis of control for a world-society, broader and deeper than that which now exists or even than that which legal, political, and economic readjustment can provide; though without such readjustment the foundation of international social control would be imperfect indeed.

Now, what is social control? In this presence, I take it, technical definitions may be spared. The "constraint of the one by the many"; the "dominance of the individual will by the group-will"; the "ascendancy of the social consciousness over the personal consciousness"—these and similar phrases convey a practical meaning quite well understood. They signify a control, if perfect, which has behind it the whole weight of the group or society, whether the society be a club, a trade-union, a nation, or an alliance of nations. They imply an authority which at its best rests on the free and intelligent choice of all the psychically interacting personalities which constitute the society. It refers to a power broader, deeper, more complex, than political power. It means a unity of strength whose source becomes higher and purer as humanism advances. But under present conditions social control is never perfect, not even in a democracy such as ours, much less in an oligarchy such as the Prussian. There are many grades in the quality of social control, some lower and some higher, according to the source of authority or to the kind of instruments employed. Among the forces or agencies of social control there is one class which, I venture to suggest, is of supreme interest for the problem in hand. I refer to the rôle of ideals in the development of a true international society. To what extent is the war revealing the existence of certain false ideals regarding the basic social values and thus clearing the way for new ideals which may tend to conserve world-peace? A brief discussion of several of these ideals may, perhaps, give a partial answer to the question.

I. THE IDEAL OF THE NATION-STATE

According to the spirit if not the letter of the prevailing teaching, the state appears in reality as an unmoral, not to say immoral, being. It is an artificial personality without a conscience. Orthodox definitions of the state reveal it as an absolute, isolated, irresponsible, heartless thing, well fitted to violate the Ten Commandments or to become the facile instrument of a caste, a class, or a dynasty. Rightly considered the state is but a means of social control. Control by the state should not be confused with control by society. True, political, religious, ecomonic, or even a wider control of society may fall into the hands of the state, that is, into the hands of the persons constituting the government which, for the time being, wields the power of the state. But that is not true social control. State control is social control only to the extent that the state, the government, is socialized, draws its authority from society itself.

In its genesis the territorial state, the nation-state, is the warrior-state; the instrument of a war lord, a king, an emperor, an ambitious heretoga. Its morality still bears the stamp of its predacious origin. Robbery, falsehood, deceit, statecraft, "might is right": what state is guiltless? Often it is righteous in word, in its bill of rights, but wicked in action. Clearly there is need of a revision of our moral philosophy, so that it may explain the actual facts of private and public life. We are floundering among four conflicting standards of ethics. In the descending scale we have a standard of abstract or private morality, a standard of business or commercial morality, a standard of national morality for home consumption, and a standard of international morality strictly for use with outlanders. Among them all the social conscience is bewildered. Is it strange that at home we are afflicted by industrial warfare and abroad by military strife? Are we not exaggerating the value of the "nation-state" as compared with "society"? The fact is nationalism is overdeveloped at the expense of internationalism. What crimes are not committed in the name of "political necessity"? According to Havelock Ellis, political necessity as a cause of war is increasing, while all other causes—racial, economic, religious, and personal—are

diminishing. "Internationalism of feeling is much less marked now," he believes, "than it was four centuries ago. Nationalities have developed a new self-consciousness, a new impulse to regain their old territories or to acquire new territories." Even "though the people as a whole are pacific, the danger of war is more permanently present now than most people were aware of previous to August, 1914"; and in proof Ellis pictures the military atrocities of the last three years as more unscrupulous, more "rigidly" efficient, than those committed by the ancient Vandals or in the Thirty Years' War.

There is truth in this statement, but it is not the whole truth. The indictment of modern civilization is too broad. The nations are not equally at fault. There has been progress where influence counts most. We of the United States, for instance, may justly protest against being classed among the reactionaries either as regards humanism in war or the sentiment of international fellowship. Are not the monstrous vandalism, the savage cruelty, and the worse than "Punic faith" of the present conflict due mainly, though not wholly, to the arrested morality of a German warrior-state, controlled, not by modern social ideals, but by a military autocracy which has deliberately and with amazing efficiency drawn all the resources of a great people into its hands? The "scrap of paper" declaration, the Zimmerman note, and the sinking of the Lusitania alike reveal the character of the unmoral warrior-state at its best—or its worst. Hegel's dictum, "The state is reason at its highest power," is a mockery of history.

If we would clear the way for permanent world-peace, we must raise the ideal of state morality and interstate morality as nearly as possible to that of individual morality. Statecraft must give place to frankness and lying diplomacy to truth in the intercourse of nations. Our country deserves high honor for her share in the humanizing, the socializing, of international law and for the moralizing of diplomacy. But let us not be proud. We are not entirely guiltless of fostering causes of war. For example, we have not acquired all of our domain righteously; and what could be more naïvely in conflict with the Golden Rule, with the spirit of human brotherhood, than an economic policy

which has excused the tax on the imported products of labor for the alleged reason that the "foreigner pays the tax"? It is not hard to understand the Kaiser's desire for a "place in the sun," though one may not approve of his method of winning it. When all peoples are free to choose a place in the sun for the unhampered exchange of their products or the treasure which nature has given them, there will be small excuse for mighty fleets; and they may at least glimpse the dawn of world-peace. In a word, the existing contrast between the state ideal and the social ideal must be modified. The state must become a faithful agent of true social control, so that the safeguarding of the welfare interests which its citizens share with all men shall become its primary function.

II. THE IDEAL OF THE FUNCTION OF WAR AND MILITARISM IN SOCIAL PROGRESS

The socialization of the state ideal, then, is the first task. The second task is to rid ourselves of a false ideal of the function of war and militarism, of physical force, in human progress, and to substitute therefor a true ideal of the real social values. It is, perhaps, not surprising, when a country is engaged in a great struggle for a righteous cause, a struggle which calls for sacrifice on the part of every man or woman, that some voices should be raised in the praise of war as a good in itself, as nature's severe but beneficent method of sifting and refining humanity. But it is harder to understand how such a theory in time of peace can be defended in cold blood by reputable students of social progress.

In reality the false ideal of war as a good in itself is the basic influence, the chief factor, in preparing the German people to follow the Kaiser in his carefully planned drive for world-dominion. For many years the youth of the empire, and especially of Prussia, have been persistently schooled in this ideal. The historian has taught them to admire the showy deeds of the unmoral, predatory warrior-state and to glorify the virtues of the war-god. The biologist and the sociologist have beguiled them with the subtle, pseudoscientific war-struggle theory of organic evolution and with the far less plausible illusion of so-called "social Darwinism."

Appealing to Charles Darwin, for instance, Bernhardi asserts that war is nature's law of growth. "War," he exclaims, "gives a biologically just decision, since its decision rests on the very nature of things." This false teaching has produced that sinister thing, the Prussian conception of *Kultur*. Never has a modern nation disclosed such a breach between ethics and scientific knowledge. At what a ruinous price in spiritual goods has the German efficiency in warfare been gained! Only when we appreciate the powerfully molding influence of such false ideals on the plastic minds of youth can we comprehend how a gifted people, marvelously efficient in the applications of science, can be capable of the savagery, the inhumanism, the perfidy of the persent war of conquest.

Such being the case, what appears to be the duty of America and her allies? To fight on until the aggressor is thoroughly subdued? Or to accept the best terms of peace which may now be had? To fight on means further awful destruction of wealth and human life and a continued sacrifice or temporary suspension of some of our most precious social ideals. Nevertheless, can we afford to stop before the German people are cured of the obsession that "might is right," that war is a good in itself, and are ready to help make the world safe for humanity?

III. THE IDEAL OF RACE VALUES

A third fruitful cause of war, fostered by war, is the false ideal of race values. Every race deems itself superior to every other race and every race is mistaken. This race conceit is contrary to the Christian ideal, which is also the modern social ideal of the equal soul value of all races. Yet everywhere in practice that ideal is disregarded by Christian and Pagan alike. Race prejudice is the most hateful and the most harmful of human sentiments. It has justified cannibalism and slavery. It has excused tyranny, cruelty, and the merciless waste of human life. It has sanctioned economic exploitation and helped to produce the sweatshop and the slum. It has bred the spirit of caste and inspired religious persecution. Everywhere from the Mississippi to the Congo it is a sinister factor in world-politics. Without its

removal can never be realized the vision of the dreamer, the brotherhood of man. Modern science repudiates the dogma of naturally superior races. It refuses to accept the color of the skin, the curl of the hair, the slant of the eye, or the shape of the shin bone as a safe index of the relative worth of human souls. It is safe to say that among scholars competent to render an authoritative judgment the ancient doctrine that by nature some races are superior and others inferior has been rejected. Every argument advanced in its support has been tested and found wanting. Every year brings stronger support for the new doctrine of the potential equality of all races. Peoples differ in their planes of cultural development, not in their inherent capacity for development. Races are low or high according to their rung on the ladder, not according to their ability to climb. Under the eye of the expert the existing differences in mental or moral status between brown and yellow, black and white, oriental and occidental, appear as the resultants of variations in environment, institutions, experience, opportunity.

Needless to say as yet the new teaching has had little or no influence on international conduct. How intense is the race prejudice existing among the warring peoples of Europe! Yet these peoples are but branches of the same Aryan stock, while, among them, Prussians and English are Teutonic first cousins. Original race lines are blurred and blended. Yet differences in speech, custom, and inherited traits have been magnified by centuries of warfare and dynastic rivalry. Perhaps never has the inter-race hatred in Europe been so savage as it is at the present hour. Witness the hate songs produced in Germany since the war began. The Berlin Junker seems almost to enjoy his "hate fest." The other peoples are not guiltless. Can there be any enduring guaranty of world-peace unless, in some large degree among the nations, the false ideal of race values shall give way to the scientifically approved ideal of potential race equality? To bring about that change will be a hard task; and what people, because of its composite character, its humane policy, and its democratic spirit, is as well fitted as is our own to take the lead in achieving it? It is a splendid opportunity for human service;

yet the American people will fail to grasp it unless first its own conscience shall be purged and its own vision clarified. American democracy must first become incapable of tolerating the lynching in Georgia or the massacre in Illinois of black citizens if it would be the successful apostle of race brotherhood in the world.

IV. THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY

Indeed an ideal of democracy, finer than that which now prevails, even in Great Britain or in the United States, must arise if democracy is to play its proper rôle as the conserver of peace. No doubt the democracy which now exists is a safer instrument of social control than is autocracy or class rule. Democracy, however imperfect, makes for peace; autocracy and class privilege at their best tend toward aggression and strife. Wars of conquest are not usually peoples' wars. More often they arise in some military ruler's lust for power or in class greed for increased possessions. With their President the American people are in this war to "make the world safe for democracy." For that end they will spend their treasure and their blood. In order that the safeguard shall be lasting, should they not offer to the world a type of democracy as free as possible from blemish? The English race on both sides the sea has achieved much for social liberty; but there is more to do. Great Britain must abolish hereditary and other class privilege in political control and set free the soil for the use of all her people. America must cease to merit the taunt of Germany that she tolerates political corruption and permits race riots. Both countries must relieve economic oppression, stop industrial strife, and abolish the liquor traffic—a chief source of moral, mental, and social inequality—and in the future secure for the plain people a deciding voice in questions of peace and war. In every land which aspires to true democracy sex privilege in political affairs must cease to exist; and woman—the original social builder, the mother of industry, the first inventor of the arts of peace—must be granted, through the ballot, a full voice in social control. Surely in this war woman is earning her charter of liberties!

Shall not America take the lead in socializing as well as in safeguarding democracy throughout the world?

V. THE IDEAL OF EDUCATION

It is one thing to dream and another thing to make the dream come true. The changing of ideals is a delicate process. I know of but one sure way in which the vision of an international society controlled through right ideals of democracy may come to pass. It will come through the socialization of education; for education, including religious teaching and all institutional agencies for mental and moral discipline, for the building of ideals, is the most efficient instrument of social control. If its dominant ideal be selfish, as in Prussia, education may prepare a people to admire and obey a ruthless military caste. If its dominant ideal be truly social, education may prepare a people for peaceful, self-governing democracy. Fill the minds of youth with social knowledge and social religion; inspire their imaginations with true ideals of human relations; surround their lives with the molding influence of right social suggestion, that most potent and most constant trainer of the human mind and character; teach them that society is a conception much greater than the state idea; that true democracy consists not merely in politics, government, administration, in the conventional sense, but also in social service, plans for human betterment, care for the welfare of mother, father, and child; show them how much rarer and nobler is moral courage than physical courage; explain to them how aggressive war recklessly squanders the emotional energy displayed in the splendid devotion, sacrifice, and heroism which it calls forth, and how it depreciates the vastly harder tests of these virtues that are called for in the normal conflicts of peaceful life. When the new education shall kindle the vision of true democracy in the souls of youth, the hour of its fulfilment will be near.

For ideals are the lever of civilization. The idealist is the pioneer of social progress. It is the fashion for the cynic, the selfish, and the thoughtless to sneer at the dreamer while they lavish praise on the so-called "practical man," the man who "does things." Let us withhold no just praise from any man or

woman who does good things, whether the things done be great or small. But let us beware of false evaluations of social service. As a matter of fact, the idealist who dreams on a full mind is the most practical of men. All the great deeds which constitute permanent civilization are the achievements of a very few idealists. These are the inventors in the Tardean sense. All the rest are imitators, helpers.

The idealist is the creative engineer who dreams a bridge over a mighty river; a subway under a great city; a railway across a continental mountain range; a ship canal from ocean to ocean. The idealist is the inspired social architect who dreams a plan for the sanitary or moral cleansing of a great city; the campaign for purging politics of graft; a law for saving little children from the tigerish man of the factory or the sweatshop; a referendum for banishing from the commonwealth the saloon, that chief breeder of pauperism, sin, and crime; a conference for the rescuing from the hands of predacious greed, for the use of the whole people, of the remnant of our country's natural wealth. The idealist is the statesman—the head of a nation—who dreams a scheme for safeguarding democracy and guaranteeing peace throughout the world.

Shall not America, my friends, in the war and after the war, by purging and raising yet higher her splendid ideals of human brotherhood, be found worthy of leadership in bringing the dream to pass?

SOCIAL CONTROL OF CHILD WELFARE

SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE
Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy

"The father is under a duty to maintain, educate, and defend his child." In these words Blackstone in 1765[1] stated in part his view concerning the legal position of the child in the family group.

"The courts of law can enforce the rights of the father but they are not equal to the office of enforcing the duties of the father. In these words, some sixty years later, 1827, the learned Chancellor Eldon[2] in the leading and notorious Wellesley case pointed out the weakness of the child's position. During the ninety years since Eldon spoke there has been developed a mighty effort to realize the unfounded statement of Blackstone and to render potent the courts of law in behalf of the child. That is, the recognition of the child as the subject of rights toward whom legal as well as natural and moral obligations could be formulated and enforced rather than the object of practically unlimited and unrestrained parental and especially paternal rights, underlies much of the most modern legislation and most important organization. For, under the common law, the child was peculiarly devoid of rights. He had no right to his mother. The father's right to the custody of the child prevailed against the mother in spite of his living a life of open adultery,[3] in spite of his being confined in prison and consigning the custody of his infant child to the care of his mistress,[4] in spite of his intrusting the child to the care of a nurse under whose care two other children had died of diseases indicating gross

[1] Blackstone's *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, Part I, chap. xvi.

[2] *Wellesley* v. *Beaufort*, 2 Russell 23.

[3] *Rex.* v. *Greenhill*, 4 Adolphus and Ellis 624 (1837).

[4] Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates* (3d series), XXXIX, 1082; *Skinner's case*, 9 More 278.

neglect.[1] This right meant the right to place the child "on work" and to appropriate the earnings and was a right which, as the justice said, had no correlative duties of support, or education, or skilful care. Theoretically, fortunately, the abuse of this power might be prevented by the exercise of the super-parental authority of the Court of Chancery, which recognized that there were limits beyond which the parent's unregulated power should not go, especially if there was danger of vitiating the child's habits of speech and outward conduct; and in those instances in which the child could secure access to the court, whose delays and complexities Dickens travestied in *Bleak House*, the child might find protection from a drunken, obscene, and blasphemous father, as in the Wellesley case cited. But because of the costliness and technicality of equity and because of its lack of facilities for discovering and meeting the needs of the child, equity could only slightly more effectively safeguard the rights of the child than could the courts of common law. During these ninety intervening years, however, there has been built up a body of legislation, and there has been developed a great administrative system looking toward the formulation and enforcement of paternal duties and parental obligations.

First in order, historically, came the factory acts, limiting the rights of the parents to set their children to work. During his great campaign in behalf of the children in the mills, in 1817, when he was trying to establish *ten* as the minimum working age of mill children, Robert Owen[2] had to defend himself against the attacks based on his presumptuous daring to interfere between father and child. Just as, in 1917, in the western district of North Carolina, Judge Boyd has ordered the non-enforcement of a federal act which would prevent Roland H. Dagenhart from putting his thirteen-year-old child to work and from allowing his fourteen-year-old child to work more than eight hours a day.[3] This decision is, however, undoubtedly an obstacle that will be brushed away, and the right of the child to fourteen years of childhood, during which

[1] *McClellan's case*, 1 Dowling's *Practical Cases* 81.

[2] Podmore, *Life of Owen*, I, 195; Owen's *Autobiography*, IA, 29, 30.

[3] See *The Survey*, XXXVIII (September 8, 1917), 507.

he shall not be subjected to exhausting and uneducative toil, has been recognized and embodied in the legislation of our states and now of Congress itself.[1] Concurrently with the child labor legislation has developed the movement for the recognition of the child's right to a minimum of seven years of common-school education,[2] and now, of very recent years, there is being embodied in legislation the claim of the child to paternal support. And so, in 1917, amended to read "the father is under a duty to support his children, to prevent their working contrary to the factory act of the state in which he lives, and to see to it that they take advantage of the educational opportunities provided out of public money," the statement of Blackstone would be partly true in all the states and wholly true in thirteen states.[3] Moreover, in sixteen states, and in England since 1839, the rights of the mother, at least, to access to her child, and in some cases to full responsibility, has been recognized,[4] and the claim of a legitimate child has been recognized to a mother's intelligence and control, when before he could claim her natural affection and interest only, since she was, in the words of Blackstone, "without authority but entitled to reverence and respect."

And, more fundamental and anterior to the right to paternal support and maternal care, comes the right to life itself. Accepting infant mortality as the most efficient test of social well-being, and following the lead of New Zealand, the facts about the huge volume of preventable loss of infant life are being brought to light by the

[1] See *House of Representatives Committee on Labor Hearing*, March 9, 1914, p. 20, for summary of state legislation; and United States Statutes at Large, Sixty-fourth Congress, First Session, Part I, p. 675, for Federal Child Labor act.

[2] The period varies in the various states between the lower limits of six, seven, or eight years of age and the upper limit of twelve, fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen years of age.

[3] Support, California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia; child labor, all except Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming; education, all except Mississippi. See *Report of U.S. Commissioner of Education*, II (1916), 9.

[4] Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Washington.

Federal Children's Bureau with their terrible indictment of an industrial and social system which pays the father so little that he cannot support and trains the mother so slightly that she cannot care. The demand of an adequate wage is no longer an item in a radical program of destruction, but an essential feature in a positive program of conservation.[1]

The child, then, is now in law entitled to support and care, support by the father and care by the mother when possible. But the father may be dead, he may be incapable, drunken, and a deserter, or the mother may be "unfit." The child is still entitled to such support as a competent father could give, to such care as a fit mother would supply. When the father is dead or incapacitated and the mother is fit, the principle of treatment is clear. Support is to be supplied by the community, the super-parent, the care is to be given by the mother. The expression of this right to support by the state in the father's place, and care by the mother, is to be found in the so-called Mothers' Pension legislation, which found definite support in the *Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws of 1909*[2] (British), and particularly in the recommendations of the minority of that commission, that "in the cases of widows with small children, always provided the home is not below the national minimum of child care, adequate aliment be supplied from the public rates,"[3] and which, enacted in Illinois, in 1911, rapidly spread until its principle has been embodied in the statutes of thirty-two states.

The agency through whom the support is allowed and administered varies in the different states. In some states, as, e.g., Illinois, the Juvenile Court is that agency; in some, as in Massachusetts, the old Poor-Law agents are used under the new law, with new safeguards and with help from the State Board of Charities; in California, the State Board of Control; in some, as in Pennsylvania, a wholly new agency is created—trustees are appointed

[1] See *Publications of the U.S. Children's Bureau*, especially Nos. 6, 9, 11, 16, 20.

[2] *Report of Royal Commission on the Poor-Laws and Relief of Distress*, Part IV, chap. 6, p. 202.

[3] Webb, *Public Organization of the Labour Market*, p. 342, on condition that the mother devote herself exclusively to the children and to the home.

in the counties by the governor.[1] Whatever the agency, it represents a new determination to supply to the destitute, fatherless child that measure of support which will enable the child to enjoy the physical requirements of food, clothing, and shelter under such conditions of maternal care as give promise of normal spiritual as well as physical development. This principle has found its highest sanction recently in the so-called Soldiers' and Sailors' Allowance bill. In the noble words of the drafter of that bill, whose leadership in the movement in behalf of establishing these rights of childhood is gratefully and loyally acknowledged:

> Men who go out to battle, even though they are not in the slightest degree physical cowards, may have a fear of what may befall them. But that isn't the real fear that confronts most of them. The real terror for men is that their families may suffer or become objects of charity. That fear the Government aims to dispel by letting the men know in advance that their families are not going to become objects of charity. . . . . The Government is ready to help the family, but the Government does not intend to absolve the married man from his first and primary obligation—that is, to contribute to the support of his wife and his children. This law recognizes and enforces that obligation. It is the first time that the Federal Government as such has recognized and enforced that obligation by law. This law says the first thing that a soldier and sailor must do is to contribute in fair measure to the support of his wife and children, and we are going to make him do it.[2]

For the child whose father is not dead nor physically nor mentally incapacitated, but morally and industrially unfit and incapable, or whose mother is "unfit," the problem is of course far more difficult. The principle that has been formulated is, however, clear and simple. When the home gives the care that Mrs. Webb has called "below the national minimum of child care," that home is to be subjected first to treatment, then to discipline, then, if necessary, to forced dismemberment.

[1] See *Publications of the U.S. Children's Bureau*, No. 7, for summary of laws enacted prior to March 20, 1914. Up to the present time laws have been enacted in Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming.

[2] Treasury Department, Bureau of Risk Insurance, *Bulletin No. 3*, pp. 4, 7.

For the treatment of the homes of this class the social machinery is as yet woefully inadequate. The development of that machinery waits upon a fuller realization that industry must be subjected to the needs of the community, including those of the wage-earner; that is, that industry must be made to pay its own costs, instead of being the controlling and autocratic influence in the community. Only when devices such as efficient and well-equipped labor bureaus have been worked out, through which the employers will, voluntarily or otherwise, organize their demand for labor, such as labor colonies which will provide for the maintenance of men in time of unemployment under conditions that are educational instead of swiftly demoralizing, and when the misuse of boy and girl labor in demoralizing and uneducative employment has been done away with, will it be possible to treat constructively the low-grade home of the casual, shiftless, and drunken, the intermittent husband and father. And only when the education of girls has been put on a sound and rational basis, and provision has been made for the permanent custodial care of the subnormal and feeble-minded woman will the problem of the immoral, shiftless, and filthy home be reduced to its lowest terms. In the meantime, consciously lacking the resources for curative treatment, there is possible only disciplinary treatment of a rigorous character, and here, again, the principle of treatment, the novel principle, is that the child has a right to have his parents made to do their duty by him. That duty the earlier court could not enforce, and if compelling the performance of that duty proves too difficult, if the laws intended to punish those who practice cruelty to children,[1] or those who contribute to the delinquency and dependency of children (offenses sometimes called by the harsh name of felony[2]) or if the non-support laws, which impose fines as high as $1,000, terms of imprisonment as long as two years,[3]— if these laws prove inadequate

[1] See the Great "Children Act," *Law Reports*, 8 Edward 7, chap. 67, secs. 21 f. See also *Journal Comparative Legislation*, N.S., III, 66, for summary of similar German legislation up to 1901. See also *ibid.*, VII, 375, for summary of laws dealing with children's courts in 1907 indicating a "world-wide movement in favor of separate treatment of offending children."

[2] New York Statutes; Bird's-eye Cummings and Gilbert's *Consolidated Statutes*, III, 3826, Penal Law, Article XLIV, § 480 (Indiana, 1908).

[3] See, for example, *Illinois Revised Statutes*, chap. 38, §§ 42hh, 42hq, and chap. 64, §§ 27–29.

there is the possibility of amputation, and the child may be wholly cut off from contact with the family that has proven to be in fact only the physical semblance of that unit which is now really and in law regarded as the elementary unit of social organization.

And for these children for whom the separation or transplanting seems necessary, the principle of treatment is also clear. For them are to be provided conditions as nearly as possible like what the home should have been.[1] This principle received conspicuous indorsement at the so-called "White House Conference" of 1909 when Mr. Roosevelt lent the prestige of his name to the conclusions concerning the treatment of neglected children. Again the agency by which this service is performed varies. In Illinois it is the Juvenile Court; in Massachusetts, the State Board of Charities through its division of minor wards; in Ohio, the Children's Guardians. Whatever the agency the recognized task is that of making good as far as possible what the child should, in the view of the community, have found supplied in the natural home. For the young children this often means without doubt "boarding out" in selected and supervised homes and attendance at the public schools, or it may sometimes mean care in an institution so organized as to give the largest measure of individual care and an experience as much as possible like that of the child whose home supplies normal and wholesome family life.

Obviously some communities move much less rapidly than others in accepting these principles and in providing the necessary resources for their application; but the course of development is clear, and the revolutionary character of that development is disguised by the mistaken impression prevailing as to what was the real attitude of the community at an earlier time. What Blackstone said of the father's duties in 1765 is slowly being made to come to pass, as the statement of the bridegroom to his bride, "with all my worldly goods I thee endow," obtains a partial basis of fact in the passage of some of these same recent non-support and abandonment laws. That revolution amounts to nothing less than transmuting the child from well-nigh a thing, the object of rights, to a person, the subject of rights. Galsworthy indicates the chasm that has

[1] Hart, *Preventive Treatment of Neglected Children*, p. 285.

been bridged by this new body of administrative machinery for the enforcement of the child's rights in his conversation in *Demos* between the young man who is the agent for this rigorous family discipline, the representative of the new order, and the father, who belongs to the old. "You have not fed or clothed your children, you have beaten them and I have taken them under the protection of the law." "Can I not do what I will with my own?" One can only sympathize with the young father to whom and to whose father before him the law gave in earlier times no help by relating the enjoyment of the privileges of fatherhood to the performance of his marital and paternal duties.

The machinery to which reference has been made for the treatment of the home in which there is neglect or degradation must obviously be adapted to the discovery where possible of the true cause of breakdown and to curative treatment when resources are available. This means the handling of children by the Juvenile Court or of the parents by the other appropriate courts after what is known as the case method of treatment, which is, of course, none other than that of acting only after an intelligent definition has been formulated of what is wrong (social diagnosis) based on an adequate knowledge of fact. Such treatment becomes possible then only when there are at the service of the agency persons skilled in applying community resources to discovered pathological conditions within the family group. The pathological conditions may result from industrial maladjustment (the underemployed or unemployable constitute a large element in our juvenile court cases); from lack of machinery for adapting the community life to the needs of newcomers (the children of immigrants constitute a large element in our juvenile court population);[1] from community neglect of special groups (the negro child is peculiarly the victim, not only of the economic, industrial, and social oppression under which his parents suffer, but of lack of educational provision in southern states and institutional provision in our northern communities).[2] It may also, of course, result from the physical or mental weakness of the child

[1] Abbott and Breckinridge, *Delinquent Child and the Home*, chap. ii.

[2] *The Crisis;* see "Negro Education," *Bulletin U.S. Bureau of Education*, 1916, No. 38, p. 7; Ovington, *Half a Man*, chap. iii.

or of the parents, or from some mental disturbance due to the parents' lack of skill in caring for the child, or to the lack of protection against abuse in connection with sex relationships.[1] For reconstructive work within the family group, or for severe but sound disciplinary treatment of the family, some medical and psychopathic diagnosis is now recognized as essential to sound social diagnosis, and the courts are seen then to be taking on agencies for the mental, physical, and social understanding and treatment of the cases brought before them.

This recognition of the child as the subject of rights, of the parent as the object of definite obligations enforceable by legal process, finds expression in the demand for the recognition and re-enactment of laws affecting children into a well-wrought and comprehensive code, or "Children's Charter." The great English act of 1908 is spoken of in these words, and the outline and programs for such "charters" are the subject of widespread discussion and concerted action in many states.[2] In the machinery set up by those acts is to be discovered the same demand that the home shall be required and enabled to do its duty and that the rights of the child in the home shall be realized. These codes or charters assume the existence of the factory acts and the compulsory education acts to which reference has been made. From the compulsory school law emerges directly the discovery that home conditions prevent the attendance of the child at school or the attendance in condition "to take full advantage of the education offered"[3]—the discovery that children come from homes that are not clean, having either inadequate or unsuitable food and needing many kinds of service. Medical inspection with its elaborate equipment for nursing and dispensary and clinical treatment is a necessary corollary to the compulsory school law, as are also the various agencies necessary to the care of the physically handicapped and mentally defective. Medical inspection, discovering the incompetence of the home, suggests provision for the better instruction of

[1] Healy, *Mental Conflicts and Misconduct.*

[2] Carstens, "A Community Plan in Children's Work," *National Conference of Charities and Correction*, 1915, p. 92.

[3] In the words of the English act authorizing school feeding; Education (provision of meals) act, L.R., 6 Edward 7, C 57.

mothers in child care[1] and household management and the development of educational provision for younger children. Medical inspection likewise points to the great volume of child life brought to the end of the school career wholly unfit to pass into industry, just as the true source of unemployment and enemployability and so of poverty is traced to the misuse of boy and girl labor; and in the Care Committees, the Juvenile Labour Exchange Advisory Committees in the English cities, the Vocational Supervision Bureaus in the American cities, are to be found other devices for aiding in the reconstruction of the home that it may be enabled and required to fulfil its services to the child.

Still one more item in the child's claim on the modern community is to be found in the demand for the chance to play. The dearth of recreation facilities resulting in play becoming for many children a lost art is soon uncovered both through such agencies as the Juvenile Court, before which boys are brought as delinquent for doing things that all boys did in earlier times, and as the school, which finds itself called on to bring about through formal education results which should be secured through informal activities. The provision for these opportunities is recognized as a public responsibility to be borne by the public and not to be charged upon the family budget. That, so far, the provision has been neither adequate nor always efficient is obvious, but the recognition of the principle is clear; it can be only a matter of time before the public assumes the burden of making play possible and safe, partly by clearing and supervising certain street zones, partly by establishing and administering playgrounds and recreation centers, and partly by controlling and supervising commercialized recreation.[2]

The program thus outlined is clear and fairly widely recognized. The administrative devices are, of course, often most crude and inefficient. Many of the tasks suggested require a high degree of skill and fine equipment, yet the means of training are still meager,

[1] Great Britain, Board of Education, *Annual Report for 1914 of the Chief Medical Officer*, pp. 25–57; Frere, *The Children's Care Committee;* Pepler, *The Care Committee, The Child and the Parent;* Greenwood, *The Juvenile Labour Exchanges and After-Care.*

[2] Addams, *The Spirit of Youth and the City Street;* Bray, *The Town Child.*

and the prevailing political standards prevent the public from obtaining the service of those equipped to do the work. To paraphrase Lord Eldon it might be alleged that "the civil service may be equal to the task of keeping the rascal out of the public service, but it is often not equal to the office of securing the service of the expert." The success of these various efforts depends also on adequate appropriations, and the body making the appropriation is often representative of the most backward and least progressive group. Moreover, the jurisdictions on which the authority is conferred are often the smaller and least self-conscious jurisdictions. Robert Owen said one hundred years ago that the care of the poor should be nationalized.[1] But until the enactment of the Federal Child Labor law in 1917, investigation and information were the only federal services in behalf of children.[2] In Illinois, for example, outside of Cook County, the Mothers' Pensions are administered by the Juvenile Court judge, who is the county judge, perhaps the most important political officer in the state, having charge, as he does, of much of the election machinery. He has jurisdiction, too, over the dependent and delinquent children, while the delinquent parents may often be brought, if prosecuted at all, before magistrates inferior in general standing to the county judge. The enforcement of the compulsory school law and the granting of working papers under the child labor law is in many states in the school district without any central supervision or control. There was, however, perceptible before the war a movement toward centralizing these forms of control at least to the extent of creating state, as distinguished from local, agencies. No chain is stronger than its weakest link, and every restraint upon the interests that are hostile to child life will break when its feeblest point gives way, and, consequently, even the eyes that can see and rejoice at the gradual recognition and formulation of the rights must often bear testimony to the inadequacy of the sanctions by which they are supposedly safeguarded. An outdoor relief official with political power stands in the way of the highly trained probation

[1] *Autobiography* of Robert Owen, IA, 62.

[2] The Bureau of Education and the Children's Bureau. Except perhaps some meager activities of the Public Health Service in the prevention of blindness.

officer; a superintendent of compulsory education, who becomes angry if truancy in any school is reduced, prevents the reappointment of the visiting teacher who was removing from the homes the causes of the children's absenteeism. A Municipal Court judge refuses to enforce the child labor law, first, on the ground that the legislature did not mean what they said, and, secondly, on the ground that they were idiots if they did. A county board refuses to appropriate for the Mothers' Pension families, and a judge before whom the delinquent fathers are brought thinks that they should be given one more chance. And so the flood of child misery seems always at high tide.

And yet the test has been recognized. "He set a little child in the midst of them." By that test are our institutions to be judged. How is the right of every child to have a father's support and a mother's care affected? "Whoever shall offend one of these little ones, it were better that a mill-stone were hanged about his neck." By that is each to be tried and if found offending to be discarded or reconstructed.

Two other rights are gradually being recognized and should be mentioned although their formulation will be a matter of patient and arduous effort. The first is the right to be physically and mentally well born, free from the consequences of vicious living and the result of other than uncontrolled criminal or irrational impulse. The laws found now on the statute books prescribing certain qualifications before the marriage license may be obtained[1] are crude attempts at the formulation of this right, while the proposals for the permanent custodial care[2] of feeble-minded women and the provision for the sterilization of certain criminals[3] look, not only toward the protection of the community against the burden and cost in the reproduction of the feeble-minded and criminal, but toward the protection of the wretched

[1] Oregon, 1893; Michigan, 1899; Wisconsin, 1908; Indiana, 1910; North Dakota, 1913.

[2] Great Britain, *Report of the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded*, VIII, 323 f. Mental Defectives bill, 1913, L.R., 3 and 4 George V, C28, § 2 (*b*) (vi).

[3] Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, California, Iowa, Utah, Nevada, Washington.

individual against her or his uncontrolled impulses and the prevention of the recurrence of that type of wretchedness and criminality.[1]

Reference has so far been made to the change in the status of the child in the legitimate family group. The humiliating and despised position of the illegitimate child need hardly be pointed out. He was the son of nobody, *filius nullius*, without name or kin so far as kinship meant rights of inheritance or of succession. In reality this child of nobody did in a way belong to his mother as the legitimate child never did at common law, for, while the right of the unmarried mother to the custody of the child of her shame was not so noble and dignified a thing as the right of the father to his legitimate child, she had in fact a claim, at least so long as the child was of tender years, not so different from his and as wide as the sky from the impotence of the married mother.[2] By virtue of this right she could hold her child from the father or from the Poor Law officials so long as the child was a "nurse-child." Early statutes, too, have enabled her to collect from the father a niggardly contribution, not so much for the support of the child as for the protection of the taxpayer. This contribution has been secured under conditions shockingly humiliating to the mother, in amounts totally inadequate[3] to her and the child's support. Moreover, the situation was so desperate that physician, social worker, and relatives have conspired to save the girl's respectability at the risk of the child's life and at the cost of all spiritual and educative value of the experience of motherhood. This has meant a greatly higher death rate among illegitimate infants,[4] a higher crime and a higher dependency rate among illegitimate adults. It has often

[1] Adolf Meyer, "Where Should We Attack the Problem of the Prevention of Mental Defect and Mental Diseases?" *National Conference of Charities and Correction*, 1915, p. 298.

The so-called "birth control" movement is urged generally in behalf of a free motherhood. It is likewise fused with the demand that the child may be the result of a free, deliberate, and equal union.

[2] *Barnardo* v. *McHugh* [1891] A.C. 388.

[3] In Illinois the total amount paid is $550 spread over five years, in Tennessee, not more than $40 the first year, $30 the second, and $20 the third. See *Studies of the Boston Conference on Illegitimacy*, September, 1914, p. 47.

[4] Newman, *Infant Mortality*, p. 213.

meant shutting the child out from the great stream of normal, wholesome, happy living.

But the despised and rejected is to become the beneficiary of the new claims put forward in behalf of childhood for paternal support and maternal care. Massachusetts, in 1913, for example, laid upon the father of an illegitimate child a responsibility for support identical with that of the legitimate child's father.[1] A carefully drawn statute was enacted in Minnesota at the last session of the legislature, and the workmen's compensation laws of several states include illegitimate children among the beneficiaries.[2] Moreover, social workers and physicians are finding that it is not impossible to make and carry out plans for keeping the mother and child together.[3]

From Norway comes the proposal embodied in the so-called Castberg Law "concerning children whose parents have not married each other" that the child shall have the right to "the name of both the father as well as the mother, to inherit from both, and to claim support and education from that parent whose pecuniary situation is the more favorable, and in general the same measure of support and education that a legitimate child could claim.[4] North Dakota faces the whole problem by legitimizing all children, and in the law recently enacted providing for the allowances to the wife and children of any soldier, the provision is the same for illegitimate as for legitimate children, provided that the father acknowledge them in writing or that he has been ordered by the court to pay for their support.

Reference to this act forces some reference to the war in its effects upon the claims built up with such difficulty. To mention war is to recognize the undoing of much of this laborious work.

[1] Massachusetts Acts of 1913, chap. 563. So with California, Connecticut, and Delaware in 1917.

[2] Idaho, New Mexico, New York, Nevada, Washington. England, also, 6 Edward 7, C58, sec. 13.

[3] *Annual Reports Massachusetts State board of Charities*, 1913, p. 124; 1914, p. 116; 1915, p. 181.

[4] Anthony, *Femininism in Germany and Scandinavia*, chaps. v, vi; *Journal Comparative Legislation*, XVII, 124; *Columbia Law Review*, December, 1916.

The fathers are being killed, the mothers are being forced to work, the children are being thus deprived both of a father's support and a mother's care. To be sure, France has said that the state will replace the father in the life of the child and has adopted the war orphans,[1] and one writer has spoken optimistically of "making war safe for childhood."[2] Moreover, sensitiveness to the claims of childhood has, undoubtedly, while not strong enough to force still further the attempts on our part to remain out of the conflict, influenced us to determine that never again shall our work be so undone.

In England, too, tests of efficiency have given an experimental basis to the conviction that the interest of the child in education and in freedom from toil is identical with the interest of the community in its man power and its technical proficiency.[3] But it cannot be denied that in all the countries numbers are going to seem of incomparable importance and that the attitude of some women must often be seriously confused between the demand of the nation that they repopulate and the demand based on their age-long experience of struggle for free, deliberate, and noble mating, in behalf of a fine flower of human childhood. It is perhaps inevitable that we grow again accustomed to thinking in terms of quantity—in wholesale fashion, rather than in terms of the individual child, and so lapse into habits of thought characteristic of the discarded past. When thousands are dying, tens of thousands are naked, millions are hungry and homeless, how can we stop to ask what are the human needs of each? The physical requirements more than exhaust our resources.

And yet a failure to do just this is to render futile the sacrifices now being offered upon the altar of democracy. The world can neither be made safe nor can democracy endure except on the basis of the fulfilment of these rights for all the children. "It may be that offense must come, but woe be it unto them through whom it comes." No declaration of a great purpose can justify

[1] See *The Survey*, October 6, 1917, p. 7.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Report of Commission on Health of Munition Workers, U.S. Bureau of Labor Bulletin*, No. 223.

the use of instrumentalities inherently inconsistent with that purpose. A democracy once created can persist only by the free use of the individual powers of those constituting the community in self-directing life. The wholesale methods of care, nurture, and education will render inevitable the re-establishment of autocratic government—the rule of the few over the many. Only by giving to all these rights to which reference has been made, individual support and individual care, can a world composed of self-determining free people be reasonably anticipated.

WAR AS A CRISIS IN SOCIAL CONTROL

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Inasmuch as we have entered into the Great War, it seems wiser to discuss this question in terms of existing conditions rather than in terms of abstract theory. I interpret social control to mean the organization and utilization of our wealth and citizens for public purposes. I am assuming that we have entered upon a long war and that many things permissible in an emergency cannot be considered. For many years we have been dwelling in a fool's paradise, prosperous, self-satisfied, contented to live our own lives and let live, rather grateful in fact for our isolation. Aloof from Europe, in reality rather deeply ignorant of her conditions, we asked only that Europe respect the Monroe Doctrine and let America alone. Thanks to the strength of the British navy, this request was respected. When the storm broke, those who should have known better allayed our fears with such phrases as "we have no concern with the causes of the conflict," and stimulated hopes of "peace without victory." One college president in the early months of the war insisted upon the appointment of a man to stump the state to combat the rising tide of militarism, and was later somewhat embarrassed to discover a way of getting rid of him. If the leaders were blind, what could be expected from the rest of us?

Foreseen or unexpected, welcomed or abhorred, the war net was spread around us. Even if we disregard the racial or national backgrounds which have affected our personal attitudes toward this conflict, war as such calls for a few words of comment. I am not concerned with debating its alleged selective value, nor its alleged revelation of superior and inferior peoples. War gives a new setting to all problems and actions. As Sumner says:

> War also develops societal organization, it produces political institutions and classes. . . . . In long periods of peace the whole societal structure

becomes fixed in its adjustments, and the functions all run into routine. . . . . Traditions acquire a sacred character, and philosophical doctrines are taught in churches and schools which make existing customs seem to be the eternal order of nature. . . . . It becomes impossible to find a standing-ground from which to attack abuses and organize reform. . . . . By war new social powers break their way and create a new order. The student is tempted to think that even a great social convulsion is worth all it costs.

It is evident to us all that certain far-reaching changes in our social programs and ideals have already been started. It is my purpose to mention some of these and to raise some questions with reference to them.

The new social conscience.—First let us notice the striking results which the more or less hidden and quiet working of the social conscience has produced. What man, acquainted with our ideas and standards of a few years past, would have ventured to prophesy the meek acceptance of compulsory and universal military service with the practical annihilation of the national guard; the confiscation of salaries and incomes deemed excessive; the substitution of an insurance system for the old pork-barrel pensions; the virtual merging of the railroads under national control; the control of food and coal; the fixing of prices; the attempt to distinguish between essentials and nonessentials in railroad shipments? Astounding charges, are they not?

Industrial reorganization.—Modern war requires the co-operation of all the members of a society, directly or indirectly. The securing and training of the fighting men, the supplying of ammunition and war material, though more immediate and spectacular, are in the long run no more important than the industrial organization of the country. We have accepted universal military service. The logic of the situation requires the virtual conscription of all citizens that each to the extent of his or her ability may contribute to the one great and immediate end, the winning of the war. This I deem a vital necessity. Unless this is done we are asking thousands to sacrifice comfort, life, perhaps, and yet allowing others to idle and loaf, doing less than nothing because they too must be fed and clothed. Unless this is done we shall continue to do as we did in building certain of the cantonments, guarantee the contractor cost plus 10 per cent and set him free

to bid in the open market for labor. This resulted in the payment of exorbitant wages and thus drew laborers from other industries themselves holding contracts with the government at fixed prices for urgently needed articles, thus robbing one department to help another. The result in industry is chaos. Moreover, the wildest sort of wildcat speculation among manufacturers has already appeared. Such a situation too has a decidedly bad effect upon laborers. The employer hesitates to enforce any standards, for positions are easily secured and labor is drifting from one calling to another at will, and loafing between times. One store was compelled to employ over 1,200 new workers during November to replace those who had left. The steel trade estimates this year's output at about 85 per cent of last year's, notwithstanding increased demands and facilities. Our government is asking for some 100,000,000 feet of spruce lumber, urgently needed for airplanes, as against an annual average cut of 33,000,000 feet. It is now getting spruce at the rate of a little over 40,000,000 feet, or about one-third of the necessary minimum, while the outlook for the next three months is that not over 60 per cent of the old average will be cut. This calls for radical change. Not only should there be registration of labor and elimination of idlers, but strikes (lockouts as well) must be forbidden and strikers treated as traitors. This must not be construed as a defense for the maintenance of inadequate wages or of bad living conditions. If the government controls, it must provide decent conditions. It must not be checked on the other hand by such agreements as that of the Lumberman's Protective League, which punishes by a fine of $500 per day all firms operating on an eight-hour basis. It should be free to insist upon an eight-hour day if that seems best. In other words, it must seek to provide those conditions which produce the greatest results with least friction.

Perhaps the greatest problem in our industry is the food supply. Food is becoming a scarce article in this world and will be much scarcer in our country in another year unless labor is provided for agriculture. Unless this is done, I do not see how the farmers can cultivate as much ground another year. The farm agent in Lehigh County, Pennsylvania, states that in that county there are now

forty-five abandoned farms of forty acres or over, and over one hundred partially abandoned, the farmers having entered industry, though still living on the farms. The labor shortage in agriculture in Lehigh County is now over 1,200.

It is already evident that women are to enter into many new industries and into old ones in larger numbers. I cannot discuss the new problems that this will create, but I am convinced that something must soon be done with, let us say, the stores which continue to employ able-bodied men in such arduous tasks as the drawing of soda water.

Education.—The future of the country must be considered as well as the present. Only direct necessity can justify the withdrawal of the pupils from the schools. The loss of students in our colleges is marked, and there are many indications that the enrolment in our high schools is falling. The demand is already heard that child-labor laws should be weakened and children put to work. Are we so ignorant of what happened in England at the outbreak of the war? The English experience should demonstrate how essential it is to maintain these standards. This may be a good time to try to dovetail school and industry. Girard College is trying the experiment of working groups of boys in some factory for two weeks at a time, one group being replaced by another, so that the employer can count on a given force. Dayton, Ohio, is doing much the same with groups of high-school boys. Many such experiments might be made. I think in general that students should stay in school till their presence elsewhere is clearly needed. I think, however, it is time to begin the careful discussion of changes in our school programs which this war may make necessary.

Religion.—It is perhaps a trite observation to say that this war is making us think of the important rather than the trivial things of life. For this very reason it is unfortunate that war tends to destroy the age-long concept of a loving heavenly Father and to reintroduce the worship of tribal gods. As the president of Union Theological Seminary has recently said:

> To the person interested in religion and convinced of its worth, one of the saddest things about the present war is the widespread disrepute into

which Christianity has fallen. Men were never more in need of religion and more eager for it than now. In every time of sore crisis they turn instinctively to it for comfort and strength; but unhappily the Christian religion (the only religion of most Europeans and Americans) has sadly lost credit in many quarters as a result of the war. It has lost, for one thing, because—as is alleged—it proved so impotent to prevent the war, or rather, because it made so little effort to prevent it. It has lost credit also because it has been for the most part simply the creature of the various warring nations, lending its support equally to the rival purposes and the hostile measures of each group of combatants. This would be no discredit, rather a ground of commendation, to a merely national faith, to a German or a French or a British religion, but it is the most serious indictment of a religion that claims to be universal, whose God is the God of the whole earth and whose fundamental tenet is that all men are his children and brothers one of another.

One lamentable consequence of prostituting a religion like Christianity to exclusively national ends is the necessity of attributing irreligion and hypocrisy to all one's enemies. The resulting arrogance and censoriousness of judgment make the conflict worse than it would otherwise be and lead some men to think Christianity a curse to the world instead of a blessing.

To some extent, doubtless, this feeling is offset by the practical work of the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the Y.M.C.A., the Knights of Columbus, and similar organizations, but it still remains a serious problem.

The state.—From this brief paper I must omit all questions as to the influence of the war upon the state as such but certain aspects must be mentioned. Justified as we have been in our faith in the "melting-pot," in our assumption that mere residence here made a man an American, nevertheless, it seems clear that we have not done our full duty by the immigrant. The time to bring him into our schools and teach him English is before, not after, he appears in the training camp of the army. The exploitation to which he has been subjected, the indifference of the so-called better classes to his condition, have often created in him an attitude toward the country quite different from that we expect to see in the patriot. Leaving the anti-American propaganda of Germany out of the question, it is most deplorable that we have failed to see and understand the inevitable reaction to the disgraceful conditions of life and labor which Professor Parker in the November *Atlantic* emphasizes as lying at the bottom of the psychology of the I.W.W. It is time that we laid the foundations

of democracy, not in rhetorical phrases, but on the solid rock of a decent standard of life. Nor do we fully realize, I fear, the extent to which our belief in democracy has been sensibly affected by the presence of the Indian, the Negro, and the recent immigrant in the great industrial centers. Either we consider these peoples part of our great democracy or else we have shifted to a class philosophy of government.

Personal rights.—Social control is exercised by that great complex of folkways, public opinion, quite as much as by organized agencies like the state. Sometimes this extra-legal control is exercised independently, sometimes in combination with the state. Now war brings an emotional crisis as well as an intellectual problem. When our patriotism becomes self-conscious we grow suspicious of him who does not shout so loudly as we ourselves. We are likely to react violently to the careless, chance remark which indicates a different viewpoint or opinion of some event, particularly if the speaker chances to be of German descent. Take the case of Fritz Kreisler. Here is an Austrian who for years has been our honored guest and who has touched both hearts and pocketbooks by his playing. Neither in word nor in deed, so far as I know, has he given cause for offense. Yet, because his country is now at war with us, he is under the ban. Has our vaunted civilization so little hold on us that we must vent our spite on such a man? If so, then we are perilously near the brute after all.

If we cannot treat courteously the man who digs in our mines or plays in our orchestras because his country is now at war with us, what hope is there of giving a square deal to those Americans who differ from the majority, honestly, and say so, honestly? Personally, I was ashamed of my country so long as our leaders failed to see that a great moral issue was at stake on which we had to take sides or abandon the cause of freedom. Yet I believe that this war is showing the limitations of nationalism in the world as they have never been revealed before and showing therefore the need of a league of nations of some sort to fight for the preservation of peace if need be. There is, it seems to me, great danger that in our desire to conquer our enemies we sacrifice, need-

lessly, our own belief in, and practice of, freedom. I believe our chief danger comes from those who talk about the wholesale killing of great peoples and the destruction of great nations rather than from those who try to love their enemies as well as God. I cannot repress the feeling that we were so slow in stating clearly the issues that we are partially to blame for the failure of many citizens to understand. I am sure that the extreme statements of some among our allies have but cemented the countries and peoples of the enemy.

Norman Angell has summarized this situation so far as England is concerned in a recent pamphlet, "Why Freedom Matters." He thinks that many of the most dangerous measures adopted have been political rather than military and inaugurated, not because of present needs, but by a desire to make them permanent.

> Their gravity does not arise from the individual hardship they inflict, but from the fact that the habit of subservience to state authority in matters of opinion which they set up tends to destroy in the individual that capacity for private judgment in politics by which alone, in the last analysis, a democracy is able to rule itself. The destruction of the right of private judgment involves finally the destruction of the capacity for public judgment. The habit of irresponsible power on the one side and docile subservience on the other must finally make impossible that moral atmosphere in which alone the general instinct for self-government can survive and develop.

In another paragraph he says:

> I am suggesting that in the stress and preoccupation of war we are ourselves destroying needlessly that which we accuse the enemy of desiring to destroy and that in so doing we tend to make impossible that better world which we were to have secured by our triumph. I do not suggest that such a failure is any necessary part of victory, but that it will come because the temper and ideals that war and victory in the absence of great vigilance are almost certain to arouse are likely to swamp—indeed are now swamping—the temper and ideas essential to a free society and what goes with it.

So far as I know we have not reached the time in this country when men like Bertrand Russell are silenced by the government, but there are many indications of a growing intolerance which is to be deplored. Are we not blind when we condemn the intellectuals of Germany for their subserviency, when we eagerly applaud the opposition of Professor Foerster, and when we wonder

if Liebknecht does not represent a rising tide of popular indignation, and then condemn those among us who disbelieve in the philosophy of the sword? Time was when education could be taught at the end of a hickory stick, when the husband might beat his wife, when the church could execute heretics. These days have passed. Is not this very war making clear the futility of the "wager of war" among the nations? The exercise of force in terms of bayonet and sword does not account for the acceptance by the Germans of their present national beliefs. Mind, not matter, is responsible. Our President deserves no small credit for his emphasis on our desire to achieve freedom for the masses of our present enemies as well as for our own nations. We must not forget the possibility of our emerging from the conflict, whether defeated or victorious, as an oligarchy rather than a democracy. This is no small matter.

As I see it, then, the fundamental question which we should keep in mind concerns the goal for which we are striving. Are we seeking the "enchained man," who believes what he is told, thinks as directed, acts as ordered, or the association of free men, held together by moral bonds, striving and co-operating for the good of all, for the democracy of the world? If the latter, then must we fight with all our might, with sword and gun if need be. Let us not sacrifice, however, our dream of the day when peace shall dawn on earth and good-will to men.

DISCUSSION

Lucile Eaves, Women's Educational and Industrial Union, Boston, Massachusetts.

Professor Kelsey's comprehensive survey of the social and economic effects of war begins by reminding us of the changed personal outlook which we are acquiring. Our past point of view has been much like that of a certain old lady recently interviewed by one of my investigators. Several flights of tenement stairs were climbed to reach the attic quarters of the mother of the young woman about whom information was sought. The visitor, who was well coached in the arts of "painless extraction" of information, presented the subject in her most engaging manner and then proposed to fill the schedule blank. But the shrewd old lady promptly closed the interview with this ultimatum,

"Well, I can't see that all this is going to do me any good, and the Lord can take care of the rest of the folks." Evidently she belonged to a past generation! Such wholesale abdications in favor of the Almighty are no longer possible to those who are developing the new sense of social responsibility which has been described in the paper.

Social control that must be exercised in connection with the reorganization of our economic activities has received the chief emphasis in Professor Kelsey's discussion. I feel that the title of the paper might well be amended to read, "After the War a Crisis in Social Control," for the gravest problems will arise immediately after the disbanding of our armies. The war is in itself a powerful means of social control. When the pleas of patriotism and military necessity can no longer be used, we will have need of new agencies to assist in making the difficult readjustments which will be required in order to make industry safe for democracy. Great Britain, our ally and chief economic rival, is developing what appear to be agencies adequate for meeting this crisis. In both countries the extension of the franchise will increase the power of the labor vote, and the war experiences will give force to the demands for a more democratic distribution of economic goods. Yet prices are likely to be high for years to come, and heavy burdens of taxation must be adjusted to the backs of those best able to carry them. For a period, at least, there is danger of a grave problem of unemployment. The new British Labor party which will be formed next month promises to be an effective agency for winning proper recognition of the needs of wage-earners. Co-operative societies which assist three and a half million persons to obtain the necessities of life at minimum cost will unite with a Trade Union Congress which represents four and a half million organized wage-earners. This new Labor party will welcome all individuals who sympathize with its aims and wish to assist in the tasks of economic readjustment made necessary by the war. If this new party does not control a parliamentary majority it will at least have sufficient strength to give effective expression to the needs of British wage-earners.

We in the United States have lagged behind Great Britain in the recognition of a democratic control of industry, and there seems at present no prospect of the development of adequate agencies for an orderly expression of the economic needs of the after-the-war period. The recent supreme court decision sustaining the injunction forbidding the efforts to unionize the coal miners of West Virginia places the American labor movement in a position more precarious than that of the British trade unions between the Taff Vale decision of 1901 and the Trade Union act of 1906. Our labor difficulties during the war have sprung rather from a fear of the weakening of the trade unions, which are the wage-earners' agencies for economic control, than from a desire for increased wages, as intelligent and farsighted labor leaders foresee the perils of this after-the-war crisis. Economically the United States will be where today Russia is politically: wage-earners will have unlimited social power without generally accepted agencies for its orderly expression.

Miss Breckinridge, in her scholarly presentation of "Social Control of Child Welfare," has shown us that it has taken a century and a half of effort to develop agencies which promise to give some measure of reality to the legal fiction which declared a child's right to maintenance, education, and protection. It is difficult to add to her discussion of what has been accomplished, and so I will outline briefly some needs of the future. Your attention is called to a second legal fiction which should receive consideration. The law assumes that young persons become capable of undertaking the responsibilities of adults when eighteen or twenty-one years of age, yet society fails to give adequate guidance and protection during the adolescent period. Reports of recent extensive investigations make it evident that some of our gravest social and economic problems have their roots in the experiences of sixteen- to twenty-one-year-old wage-earners. The British Royal Commissioners on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress declared that they regarded "the perpetual recruitment of the unemployables by tens of thousands of boys, who, through neglect to provide them with suitable industrial training, may almost be said to graduate into unemployment as a matter of course, as perhaps the gravest of all grave facts which this Commission has laid bare."[1] The report of an intensive study of irregularity of employment made for the New York Factory Investigation Commission[2] declares that the failure of employers to organize their business so that employment will be on a sounder basis is due chiefly to the fact that large numbers of young persons, partially supported by their families, are available for seasonal employment. Many fields where social control of adolescents is needed have been revealed by the investigations which I have directed during the past three years. My time will permit only a brief summary of three of the most imperative of these needs.

That the adequate nourishment of young working women is a fit source for social control is evident from the results of our study of the *Food of Working Women in Boston*. Over half of the females fourteen to twenty-one years of age, living in the eight largest cities of the United States, are wage-earners.[3] Young girls go forth to sell to strangers the labor power of their tender, immature bodies. The obligation of the public to supply opportunity for a hot and nourishing noon meal to secondary-school students is generally recognized; yet the nutritional needs of the student are much less urgent than those of the young wage-earner. We found that among working women the facilities for obtaining proper food were in an inverse ratio to the nutritional needs. The younger

[1] *Minority Report, Royal Commission on Poor Law and Relief of Distress*, XXXVII (1909), 1167. See also Cyril Jackson's "Report on Boy Labor in London and Certain Other Towns," Appendix XX, Vol. XLIV.

[2] I. O. Andrews, "The Relation of Irregular Employment to the Living Wage for Women," *Fourth Report of the Factory Investigating Commission*, II (New York, 1915), 523–25.

[3] *The Food of Working Women in Boston*, p. 14.

women required food for both growth and maintenance, their occupations demanded more physical exertion than those of older women, and the work day was longer, yet their wages were lower, their noon period shorter, and assistance in obtaining a nourishing noon luncheon much less.[1]

The unusual physical strain to which these mothers of the next generation are subject gains peculiar significance at this national crisis. One of the first and ablest of the British discussions of the fields and agencies of social control made necessary by the war is found in the paper dealing with statistical inquiries needed after the war in connection with eugenics, by Leonard P. Darwin, presented at the February, 1916, meeting of the Royal Statistical Society.[2] The selective power of war is revealed in his figures showing the tendency to enlist well-endowed men and the higher death-rates of young officers. I hesitate to suggest that before many months the United States may be grieving over the same sad losses which threaten to impair the racial qualities of the European populations. Fortunately the female is as potent as the male for the continuance of desirable racial traits. Lester F. Ward has pointed out the wide distribution of talent and the important part played by environment and education in the development of genius.[3] The half of the female population who go forth in their youth to serve society will marry earlier and bear more children than the half who lead more sheltered lives, and so the future racial integrity demands a social control that shall safeguard the physical well-being of wage-earning girlhood.

Guidance in selecting and preparing for a wage-earning vocation is the second field of social control in the interests of the adolescent wage-earner to which I wish to call attention. Its need has been recognized in the British Education (Choice of Employment) act of 1910 and in the rapid development in the United States of vocational guidance and school placement. Even in communities where much attention has been given to this need, the agencies are inadequate and the results wasteful of youthful energy and interest. Thus the records of the Boston Placement Bureau show distressing discrepancies between opportunities for employment in certain occupations and the numbers of young persons who have prepared themselves to enter them.[4] That there

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 162.

[2] Leonard Darwin, "On the Statistical Inquiries Needed after the War in Connection with Eugenics," *Royal Statistical Society*, LXXIX (March, 1916), 159–75.

[3] *Applied Sociology*, chaps. viii–x.

[4] Eighty-three per cent of the orders for boys request that they shall be sixteen years of age or older, 22 per cent of these requests are for industrial work and 54 per cent for clerical positions; 48 per cent of the boys have prepared for industrial and 28 per cent for clerical positions. Girls sixteen years of age or over are requested in 87 per cent of the orders for females; 35 per cent of the positions offered are in factories and only 25 per cent are clerical, while 23 per cent of the girls prefer industrial and 42 per cent choose clerical work.

is a social obligation to assist the young, not only with vocational training which will make possible honorable self-support, but also with the guidance necessary for adjustment to our complex economic conditions, seems evident from our assumption of irresponsibility during the years of legal minority.

Our investigations have made evident also the need of assisting the young wage-earner in making his wage contract. The difficulties experienced by adults in securing an equitable wage contract have led to extensive plans of organization and endless controversy. Our Boston studies furnish abundant evidence of the universal inability of young persons to command a living wage. This is true even though the majority of those placed are over sixteen and have received more or less secondary or vocational training. If it were possible to develop social agencies which would supply guidance and instruction that would enable young men to establish family ties when adult years are reached, most of our social problems would be solved.

Miss Breckinridge's paper reveals in a striking way our failure to standardize the agencies for social control in the interests of child welfare. It has occurred to me that here is an opportunity for sociological research. Five years ago our society appointed a committee for the purpose of promoting unified investigations. It was proposed that the many college teachers in our ranks should direct their students in the study of subjects of public interest, and that the results of such investigations should be brought together by the central committee, so that valuable data would be given permanent form. The death of Professor C. R. Henderson, the chairman of the committee, prevented the carrying out of this plan. A study, in accordance with definite standards, of agencies for promoting the social ends set forth in Miss Breckinridge's paper would be a suitable task for such a committee.

Some of us whose spirits are still youthful and valiant feel aggrieved that our gray hairs betray the fact that we no longer are of the age desired for the front trenches, but these efforts to devise agencies which shall make possible an effective utilization of the social forces aroused by this great national crisis are equally indispensable. The self-sacrifice, the economy in utilization of resources, and the capacity for organized activities developed during the war should not be wasted. We must discover the agencies which will make industry safe for democracy, must standardize the means of safeguarding our racial integrity, and must demonstrate to the world that the freedom of the individual is not inconsistent with the efficiency of the nation.

Charles W. Coulter, Western Reserve University

Professor Kelsey, in his sane and comprehensive paper on "War as a Crisis in Social Control," has opened up a field as broad as society itself and indicated the almost limitless ramifications of the subject. The restricted longitude of such a paper, however, prevents more than an outline treatment, and I

assume the discussions are intended to fill in the minor details or to have the facts considered from a slightly different standpoint.

One cannot close his eyes to the obvious social changes, industrial, educational, religious, and political, which are shown to have already taken place, to say nothing of the abrogation of personal rights, and the coercion of the individual to be loyal, even in his thinking, to his group, to sacrifice for it, to think of outsiders with hatred and contempt, but of those within in terms of brotherhood. It is worth while, however, to notice the character of the controls and where, in the exigency of war, they ultimately rest.

An evolution of society is constantly in progress. Variations in social forms are continually occurring. In general, those best adapted become the norms, but, as Sumner has shown (*War*, p. 32), societal selection is prevented from conditioning out the untested variations by reason of "social prejudice, monopoly, privilege, orthodoxy, traditions, popular delusion," and many other restraints. Thus some of the unverified theories persist and are ready to hand for another trial under the stimulus and pressure of war. Take for example the government's control of railways, its direction of mining operations, and other industrial activities. These are in no sense new programs. Certain groups have long and consistently advocated them as correctives for social maladjustments. Such variations, tried and untried, are in the peace-group, and the crisis of war permits but a rude, hurried, and frequently imperfect selection *de novo* among them.

There is always an assumption of power and a popular willingness to repose control in the political, executive, or military authorities, who are made thereby the agents of such a selection. Sentiments of patriotism prevent organized objection to any feasible experiment being tried, so that the pendulum may swing to the extreme limit through the adoption of untried expedients. One does not have to go back to France's internecine combats of revolutionary days nor into the contemporary Russian situation for evidence of this fact. It is abundantly illustrated in our creation of a food directorate which fails to direct, a fuel controller who finds it possible only indifferently to control, a series of government agreements with manufacturers fixing the prices of such commodities as sugar with no reference to exportation prices, which has rendered our situation in this particular most acute. The government's attempted control of the private shipbuilding industry by the creation of an emergency fleet corporation is another case in point. Mr. Hard seems to think (*New Republic*, XIII, 114) that despite its overwhelming expenditures of the nation's money, through the shortsighted policy of governmental competition in the labor market, it has actually reduced the total tonnage output of America's merchant marine below what it normally would have been, thereby occasioning an irreparable loss for this first and probably most urgent year of our shipping need.

The danger attending the adoption of untried expedients in government control is also to be seen in our belated legislation providing for a tax on excess

profits, which has tended to encourage the manipulation of accounts so as to bring inadequate returns in revenue. The law necessarily has suffered such local interpretation that, to preserve any semblance of its former identity, it will have to be consistently modified by supreme court decision or be amended. Nor is the adoption of these measures to control society in war time unique to America. France and Britain have already passed through the refining fire.

The facts combine to show that in all belligerent countries governmental control, to be relatively complete and to carry with it the co-operation of the people, must be in essential harmony with the self-maintenence *mores* of the group. In other words, governmental action, because it is in a secondary field, must conform to what is popularly found to be expedient. This applies directly to state control of labor. If America desires to keep a contented, efficient, and at the same time highly-geared industrial organization behind her fighting men in Europe—and we confidently hope she may, for this war must be carried to a successful issue—it will not be by legislation or a wholesale conscription of labor (for that necessarily means a degree of subsidization on the one hand or of exploitation on the other), but by an honest and much more facile use of those government agencies which already exist or the creation of others for easing threatening labor disputes.

The impotence of the secondary social institutions to hold and exercise adverse control over that which has to do with self-maintenance is evidenced also by the recent changes in religion. If, within the last three years, there has not been a reversion to a more primitive tribal type, as Professor Kelsey seems to think, the exponents of religion have at least changed front with surprising facility. Two of our most prominent religious leaders at a community patriotic meet this year in Cleveland urged their hearers not to lose faith in religion because of its failure as an antidote for war; then, inconsistently enough, they proceeded on grounds of religious duty to justify our participation in the struggle. That sequence is the best possible argument for the success of religion. The failure of an institution, as of an organism, lies in its lack of adaptation to changing life-conditions. Success is measurable only in terms of adaptation. History shows that no religious concept has been absolute; no religious organization entirely permanent; all have slowly changed. The recent speedy change in the attitude of religion to war, that it might keep pace with the changing conditions, seems to us the best possible evidence of its right to survive.

There is but one logical thing for the exponents of religion to do, if they are concerned with its perpetuation by a group engaged in war, and that is to facilitate its adjustment in form and content to the changed conditions. Automatically, if it persists, it will sanction the new *mores* which arise. We ought to face another fact also. In the measure that religion becomes adapted to belligerent groups, it strengthens their purpose, and in so doing may actually prolong the war. That which makes it a stabilizing influence in peace time makes it equally the defender of the *status quo* in time of war.

Only this fact could relieve the Church Peace Union and the League to Enforce Peace from a suspicion of irony when, three days ago, they announced their joint intention of immediately participating in a "Win the War" campaign. It sheds some light also on the action of those who have been quite unjustly condemning Drs. Manning, Hillis, Van Dyke, and other formerly peaceful religious shepherds for "their wild whirling words in justification of war" (*New Republic*, XIII, 127). Such critics display an arrogant ignorance of the nature of religion, the history of its institutions in past crises, and the character of its modern exponents. There is much more danger that an anomalous situation may develop in which our essentially peaceful religious institutions, after their more complete adaptation to war conditions, may persist unduly long and fail quickly to readapt themselves to reversed conditions.

So it would seem that religion, basically, does not condition war but is conditioned by it. Far from being a failure because it did not avert or does not stop war, its speedy adaptation, from the standpoint of the sociologist, is the best evidence of its success.

We may say, then, with reference to social control in war time, that the government or military authorities are intrusted with the task of making a hurried selection among existing social variations. The best expedients are arrived at by a process of trial and error, and thenceforth they become the norms. But only those which are compatible with the *mores* of society's postbellum industrial organization will be intrenched with any degree of permanency. As a device for centralizing control we can say with Sumner (*War*, p. 35), "War is a regrettable makeshift, and it is the task of the statesman to find rational means to the same end. Any statesman who proposes a war as an instrumentality admits his incompetency."

EDITH ABBOTT, CHICAGO SCHOOL OF CIVICS AND PHILANTHROPY

Although I do not wholly agree to what has been said upon the subject of industrial control, I have preferred not to spend the few minutes allotted to me in disagreeing with other speakers but rather in adding certain facts as to the effect of the war upon some of the social problems that were with us in the days of the old peace and may be expected to be with us again in the days of the new and better peace that we are seeking.

Members of this Association must share with those actively engaged in social work a deep interest in the effect of the war upon such questions. Too often the policies of our social agencies are formulated after a haphazard fashion to meet an immediate and pressing need. It would seem to be our duty, however, to attempt to forecast the social changes that must come with the war, and more important still the social changes that peace will bring, in order that they may be met with adequate forethought and preparation. In particular, it seems worth while to take note of English experience as to the effect of

war, since England is the belligerent nation with social conditions most like our own.

First as to the effect of the war on pauperism and destitution. In a sense we in America have, of course, been in the war from the beginning, and the first shock of the great mobilization in the summer of 1914 was felt not only in Europe but here in the United States, where unemployment became very acute. We shared with England and with the whole world the great problem of destitution that was the immediate result of the industrial changes and readjustment that followed the outbreak of hostilities. It is in part due to this circumstance that no immediate increase in destitution followed our own formal declaration of war last spring.

In England, on the other hand, there was a sudden rise in pauperism caused by the social and industrial disorganization of August, 1914. A Government Committee on the Prevention and Relief of Distress was appointed, the country was organized under local representative committees, and a national Relief Fund was opened. But the distress was only temporary, and the figures for the first year of the war showed a decline in the number of paupers, which has continued down to the present month with occasional seasonal fluctuations. Especially noteworthy has been the decline of the pauper rate for London. But decreases are noted also in the rates from England and Wales and Scotland and Ireland. I shall, however, forbear giving the figures.

Evidence of the decline of pauperism is also to be found in the great reduction in the number of children given free dinners at school. The last report of the Chief Medical Officer of the Board of Education comments on this point as follows:

> Before the war the average number of children fed per annum was approximately 150,000. It rose during the year 1914–15 to the great figure of 422,000, and it fell during the year 1916–17 from 422,000 to 64,000. A further sign of the better condition of the people is that when the children cannot be fed at home, the parents can pay for their meals at school, and in the last two years the parents' contributions for this purpose have risen from £3,000 to more than £11,000.

England, however, is not living in a fool's paradise, and it is recognized on all sides that this prosperity will end when peace comes. As we look back now, it seems to be true that England has been laying careful plans ever since the very beginning of the war for the readjustment that must follow demobilization. These plans in the first place are for the care of the discharged soldier, and a series of proposals have been agreed to for assisting the soldier back to civil employment, including insurance against unemployment valid for one year. The munition workers who will be unemployed by the thousands at the coming of peace have also been provided for by an amendment of 1916 to the Unemployed Insurance act, which has been extended to all persons engaged in manufacturing munitions or those employed in such trades as chemicals, metals, rubber, leather, brick and saw-milling.

That is, England's new motto seems to be "In time of war prepare for peace," and in the midst of the most gigantic war efforts the world has yet known, preparations are being made for the coming peace, in order that those who shall have borne the battle and the labor of providing munitions for the battle shall not be in a position of acute distress when the war is over.

The subject of crime after the war is also giving cause for anxiety. It appears that the war has brought about a great decrease of adult crime as well as of pauperism, but in England and in France too there is no blinking the fact that the beginning of peace will produce a great increase in arrests and convictions.

Interesting testimony on this point may be found in the last report of the Commissioners of Prisons for England and Wales; and for France, our *American Journal of Sociology* recently summarized the very significant article contributed by Professor Roux of the University of Dijon to the *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, calling attention to the fact that after-war conditions would almost inevitably lead to a serious increase in crime.

One must admit, says Professor Roux, that war does not develop the virtues of peace. War is a school of courage and of sacrifice. It is not a school that teaches respect for the person or the property of others. The men will come back from these years of war with a new outlook. The habit they have formed of violent solutions and of acts of force will render it more difficult for them to remain honest, and the horrors of war will have rendered them more or less unstable.

Up to the present the United States has suffered less and sacrificed less in the war than any other nation belligerent or neutral in the Western World. But in France and England, where the burdens of the war have been so heavy, there has been added a great concern over the conditions of the new peace that is coming. In both of these countries there is said to be "emulation of the spirit of the architects of Belgium at work in their exile redesigning their cities after new and nobler plans"; English writers like Professor Patrick Geddes, Victor Branford, and Dr. Gilbert Slater (see *Ideas at War* and the *Coming Polity*) in forecasting the "coming polity" point out that the new peace must be a better peace than that which is now gone forever. They refuse to look forward to a time when the horrors of war shall be followed by "the tragedies of a peace in which the world struggles under a crushing burden of debt and poverty toward some melancholy future." They look forward to the "after-war task, not as a return to the peace we have left forever (which was not peace at all but thinly disguised, latent, and potential war), but as a further step, an upward progress." In reply to the challenge, "How are you going to reconstruct? How are you going to get the money—when so much will have been spent and the burden of debt will rest so heavily upon us all?" they answer that "we do not reconstruct with money but with life; with the life and labour of the future and not with the savings of the past." We shall be impoverished, it is true, they say, but when we no longer divide our wealth between

creature comforts and munitions, as in the recent past and present, we shall find our resources ample for greater achievements than in our days of fat utilitarian prosperity (and its heavy war insurance).

There are other groups in England actively studying the possible methods of social reconstruction after the war. The little book called the *Hope of Society*, published early in the present year, with essays by Mr. J. A. Hobson, Mr. Heath of Toynbee Hall, and others of somewhat radical tendencies, shows how seriously the coming of peace is regarded and how hopefully these English social reformers look forward to a new and better England coming out of the terrible years of sacrifice and endurance. For example, there are to be new claims for state aid, particularly in so far as the welfare of children is concerned. Sir George Newman, the distinguished chief medical officer of the Board of Education and chairman of the Health of Munition Workers Committee, says in his recently issued annual report:

> "The European War has given new emphasis to the importance of the child as a primary asset. The future and strength of the nation unquestionably depend upon the vitality of the child, upon his health and development, and upon his education, and equipment for citizenship. Great and far-reaching issues have their origin and some of their inspiration in him."

In the old days, the report continues, "the school authorities received and handed on the child as a 'bird of passage.' Now in searching more deeply for methods of protecting the school child, the authorities are extending their activities to the care of the child before he comes to school, and equally they are asking for further powers to protect him after he leaves school to enter industry."

Other signs of the times are the very vigorous administration of Mr. H. A. L. Fisher as president of the Board of Education, the proposals for a Ministry of Health indorsed now by the President of the Board of Education and the President of the Local Government Board, and the proposals for further state activity in housing reform. Public opinion in Great Britain has expressed itself on numerous occasions as to the importance of entering upon a new and active campaign for better houses. Soldiers who have fought the nation's battles, it is said, must not return to slum houses and dug-outs. As the President of the Local Government Board declared, England cannot let her soldiers come back from the water-logged trenches to dwellings that are little better than pigsties, and the recent report of the Royal Commission on Housing in Scotland emphasizes this point. A hopeful newspaper correspondent said that as the great fire once purged London from the plague, so the great war may clear the nations of its slums.

If in the past three years England has found time for an Official Committee and Ministry of Reconstruction, it is surely not too much to hope that here in America, in the midst of our stirring preparations for war, we shall find some time likewise to make provisions for peace. For the war may bring with it a

great opportunity for remaking the whole of our battered social fabric, but only if we have so concerned ourselves with the making of the future that we shall be alert to seize the opportunity when it finally arrives. The distinguished French scholar who spoke yesterday at the American Historical Association referred to the historians as "professors of hope." Is it too much to expect that sociologists may also become "professors of hope," and that they may discover the way into new paths of social progress?

PRIMITIVE INDIVIDUAL ASCENDANCY

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In the preface to *Social Control* Professor Ross declares that he began the work with the idea that "nearly all the goodness and conscientiousness" by which a community is held together can be traced to social influences. Further investigation, however, appeared to show "that the personality freely unfolding under conditions of healthy fellowship may arrive at a goodness all its own, and that order is explained partly by this streak in human nature and partly by the influence of social surroundings." Since these words were written, more than sixteen years ago, something has been done, here and there, to set forth the actual contribution made by the "great man" to the society of which he forms a unit, but we still await the appearance of a work on "Individual Ascendancy" as comprehensive, original, and path-breaking as was *Social Control.*[1]

Sociologists have long been used to thinking of savage and barbarous peoples as firmly fixed in a "cake of custom." Such changes as occur in primitive society take place, we are told, not as the result of deliberate innovation, but rather in the way that fashions alter among ourselves, by scarcely purposive drifting. The crowd, rather than the individual, does the thinking. Émile Durkheim and his followers in the *L'Année sociologique* go even further and see in the individual merely a product of social environment, the passive subject of social compulsion. *L'individu n'exist pas.* This ant-hill or beehive philosophy, it must be acknowledged, finds

[1] On the anthropological aspects of the subject see particularly Eben Mumford, "The Origins of Leadership," *American Journal of Sociology*, XII (1906–7), 216–40, 367–97, 500–531; A. Vierkandt, "Führende Individuen bei den Naturvölkern," *Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft*, XI (1908), 542–53, 623–39; Barbara Freire-Marreco, "Authority in Uncivilized Society," *Sociological Review*, I (1908), 330–47; and W. D. Wallis, "Individual Initiative and Social Compulsion," *American Anthropologist*, N.S., XVII (1915), 647–65.

some confirmation in the accounts of uncivilized peoples which we have received from travelers as well as from trained anthropologists. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that closer acquaintance with primitive groups will show that they are very susceptible to the force of personality, that they do contain their share of eminent men, and that social progress, even in the lower culture, has been largely influenced by conscious leadership.

Some insight into the process of social change is afforded by recent investigations in aboriginal Australia. Here a hereditary chieftainship is all but absent, and government generally assumes the form of a gerontocracy. Headmen of totemic and local groups, magicians, and old men of recognized importance form councils, in which all matters affecting the tribe as a whole are debated and decided. At such meetings it seems probable that innovations in custom may be introduced.

Spencer and Gillen write of the Central Australians:

> We have already pointed out that there are certain men who are especially respected for their ability, and, after watching large numbers of the tribe, at a time when they were assembled together for months to perform certain of their most sacred ceremonies, we have come to the conclusion that at a time such as this, when the older and more powerful men from various groups are met together, and when day by day and night by night around their camp fires they discuss matters of tribal interest, it is quite possible for changes of custom to be introduced. . . . . It must, however, be understood that we have no definite proof to bring forward of the actual introduction by this means of any fundamental change of custom. The only thing that we can say is that, after carefully watching the natives during the performance of their ceremonies and endeavoring as best we could to enter into their feelings, to think as they did, and to become for the time being one of themselves, we came to the conclusion that if one or two of the most powerful men settled upon the advisability of introducing some change, even an important one, it would be quite possible for this to be agreed upon and carried out. That changes have been introduced, in fact, are still being introduced, is a matter of certainty; the difficulty to be explained is, how in face of the rigid conservatism of the native, which may be said to be one of his leading features, such changes can possibly even be mooted. The only possible chance is by means of the old men, and, in the case of the Arunta people, amongst whom the local feeling is very strong, they have opportunities of a special nature.[1]

[1] Spencer and Gillen, *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia* (London, 1897), pp. 12 ff.

The personal initiative of the Australian magician also assumes considerable importance. The magician is one of the principal leaders of Australian society, and among the southeastern tribes he is often, sometimes invariably, the headman. Concerning these tribes Howitt, than whom there is no better authority, writes as follows:

> They universally believe that their deceased ancestors and kindred visit them during sleep, and counsel or warn them against dangers, or communicate to them song-charms against magic. I have known many such cases, and I also know that the medicine-men see visions that are to them realities. Such a man, if of great repute in his tribe, might readily bring about a social change, by announcing to his fellow medicine-men a command received from some supernatural being such as Kutchi of the Dieri, Bunjil of the Wurunjerri, or Daramulun of the Coast Murring. If they received it favorably, the next step might be to announce it to the assembled headmen at one of the ceremonial gatherings as a supernatural command, and this would be accepted as true without question by the tribes-people.[1]

That modifications of Australian customs have been made through individual agency is suggested by some native legends. Thus, almost every tribe studied by Spencer and Gillen has a tradition of certain persons who first introduced the stone knife for use in circumcision in place of the firestick, which previously had often caused the deaths of young men at initiation.[2] Similarly, many tribes ascribe the introduction of the present marriage system to eminent ancestors. Howitt, for instance, gives two legends, one belonging to the Dieri of Central Australia, the other to the Wurunjerri of Southern Victoria, which agree in the essential point that the division of the tribe into two exogamous classes was devised with intent to regulate the relations of the sexes. According to the Dieri story, the several families of ancestral Dieri married in themselves without shame. The result was great confusion and sexual disorder. The elders, observing this, came together to consider how these evils might be avoided. They ordained that the families should be divided and that no member of a segment should marry

[1] A. W. Howitt, *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia* (London, 1904), pp. 89 f.

[2] Spencer and Gillen, *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia* (London, 1904), p. 26.

within it. Accordingly, it was decreed, "Thou grub totem, go to produce crow; thou crow totem, go to produce emu," and so on for the other totems.[1] That such a legend preserves a faithful record of what actually occurred, namely, the deliberate arrangement of the matrimonial classes to prevent the commission of the heinous sin of incest, is the view, not only of first-hand observers of the Australians, but also of so comprehensive a student of primitive society as Sir James Frazer. He thinks that it would hardly be possible to find another human institution which bears more distinctly the impress of deliberate design than the exogamous classes of the Australian aborigines. The arrangement took shape in the minds of a few very intelligent men who by their influence and authority persuaded their fellows to put it into practice.[2]

Occasionally, after much reading of works of travel, one comes upon what Dr. Marett styles an "anthropological biography." A few instances of this sort may be cited, beginning with that of Jalina-piramurana, a headman of an Australian tribe fifty years ago.

During the time I was with them there was only one headman who had supreme control over the whole tribe. From his extremely polished manners and his gestures I named him the Frenchman. He was feared and greatly respected by his own and by the neighboring tribes. Neither his two brothers, both of them inferior to him in bravery and oratorical powers, nor the elder men presumed to interfere with his will or to dictate to the tribe except in minor matters. It was he who decided disputes, and his decisions were received without appeal. Even the neighboring tribes sent messengers to him with presents of bags, pitcheri, red ochre, skins, and other things. He decided when and where the ceremonies of circumcision and initiation should take place. His messengers called together people from a circle of a hundred miles to attend the peace festivals (*mindari*), to attend his councils or in other matters which were considered to affect the welfare of the tribe. I have often been invited to attend his councils when they proposed to celebrate any grand ceremony. He possessed wonderful powers of oratory, making his listeners believe anything he suggested, and at all times ready to execute his commands. His disposition was not naturally cruel or treacherous, as was that of many of the Dieri, but he was, when not excited, kind, considerate, patient, and very hospitable. I never saw anything low or mean in him. As a rule the Dieri,

[1] Howitt, *op. cit.*, pp. 89, 481.

[2] *Totemism and Exogamy* (London, 1910), I, 513 f.; IV, 106, 120 f.

being separated from all but their own relations, speak ill of each other; but I never heard anyone speak of this man Jalina-piramurana but with the greatest respect and even reverence.[1]

By the side of Jalina-piramurana, the Dieri headman, we may place two other figures selected from rude types of society. In his account of the natives of British New Guinea, Dr. Seligmann refers to the case of Geboka Namo as showing how greatly the influence generally wielded by chiefs can be exceeded when a suitable man arises. Geboka Namo is not only head of his own village, but all the members of the eastern section of the Garia tribe, to which he belongs, admit his authority and follow him to war, as they did his father before him. "His father, indeed, was so celebrated a fighter that the neighboring Sinaugolo asked him to lead them in war, and to this day the son Geboka Namo, who is recognized as the war chief of the Sinaugolo as well as of the Garia, exerts a very real influence among the Sinaugolo."[2] The third figure is that of Kuriolv, whom Dr. Rivers declares almost entirely dominated the Todas at the time of his visit in 1902. Kuriolv acted as leader of the Toda council, or *naim*, a deliberative body of five or more members representing various clans. He was very intelligent and enjoyed a reputation for eloquence and great persuasive powers. When persuasion failed, he probably resorted to some kind of intimidation. "He seemed to me," says Dr. Rivers, "to afford an excellent example of the process by which one man may bring about considerable changes in the laws and regulations of a community; though I was told in several instances that the Todas would revert to their old customs as soon as Kuriolv died."[3]

The opening up of the Pacific to European discovery revealed the fact that almost every island had its hereditary chief and that over some of the archipelagos reigned veritable kings. To William Mariner we owe an intimate account of the conditions which pre-

[1] S. Gason, quoted by A. W. Howitt in *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, XX (1891), 65. For Howitt's own account of Jalina-piramurana see *Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, pp. 297 ff.

[2] C. G. Seligmann, *The Melanesians of British New Guinea* (Cambridge, 1910), p. 58, n. 2.

[3] W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas* (London, 1906), pp. 550 ff.

vailed in the Tonga or Friendly Islands during the first decade of the nineteenth century. Mariner, a young Englishman of good birth and fair education, went to sea in the privateer "Port au Prince." After cruising in the Pacific for more than a year the ship put in at one of the Tonga Islands, in the same place where Captain Cook had formerly anchored. Here nearly all the crew were murdered by the natives. For some reason Finau,[1] the chief of Vavau, took a strong fancy to Mariner and gave orders that his life should be preserved. This formed the commencement of a friendship which lasted till Finau's death. Mariner lived within the chief's inclosure, and from one of the latter's wives received instruction in the language and customs of the Tonga people. Finau even adopted Mariner as his own son and admitted him to all his councils.

Finau's character, as a politician, at least in point of ambition and design, may vie with that of any member of more civilized society; he wanted only education and a larger field of action to make himself a thousand times more powerful than he was. Gifted by nature with that amazing grasp of mind which seizes everything within its reach, and then, dissatisfied with what it has obtained, is ever restless in the endeavor to seize more, how dull and irksome must have been to him the dominion of a few islands, which he did not dare to leave to conquer others, lest he should be dispossessed of them by the treachery of chiefs and the fickleness of an undisciplined army. His ever restless and ambitious spirit would frequently vent itself in such expressions as the following: "Oh, that the gods would make me king of England! There is not an island in the whole world, however small, but what I would then subject to my power. The king of England does not deserve the dominion he enjoys; possessed of so many great ships, why does he suffer such petty islands as those of Tonga continually to insult his people with acts of treachery? . . . . None but men of enterprising spirit should be in possession of guns; let such rule the earth, and be those their vassals who can bear to submit to such insults unrevenged."[2]

A few years before Mariner began his enforced sojourn in the Tonga Islands the first English missionaries came to the shores of Tahiti. They soon succeeded in converting the king of the island, Pomare the Second, to Christianity. William Ellis has told us a

[1] Mariner spells the name "Finow."

[2] John Martin, *An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands . . . . from the Extensive Communications of Mr. William Mariner* (Boston, 1820), pp. 251 f.

great deal about this native ruler, who induced his people to destroy their idols and temples and forsake their heathen ways. Pomare learned to read and write, took a keen interest in the art of printing, fostered the establishment of a native missionary society, and promulgated the first Tahitian code of laws.

The conspicuous station Pomare had occupied in the political changes of Tahiti, since the arrival of the missionaries, the prominent part he had taken in the abolition of idolatry, the zeal he had manifested in the establishment of Christianity, and the assistance he had rendered to the missionaries caused a considerable sensation to be experienced among all classes by his death; and as his name is perhaps more familiar to the English reader than that of any other native of the South Sea Islands, some account of his person and character cannot fail to be acceptable. . . . . Tall, and proportionably stout, but not corpulent, his person was commanding, being upwards of six feet high. His head was generally bent forward, and he seldom walked erect. His complexion was not dark, but rather tawny; his countenance rather heavy, though his eyes at times beamed with intelligence. . . . . He was, however, though heavy in his appearance and indolent in his habits, inquisitive, attentive, and more thoughtful perhaps than any other native of the islands;—a keen observer of everything that passed under his notice, although at the time he would not appear to be paying particular regard. He was not only curious and patient in his inquiries, laborious in his researches, but often exhibited a great degree of originality. I have sometimes been in his company, when he has kept a party of chiefs in constant laughter, as much from the coolness with which his expressions were uttered, as the humor they contained. He was not, however, fond of conviviality or society, but appeared to be more at ease when alone, or attended only by one or two favorite chiefs. In mental application Pomare certainly exceeded every other Tahitian; and, had he been free from practices which so banefully retarded his progress, and enjoyed the advantage of a regular and liberal education, there is every reason to believe the development and culture of his intellect would have shown that it was of no inferior order.[1]

From the island-world of the Pacific we turn to South Africa. During the first half of the nineteenth century that part of the Dark Continent witnessed the formation of powerful native kingdoms through the consolidation of Bantu communities. The process began about 1800 in the country now called Zululand, then inhabited by many small tribes. A great man made his appearance in the person of Dingiswayo, chief of the Umtetwa tribe. Suspected, when still a youth, of treasonable designs against his father,

[1] William Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, III (London, 1859), 249 ff.

Dingiswayo took refuge in flight, visited Cape Colony, and witnessed the drilling of European soldiers. The idea then came to him how much his own people might be improved by subjecting them to a similar discipline. After succeeding to the chieftainship, Dingiswayo instituted his military reform. The Umtetwa warriors, who had previously fought in unorganized masses, he formed into regiments (*impis*), subdivided into companies each with its *induna*, or captain. The new system immediately proved its worth in battle, and Dingiswayo acquired dominion over most of the tribes between the Tugela and Pongolo rivers. If native tradition is trustworthy, the new sovereign aimed to be as eminent in peace as in war. He began an extensive trade with the Portuguese at Delagoa Bay; encouraged, by liberal rewards, the arts and crafts of his people; and even established a manufactory where a hundred workmen were employed. This Peter the Great of Zululand was assassinated about 1818.[1]

The work of nation-making in South Africa was now taken up by the Zulu chieftain Chaka (Tsaka), perhaps the most notable figure that has yet appeared in the history of the African race. The Zulus at this time formed a small tribe, without influence and tributary to the Umtetwa. Chaka as a young man served under Dingiswayo and gained such a reputation for valor that he was given the title of *Sigidi*, "Thousand," in reference to the number of the enemy he had slain. After Dingiswayo's death the army raised him to supreme power as chief of the united Umtetwa and Zulu tribes. Chaka now conceived schemes of conquest on an extensive scale. He strengthened the regimental system devised by his predecessor and adopted a new order of battle, the troops being massed in crescent formation with a reserve to strengthen the weakest point. Chaka also substituted the stabbing-assegai for the throwing-assegai, which had been the typical weapon in this part of Africa, and increased the size of the shield so as more completely to protect the body. Military kraals were formed in which the soldiers lived apart from the rest of the community, and young warriors were forbidden to marry until they had distinguished themselves. "The world has probably never seen men trained to

[1] J. Y. Gibson, *The Story of the Zulus* (2d ed., London, 1911), pp. 11 ff.

more perfect obedience. The army—consisting of from forty to fifty thousand soldiers—became a vast machine, entirely under command of its head. There was no questioning, no delay, when an order was issued, for to presume upon either was to court instant death. Most extraordinary tasks were occasionally required of a regiment to prove its efficiency in this respect. At a review an order would be sometimes given which meant death to hundreds, and the jealousy between the regiments was so great that if one hesitated for a moment the others were ready to cut it down."[1]

As might be supposed, Chaka's armies were irresistible. During the two years following his accession, he is said to have deprived two hundred communities of their independence and to have brought half a million people under his sway. By 1820 he had become master of Zululand and Natal, while the terror of the Zulu name was carried far and wide into the interior of the continent. Chaka died in 1828, but other Zulu leaders followed in his footsteps, so that the original state of autonomy of the Bantu tribes was replaced by kingdoms over the larger part of South Africa.

The genius of Francis Parkman has made the name of the Ottawa Indian chieftain Pontiac familiar to all readers of American history. Having united most of the tribes northwest of the Ohio River, Pontiac planned a general uprising of the Indians against the British settlements from Fort Pitt to the Straits of Mackinac. Many frontier posts were destroyed, but the failure of the French to co-operate with the Indians and the successful defense of the main points, Fort Pitt and Detroit, compelled Pontiac to relinquish his hope of driving the British from Canada. He made peace in 1765, and four years later was murdered by a Kaskaskia Indian.

Pontiac must have been a man of extraordinary executive ability. He created a regular commissary department based on promissory notes, these being written on birch bark and signed with the otter, the totem of his tribe. It is said that he employed two secretaries to attend to his correspondence and managed to keep each in ignorance of the business transacted by the other. Concerning his personality Parkman writes:

[1] G. McC. Theal, *History of South Africa from 1795 to 1828* (London, 1903), pp. 375 f.

The fact that Pontiac was born the son of a chief would in no degree account for the extent of his power; for, among the Indians, many a chief's son sinks back into insignificance, while the offspring of a common warrior may succeed to his place. Among all the wild tribes of the continent, personal merit is indispensable to gaining or preserving dignity. Courage, resolution, address, and eloquence are sure passports to distinction. With all these Pontiac was pre-eminently endowed, and it was chiefly to them, urged to their highest activity by a vehement ambition, that he owed his greatness. He possessed a commanding energy and force of mind, and in subtlety and craft could match the best of his wily race. But, though capable of acts of magnanimity, he was a thorough savage, with a wider range of intellect than those around him, but sharing all their passions and prejudices, their fierceness and treachery. His faults were the faults of his race; and they cannot eclipse his nobler qualities. His memory is still cherished among the remnants of many Algonquin tribes, and the celebrated Tecumseh adopted him for his model, proving himself no unworthy imitator.[1]

Tecumseh, who took up and carried almost to a successful conclusion Pontiac's idea of a great federation of the native American tribes, was doubtless the most remarkable character in Indian history. Even his opponent, General William Henry Harrison, regarded Tecumseh as a genius and declared that were it not for the vicinity of the United States he would perhaps establish an Indian empire rivaling that of Mexico or Peru.[2]

He hated the whites as the destroyers of his race, but prisoners and the defenseless knew well that they could rely on his honor and humanity and were safe under his protection. When only a boy—for his military career began in childhood—he had witnessed the burning of a prisoner, and the spectacle was so abhorrent to his feelings that by an earnest and eloquent harangue he induced the party to give up the practice forever. In later years his name was accepted by helpless women and children as a guaranty of protection even in the midst of hostile Indians. Of commanding figure, nearly six feet in height and compactly built; of dignified bearing and piercing eye, before whose lightning even a British general quailed; with the fiery eloquence of a Clay and the clear-cut logic of a Webster; abstemious in habit, charitable in thought and action, brave as a lion, but humane and generous withal—in a word, an aboriginal American knight—his life was given to his people, and he fell at last, like his father and his brothers before him, in battle with the destroyers of his nation, the champion of a lost cause and a dying race.[3]

[1] Francis Parkman, *The Conspiracy of Pontiac* (10th ed., Boston, 1884), I, 182 f.

[2] B. Drake, *Life of Tecumseh* (Cincinnati, 1852), p. 142.

[3] James Mooney, "The Ghost-Dance Religion," *Fourteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology* (Washington, 1896), Part II, p. 681.

All the biographical sketches which have been quoted agree in stressing the element of personal ability as the essential factor accounting for predominance. Strength of body and strength of will, unusual intelligence, a persuasive tongue, great energy, ambition, and force of character are the personal traits which raise a man above his fellows and constitute the leader. This is not to deny that other grounds for superiority may exist. In some parts of Australia age alone, unless accompanied by mental weakness, is sufficient to insure influence. In the southern Melanesian islands the chiefs seem to be those who rise to the highest rank in the secret societies. There are instances in North America and Africa where the richest man is he who rules his group. And Sir James Frazer has shown, by a vast collection of ethnographic evidence, how frequently among primitive peoples the magician has developed into the chief. To enumerate and illustrate all the methods by which men have secured authority in rude communities would form a valuable contribution to comparative sociology.

A number of primitive peoples have special words denoting the more than natural power which certain persons (and things) may possess, both from known and unknown causes. Of these words the most familiar is *mana*, a term found in the Pacific languages and variously translated as sanctity, good fortune, luck, prestige, and "virtue." The *mana* of a Maori prophet was shown by the truth of his predictions and the efficacy of his incantations. The *mana* of a Maori doctor was evidenced by the recovery of his patients. Uninterrupted success in battle proved the warrior's *mana*, and ability as a ruler likewise demonstrated the *mana* of a chieftain.[1] Similarly, in Melanesia, if a man gains renown as a fighter, "it has not been his natural strength of arm, quickness of eye, or readiness of resource that has won success; he has certainly got the *mana* of a spirit or of some deceased warrior to empower him, conveyed in an amulet of a stone round his neck, or a tuft of leaves in his belt, in a tooth hung upon a finger of his bow hand, or in the form of words with which he brings supernatural assistance to his side."[2] In some parts of Melanesia the power of chiefs

[1] A Pakeka Maori, *Old New Zealand* (Auckland, 1863), pp. 223 ff.

[2] R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians* (Oxford, 1891), p. 120.

appears to depend largely on their reputation for *mana;* a chief supposed to be well endowed with *mana* will have a wide influence in his island and even beyond it; the young men flock about him, carry out his orders in peace, and fight for him in war.[1]

The equivalents of *mana* outside the Pacific area are numerous, but in the present connection it is necessary only to show how this widespread conception of personal power contributes to the development of leadership. The leader secures respect and obedience, not simply because of his exceptional gifts, but also because he is thought to be endowed with *mana* in a special degree. Furthermore, the man who believes in himself, as we say, or who believes in his *mana*, as the savage would say, for that very reason will be more likely to come to the top than the man who feels less confidence in his own supernatural powers. And so what must be called a superstition has helped to build up the fabric of government in rude communities.

In the light of what we know about the great men of savage society it seems probable that the so-called culture-hero, the creator or discoverer of useful arts and the founder of social institutions, is not always a purely mythical figure. The exceptional person who conferred so many benefits during life may be deified after death, thus becoming the center of a genuine cult. The "high gods" of the Australian natives appear to be simply supernatural headmen, and in many instances doubtless were once living men after the model of Jalina-piramurana. Rivers mentions several Toda deities who are presumably deified men. The most notable instance is that of Kwoten, who raised the clan called Pan to a high position in the community and introduced several innovations in Toda custom. His ring can still be seen, and his spear was in existence not long ago.[2] Ellis finds four cases of deification among the eastern Ewe-speaking tribes of the African Slave Coast, though no similar examples may be found among the western Ewe tribes or on the Gold Coast. Two out of the four are deified kings, who were very cruel and terrible to their subjects during

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 57 f.; cf. W. H. R. Rivers, *History of Melanesian Society* (Cambridge, 1914), I, 99.

[2] Rivers, *Todas*, pp. 193 ff., 203, 446.

life, but Kpati and Kpasi, the other two, are worshiped as benefactors. They are local gods of Whydah, and according to tradition were the first men who began the trade which made Whydah the chief port of the west coast of Africa.[1] How mythic elements may attach to any exceptional leader and grow so luxuriantly as to obscure his historic character is further illustrated in the case of Hiawatha, one of the organizers of the Iroquois League and celebrated as a reformer, statesman, legislator, magician, and prophet. Hiawatha probably flourished in the second half of the sixteenth century, but after his death he was reputed to have done things which properly belong to the chief gods of the Iroquois. In this way he became the central figure in a cycle of legends.[2] Another pertinent instance is that of the first Japanese emperor, who fourteen hundred years after his death received the name of Jimmu tennō (Jimmu, son of heaven). Amaterasu, the sun-goddess, invested him with sword, mirror, and spear, and by divine help he became supreme in Japan. The figure of Jimmu is commonly regarded by Western students as wholly mythical,[3] but his work of welding the Japanese tribes into a state was surely not more difficult than the similar task which Chaka so successfully accomplished in South Africa. Writing of an Indian province (Berar), Sir Alfred Lyall declares that any renowned soldier would certainly be worshiped after death if his tomb was well known and accessible. He mentions the canonization of M. Raymond, a French commander who died at Hyderabad, and the better-known case of General Nicholson, who was adored as a hero in his lifetime in spite of his violent persecution of his own devotees.[4] But it is needless to multiply examples of the apotheosizing tendency of man.

If, as has been suggested, the exceptional personality is perhaps not rarer among so-called primitive folk than among ourselves, it will naturally be asked, Why does he not count for more as a progressive agency? The answer must be sought in the special con-

[1] A. B. Ellis, *The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast* (London, 1890), pp. 88 ff.

[2] J. N. B. Hewitt, in *Handbook of American Indians*, Part I, 546. Cf. W. M. Beauchamp, "Hi-a-wat-ha," *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, IV (1891), 295–306.

[3] G. W. Knox, *The Development of Religion in Japan* (New York, 1907), pp. 46, 63.

[4] Lyall, *Asiatic Studies* (2d ed., London, 1884), p. 19.

ditions of savage and barbarian life. In the first place, primitive society lacks *conservative* institutions comparable with our own. The genius may have his vision, he may initiate some important reform, he may even succeed in raising the material, moral, or intellectual level of his community, but too often his work perishes with him, too often his activity has only an ephemeral influence and fails to be perpetuated after his death. A society which depends on oral tradition can transmit few innovations. Not until a mechanical means of tradition, namely, the art of writing, has been perfected is it possible to preserve an adequate Record of the Past.

In the second place, the superstitious fear of the new, which so especially marks the savage, in many cases interposes an almost impassable barrier to the expression of individuality. A missionary, after more than twenty-five years' teaching of the Congo natives (his remarks apply particularly to the Bangala), declares that though they have a wonderful power of imitation they lack inventiveness. This lack is undoubtedly due to deliberate social suppression. For generations it has been customary to accuse of witchcraft anyone who has commenced a new industry or begun a new art. "To know more than others, to be more skillful than others, energetic, more cute in business, more smart in dress, has always caused a charge of witchcraft and death."[1] Or, to take another case, how slowly must the Wanika move forward, among whom "if a man dares to improve the style of his hut, to make a larger doorway than is customary, if he should wear a finer or different style of dress to that of his fellows—he is instantly fined."[2]

These are instances of what Walter Bagehot called "the persecuting tendency" of savages, and, indeed, of ignorant people in civilized communities. It is the necessary outcome of the idea of collective responsibility, the idea that all may suffer for the guilt of one. Hatred of the nonconformist thus becomes an expression of the sense of group-welfare. The lot of the reformer, in consequence, is often harder among primitive folk than among ourselves; if lowly born, he is promptly clubbed; if a chief and something

[1] J. H. Weeks, *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, XXXIX (1909), 135.

[2] Charles New, *Life, Wanderings, and Labours in Eastern Africa* (London, 1874), p. 110.

happens to him, either by disease or by accident, men see in his fate the righteous punishment of impiety and a warning against any departure from the good old ancestral ways. The rationalistic Finau, who had often confided to Mariner his doubts that there were such beings as the gods—men were fools, he said, to believe what the priests told them—was stricken with a mortal sickness at the very moment when he had given orders for the execution of a priest who had offended him. "'No wonder!' (for such was the general exclamation) 'no wonder that he died! a chief with such dreadful intentions!'"[1] One of our American anthropologists mentions the interesting case of a Kiowa Indian, a noted warrior and medicine-man, who in 1853 at the sun-dance deliberately broke one of the ancient ordinances relating to that ceremony. He was soon afterward thrown from his horse and killed. The Indians naturally regarded his fate as the speedy punishment for sacrilege.[2] When one considers the obstacles before them, the work of Pomare II at Tahiti and Kamehameha II at Hawaii in abolishing the oppressive taboo systems of those islands must be included among the most shining examples of individual initiative ever recorded.[3] What they did, within recent times, has doubtless been often done in many more obscure situations by those unknown lawgivers, prophets, and teachers who abridged, modified, or even suppressed traditional customs which had come to retard the onward march of humanity.

[1] Martin-Mariner, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

[2] James Mooney, "Calendar History of the Kiowa Indians," *Seventeenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology* (Washington, 1898), Part I, p. 296.

[3] See the accounts in Ellis, *op. cit.*, II, 93 f.; IV, 126 ff.

PRIMITIVE SOCIAL ASCENDANCY VIEWED AS AN AGENT OF SELECTION IN SOCIETY

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The collective regulation of the individual extends to a greater range of thought and action in primitive society than with us. The struggle for existence is far more severe, for famine, pestilence, drought, wild beasts, and ferocious enemies are an ever-present menace. Moreover, men are so ignorant of the causes of these phenomena that they are loath to run the risk of new ways of meeting old needs when use and wont have demonstrated the security of established modes of action. Hence society cannot afford to take the risk of innovation, and the pressure of ancient belief, of immemorial custom, and of mechanical ceremony is harsh and arbitrary. Primitive social ascendancy is impatient of individual idiosyncrasy and manifests itself in those cruder forms of social control which coerce and constrain from without. The subtle and refined instruments of social order, such as enlightenment and personal ideals, are less important than tribal law, social custom, magical ceremony, and belief in the supernatural.

While this general fact has been recognized by modern sociologists, its consequences have not always been clearly perceived. Durkheim, Gumplowicz, Sumner, Ross, and other writers have emphasized the phenomenon of social ascendancy. They have clarified our knowledge of the subject by the scope of their descriptive treatment as well as by the penetration of their analysis. Yet these authors make only scattered references to selection caused by the pressure of social ascendancy. This paper, therefore, treats of primitive social ascendancy viewed as an agent of selection in society, and seeks to distinguish the different types of social adaptation resulting from the selective processes at work in collective life.

Primitive social ascendancy has been treated so carefully in Tylor's *Primitive Culture*, Frazer's *Totemism and Exogamy*, Sumner's *Folkways*, and Webster's *Primitive Secret Societies*, that a brief paper of this sort can add little to the descriptive knowledge of the subject. It is possible, however, to choose examples of the functional aspect of primitive social control that shed considerable light upon the selective processes at work. A brief survey of the selective results of constraint and coercion produced by belief in the supernatural, belief in magic, conformation of behavior to restrictive taboo and to kinship regulations will therefore be useful.

Mrs. Elsie Clews Parsons[1] has assembled some interesting material showing how belief in the supernatural is a very potent means of preserving the primitive social order. The "bogy-man" who carries off naughty children, who eats and kills unmanageable juniors, is appealed to by primitive parents to keep the children where they belong and out of the way of adults. The owl will come and take away noisy children of the Thompson River, Kootenay, and Sioux Indians.[2] Caffre children are threatened with the Nomgogwana monster.[3] The Gineet-Gineet of the Euahlayi tribe of New South Wales is alert to catch bad children in his net.[4]

In initiation ceremonies the social hold upon the novice is strengthened by taboo. Boys and girls of the Lower Murry tribes in Australia are told that to eat emu, wild duck, swans, geese, black duck, or the eggs of any of these birds will cause their hair to become prematurely gray and their muscles to shrink.[5] If a Urabunna initiate should allow a woman to see one of the secret sticks, he and his mother and sisters would drop dead.[6]

Those who commit incest among the Omeo tribe of Victoria are beaten by the "jidjigongs" or snakes. Anyone who married into

[1] "Links between Religion and Morality in Early Culture," *Amer. Anthropol.*, XVII, No. 1, pp. 41–57.

[2] J. Teit, "The Thompson River Indians," *Mem. Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.*, II, 108.

[3] D. Kidd, *Savage Children* (London, 1906), pp. 96–97.

[4] K. L. Parker, *The Euahlayi Tribe* (London, 1905), p. 137.

[5] P. Beveridge, *Jour. and Proc. Roy. Soc., New So. Wales*, XVII (1883), 27.

[6] B. Spencer and F. J. Gillen, *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia* (London and New York, 1904), p. 498.

prohibited subclasses of the Queensland savages would die because his behavior was offensive to Kohin, an earth-roaming spirit of the Milky Way.[1] The islanders of the Malay Archipelago believe that sickness will follow the eating of stolen food from tabooed fields.[2] Batak thieves are cursed by the magic of the great priest of Baglige.[3] Iconoclasts among the Dakota, Ainu, and in the Malay Archipelago will be punished by supernatural powers.[4]

Australian blackfellows are educated from their infancy to believe that departure from the customs of the tribe will inevitably be followed by such evils as becoming prematurely gray, being afflicted with ophthalmia, skin eruptions, or sickness, and death from evil magic.[5] African Bakalai believe that if a man should eat his totem the women of his clan would miscarry and give birth to animals of the totem kind, or die of some awful disease.[6] If a man of the Elk clan of the Omahas ate of any part of the male elk, he would break out in boils and white spots on different parts of his body.[7] Among the Samoans the man who ate a turtle would grow very ill, and the turtle within him would say, "He ate me; I am killing him."[8] Members of the secret society of the Hohewachi, fixing their minds on an offender against Omaha tribal custom, thrust him from all helpful relations with man and animals, so that he suffers misfortune or death.[9] And so it goes, belief in the supernatural being invoked to terrify children into obedience to parents, adults into conformity to custom, and all offenders into submission to society. In this way a selected and approved conduct is obtained and the social order preserved without violence.

[1] A. W. Howitt, *The Natives of South-East Australia* (London and New York, 1904), p. 498.

[2] M. Bartels, *Die Medicin der Naturvölker* (Leipzig, 1893), p. 29.

[3] J. von Brenner, *Besuch bei den Kannibalen Sumatres* (Würzberg, 1894), p. 226.

[4] M. Eastman, *Dacotah* (New York, 1849), p. 87; H. R. Schoolcraft, *Indian Tribes*, II (Philadelphia, 1851–57), 195–96; J. Bachelor, *The Ainu and Their Folk-Lore* (London, 1901), pp. 58, 177–78.

[5] E. M. Curr, *The Australian Race*, I (1866), 52.

[6] Du Chailler, *Equatorial Africa*, p. 309.

[7] *Third Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology*, p. 225.

[8] Turner, *Samoa*, p. 50.

[9] *Twenty-seventh Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology*, p. 497.

But since the punishments promised by belief are not always immediate and the social order must be preserved, the group supplements control by this means with rougher methods. Seri marriage customs are enforced on pain of ostracism and outlawry.[1] An Omaha brave, well on toward the high rank of chief, yielded to temptation and went upon an unauthorized war party without first performing the ceremonies that alone could give the enterprise the sanction of the tribe. Although he was successful, he was punished by debasement for breaking tribal custom.[2] Deliberate murder among the Omahas is punished by banishment for four years of solitary life outside the village, communicating with no one.[3]

A serious breach of tribal custom among the Wyandot is punished by outlawry declared after formal trial before the tribal council. Should the offender continue in the commission of the wrong act, it is lawful for any person to kill him on sight, and sometimes it becomes the duty of all men to kill him.[4] The Kamilaroi drive out of the company of his friends a man who persists in keeping as his wife a woman of a subclass with which his subclass must not marry. When this does not induce him to leave the woman, his male kindred follow him and kill him, and the female kindred kill her.[5]

One who makes light of the authority of the chiefs or of the sacred packs of the Omaha is considered a disturber of the peace, and by order of the tribe is killed by being wounded with the poisoned end of a staff.[6] Among the Tlingit, when a murderer is not high caste enough to make up for the dead man, a council of the people of the victim gather before the house of a man of equal caste and call him out to be killed.[7] A murderer or his nearest kin is killed by the Iowa.[8] The natives of Southeast Australia ordinarily kill young men who transgress the marriage class rules. The

[1] *Seventeenth Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology*, p. 283.

[2] *Twenty-seventh Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology*, p. 405.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 215.

[4] *First Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology*, pp. 67–68.

[5] Howitt, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

[6] *Twenty-seventh Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology*, p. 213.

[7] *Twenty-sixth Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology*, p. 449.

[8] *Fifteenth Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology*, p. 239.

Karamundi and Barkinji kill men who break the totem marriage rules. The Yaitma-thang and Wolgal tribes usually punish infringements of this sort by death. Among the Tongarankas the whole tribe take a hand in the killing of an offender against marriage laws or class rules.[1]

Adultery is a particularly heinous offense against marriage customs, and among many primitive peoples is punished by death. It is regarded as a grave transgression because the wife is ordinarily considered to be the property of her husband.[2] In Melanesia adultery is regarded as an offense against society. The man who commits it is led before the chief, judged by the council of elders, and executed on the spot.[3] In Africa, at Bornon, the guilty ones are bound hand and foot, and their heads smashed by being struck together.[4] In Uganda King M'tesa caused adulterers to be dismembered, having one limb at a time cut off and thrown to the vultures, who feasted on it before the eyes of the sufferers.[5] The reindeer Koriaks, of the Eskimo, kill at once a man and woman taken in adultery.[6] The Pipiles of Salvador punish the delinquents with death.[7] In Yucatan the guilty ones were stoned or pierced with arrows and impaled or disjointed.[8] Ancient Mexicans generally punished the offense with stoning.[9]

Several Australian tribes punish by death penalty those who reveal tribal secrets. The Gommera order the killing of any man who reveals the bull roarer to a woman, or any of the secrets of the Bunan or the Kuringal. The council of Headmen of the Kamilaroi tribes may decree the death of men whose conduct is irregular.[10] The Kamilaroi tribe of the Gwydii River kill a man who has spoken to or has had any communication with his wife's mother.[11] The

[1] Howitt, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

[2] Letourneau, *The Evolution of Marriage and the Family* (London, 1904), pp. 208–27.

[3] De Rochas, *Nouvelle Caledonia*, p. 262.

[4] Denham and Clapperton, *Hist. univ. des Voy*, T. XXVII, p. 437.

[5] Speke, *Voyage to the Sources of the Nile*, p. 343.

[6] Démeunier, *Moeurs des différent peuples*, T. Ier, p. 219.

[7] Bancroft, *Native Races*, II, 675.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 674.

[9] Prescott, *Hist. Conq. of Mexico*, I, 26.

[10] Howitt, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 208.

Chepara kill men who become insane or have the habit of idiotically muttering to themselves because they are considered *Wulle*.[1]

Clearly some principle of interpreting this mass of selective phenomena is necessary to throw light upon the type of adaptation secured by social control. An examination of the treatment that sociologists have given to selection in society indicates a state of confusion upon this point. Natural selection is not always distinguished from social selection,[2] and the terms social selection and societal selection are used interchangeably to designate selective processes that secure quite different forms of adaptation. What some writers call counterselection,[3] or misselection,[4] are really forms of social selection. While it is not wise to try to force formal logic on mobile life-processes which are in a state of flux and forming, it is at least worth the effort to make an attempt at consistent classification.

When a human being gets in the way of ponderous social institutions or aged customs driven by the momentum of antiquity, a social selection takes place; the unlucky individual may be crushed to physical extermination, or simply pushed out of the ways of ordinary social intercourse. In any event a social selection quite different from natural selection occurs, and in the long run the process seems to result in the survival of a race of tractable and conforming individuals.

Considering this phenomenon we find that sociologists have not always distinguished between selection that works on the physical plane and selection that works on the psychic plane. This distinction is very important, for selection on the physical plane involves the extermination of the individual and brings decisive results. The antisocial, the innovators, the non-conformists, and offenders are once for all eliminated. Selection on the psychic plane is milder. It merely modifies conduct and thought. It fails

[1] Howitt, p. 354.

[2] F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1909), p. 326; and C. A. Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects* (New York, 1915), p. 56.

[3] A. G. Keller, *Societal Evolution* (New York, 1915), chap. vi.

[4] E. A. Ross, *Social Control* (New York, 1910), p. 424; and *Foundations of Sociology* (New York, 1905), pp. 328–30, 335–39.

to strike through to racial stock and secure a physical basis for perpetuating its gains.

Let us examine this selective process that works on the physical plane. It manifests itself in various ways. Sometimes it involves the killing of helpless non-producers—the aged and the infants—as in parricide or infanticide. These victims of social power are not offenders against social usage; their only sin is that they stand in the way of group survival. In communities where these practices flourish the struggle for existence is severe and food is scarce, so that this established population policy of the group has received rough confirmation by natural selection working groupwise. In such a case the dominating mode of the social mind is one of formal like-mindedness. Sometimes the selective death-rate is more clearly seen, as when society deliberately destroys the offender against its ways. Again, the impulsive action of a mob crushes the life of an offender. Sometimes conventions of the leisure class and higher standards of comfort delay marriage among certain strains of the population so that they multiply more slowly than the squalid and reckless. Sometimes war reverses the process of survival of the physically fit, who, first chosen by strict military standards, are later slaughtered wholesale by machinery, like so much meat in a grinder, and the weak are left behind to perpetuate the race. Again, a formal and custom-bound religious system, intolerant of independent thought, ruthlessly tortures and kills the rationally intellectual. And thus the human variate is caught and crushed to death in social machinery that other men of other ages have by their collective behavior set in motion, and thus the innovator, the non-conformist, the offender, and, in fact, any who dare originate or advocate a new idea are executed, lynched, stoned, hanged, or burned to death by torture, for the mills of society grind ruthlessly if not consistently fair.

But selection in society is not always of the bloody type that kills, and it often fails to mold the race by establishing a selective birth-rate. Social selection takes place on the psychic plane also. Squatters upon the path of some social institution may be merely thrust aside, while the procession proceeds upon its ponderous way. Innovators and offenders against the customary are simply

constrained or coerced into approved behavior. It is not always necessary to crush the delinquent lifeless in order that his anti-social act or new idea may be eliminated.

The manifestations of social selection upon the psychic plane are manifold. Sometimes the offender is separated from the privileges of association with his fellows by expulsion from society. This process takes the social forms of ostracism and imprisonment, the political forms of banishment, exile, and outlawry, and the ecclesiastical forms of excommunication and interdict. In all these ways the harmful idea and conduct are got rid of by doing away temporarily or permanently with the individual who originates or practices them. Sometimes the method of physical chastisement and corporal punishment are used to coerce delinquents. Finally, direct selection of ideas may proceed with great deliberation, as in formal discussion by a legislative body of the merits of some resolution. Perhaps the highest type of this selective process is seen in those forms of popular legislation known as the initiative, the referendum, and the recall of elected officials, as well as in popular voting under universal suffrage.

Ross[1] in speaking of social selection and Keller[2] in describing the process of societal selection have called attention to the difference between selection that takes place upon the physical plane and that which takes place upon the psychic plane. Yet even these authors have left the matter somewhat indefinite. I would therefore suggest the following distinctions in an endeavor to attain a sound basis for clear thinking about this important phenomenon of social life. The terminology has been worked out in consideration of the foregoing analysis, in the belief that it may help to correct a confusion in thought that is so clearly indicated by confusion in prevailing terminology.[3]

When the pressure of social ascendancy or the slow crowding of social conditions, customs, and conventions causes the death of any individual or the termination of his family line, the phenomenon

[1] *Social Control*, pp. 323, 437; *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 343–48.

[2] *Societal Evolution*, pp. 71–72, 89.

[3] I proposed substantially this terminology for these types of social selection in an article, "The Experimental Method and Sociology," *Scientific Monthly*, February–March, 1917.

is *social selection*. Now this social selection not only takes the form of conscious group action to exterminate offenders or obnoxious persons, but there is also the blind and non-purposive crowding of technique conditions and social institutions which often establishes a selective death-rate or a selective birth-rate. Hence, borrowing a distinction from Keller,[1] we may say that social selection is sometimes rational and sometimes automatic. It is automatic whenever the victim has met his fate from standing in the way of slowly changing custom, or has dashed himself against the impenetrable surface of an ancient institution, or is killed by the impulsive action of a mob. In the latter case the dominating mode of the social mind is what Giddings calls sympathetic like-mindedness; in the former cases it is formal like-mindedness of the people that has set the conditioning limits of social selection. On the other hand, the process becomes rational whenever a non-conformist or an offender is exterminated by the deliberate, thought-out plan of action exemplified in execution that follows formal trial, or in capital punishment after criminal procedure. In all such cases the dominating mode of the social mind is rational like-mindedness. Now in these different forms of social selection it should always be remembered that the objectionable thing which is got rid of is, in general, the misfit idea, act, or habit. The killing of its exponent or promoter is only incidental to the accomplishment of this conscious or dimly perceived end. Thus social selection works upon the raw materials of psychic stuff, although it acts upon a physical plane.

Turning now to that form of selection which works upon a psychic plane, attaining its results by the coercion and constraint of human variates, I would suggest the term *societal selection* for this process. Societal selection, therefore, is the phenomenon of the constraint or exclusion from the group of obstructionists, innovators, non-conformists, or social offenders, or of the ejection from the social mind of an objectionable practice. This process is sometimes automatic and sometimes rational. It is automatic when an offender is ostracized, as Maxim Gorki was shunned by the American public. It is rational when an objectionable person is deliberately excluded from the group for definite and well-understood

[1] *Op. cit.*, chaps. iii, iv, and v.

reasons. Its political forms are seen in exile, banishment, and outlawry. Excommunication and interdict are its ecclesiastical forms. The distinctly social form of rational societal selection is imprisonment of delinquents and especially the individualization of punishment. Here again, as in social selection, the objectionable thing got rid of is, in general, the offensive idea, act, or habit, but in this case the end is accomplished by milder means. Not only is societal selection less harsh, it is also more direct. Misfit ideas are expelled from the social mind in the act of formal voting by any deliberative body of human beings, whether at an election, in legislative assembly, or by the popular initiative, referendum, and the recall of elected officials.

Assuming for the moment that this proposed terminology, which I believe corresponds to real and significant distinctions, meets with your approval, let me conclude with a brief examination of the types of adaptation attained by social as contrasted with societal selection. If we consider social adaptation as such a relationship between human individuals, social groups, or institutions as is favorable to existence and growth,[1] then analysis discloses the following facts.

Social selection working on the physical plane exterminates the antisocial and solves the problem of the social order so that it stays solved. It works on instinct and evolves a human type with inborn social tendencies. But the process is expensive. The criteria of social selection are often set by blind social conditions or accidentally and ignorantly attained. Unequable tax systems and impediments upon the marriage of the intellectual discourage propagation of the best stock. The machinery of social selection is crude. As often as not the innocent man is lynched, and justice frequently miscarries. There is no racial gain from the vicarious death penalty. Among the Tlingit Indians when a murderer is not high caste enough to atone for the dead man, an innocent man of the same caste who belongs to the kin of the offender is killed.[2] Social selection is unduly harsh in case of minor offenses. The primitive man who revealed tribal secrets or married in violation

[1] L. M. Bristol, *Social Adaptation* (Cambridge, 1915), p. 8.

[2] *Twenty-sixth Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology*, p. 449.

of his class or totem rules was killed. Even in England it was not until 1832 that the death penalty for sheep, cattle, and horse stealing was abolished.[1] Finally social selection fails to recognize in certain types of psychic variation a higher social usefulness than is apparent on the surface, and so genius and original ability have been ruthlessly crushed out. Galton has shown how the Catholic church brutalized the breed of our forefathers by first condemning gentle natures to celibacy and then making "another sweep of her huge nets, this time fishing in stirring waters, to catch those who were the most fearless, truth-seeking, and intelligent in their modes of thought, and therefore the most suitable parents of a high civilization . . . . put a strong check, if not a direct stop, to their progeny."[2]

Social selection is also slow in attaining its adaptation. It takes ages of bloodshed accompanied by sanguinary waste to secure the tame and tractable type. Moreover, when its work is done and the race has been purged of antisocial strains, it is adaptation to past conditions that is achieved. In the meantime a new social order has, like as not, arisen and sweeping changes in the criteria of selection have appeared. In short, "We must not," as Ross says, "overlook the fact that selection adapts men to yesterday's conditions, not to today's."[3] Humanitarians have always perceived the cruelty, inefficiency, and waste of social selection and have striven to hasten the evolutionary tendency away from social selection to a milder form of the weeding-out process. The historical trend toward gentler penalties for offensive conduct is known to all. Let us consider, therefore, the type of adaptation achieved by selection that works on the psychic plane.

Societal selection attains its adaptation by coercing and restraining the offender and modifies his conduct or ideas while living. It works on habit, weeding out the misfit act, and achieves a superficial surface adaptation that may not endure without the restraining pressure of social ascendancy. Spin loose the binding-screw of the social presses, custom and convention, and primitive human

[1] J. F. Stephen, *History of the Criminal Law of England*, I (London, 1883), 474–75.

[2] *Hereditary Genius* (New York, 1892), pp. 343–44.

[3] *Social Control*, p. 9.

nature flares out in savage impulse. Robert Owen thought that he could establish an ideal community by doing away with the existing institutions of marriage, private property, and religion, yet the disastrous failure of this New Harmony experiment seemed to prove the instability of man's social nature without these balance wheels of social order.[1]

Adaptation attained by societal selection has the merit of being cheap. It is not wasteful of human life and spills no blood. Yet the conformity of the browbeaten innovator who secretly muses upon his grievance is far from wholesome. It is superficial adaptation often purchased at loss of self-respect. The wastes of societal selection are in no track of blood, but in a trail of broken spirits and festering hypocrisy. Happily the increasing rationalization of societal selection has discovered a refined instrument of social order in the form of individualization of punishment. By this device the pressure of social ascendancy may be delicately adjusted, and conformity may be secured without danger of undermining the self-resource and self-respect of an offender. The direct selection of ideas has been made more efficient by such devices as parliamentary rules of procedure, and by the machinery of the popular initiative and referendum.

Besides being cheap, another merit of societal selection is that it secures quick results—adaptation is relatively immediate. The young of one generation after another are readily molded to type. For this reason, when adaptation is at last attained it is more nearly adaptation to contemporary conditions than can ever be the case with adaptation produced by social selection. In short, the adaptation lag is less than that which follows social selection. But even the rational form of societal selection is at best only a hit-or-miss effort to solve the problems of the social order. It must always remain largely the method of trial and error practiced collectively and necessarily accompanied by considerable waste. Viewed in evolutionary perspective its lasting achievements are only those which natural selection working groupwise has had time to confirm. McGee[2] describes a curious case in which the Seri

[1] Chapin, *op. cit.;* also "Moral Progress," *Popular Science Monthly*, May, 1915.

[2] *Seventeenth Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology*, Part I, p. 203.

taboo against the killing of smaller rodents has permitted their multiplication in such numbers that hundreds of square miles of territory round about Seriland have been honeycombed with their burrows. "A special consequence of the tabu is found in the fact that the myriad squirrel tunnels have rendered much of the territory impassable for horses and nearly so for pedestrians, and have thereby served to repel invaders and enable the jealous tribesmen to protect their principality against the hated alien." In such cases of confirmation by natural selection, reason is only subsequently applied to justify.

Keller[1] has made good the point that rational societal selection is most active and successful in the realm of maintenance mores. "The nearer the mores come to the struggle for existence, the more nearly they concern self-maintenance," says Keller, "the more vivid is the demonstration of their expediency and inexpediency."[2] In other words, the adequacy of means to ends is most striking in maintenance mores. Hence rational societal selections that have taken place in subsistence activities are subjected to the searching test of expediency, and it is these adaptations that natural selection working groupwise is quickest to confirm.

Science makes rational societal selection coincide with the limitations set by nature's laws. Health ordinances based upon sanitary science favor the survival of communities practicing them. Thus rational societal selection, when really effective, becomes impersonal, like an elemental force of nature, because natural selection working groupwise confirms its adaptations. This is why man has progressed so far in manual and industrial arts and in engineering and has been so slow to develop social science. In the former field natural selection is quick to note survival value and to ratify or reject; in the latter field there is no such decisive test.

But although the process of societal selection attains adaptation at less cost and time, its results do not "stay put." Its adaptations, unless confirmed by natural selection working groupwise, depend upon the continuing pressure of social ascendancy. Remove the pressure and the social order disintegrates. Russian society becomes chaotic as soon as the firm grip of its ancient ruling

[1] *Societal Evolution*, pp. 130–32. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 132.

order is relaxed. Utopian communities have ever failed to preserve tranquillity once the restraining bonds of custom and convention are loosened. In revolutions, wars, and riots primitive human nature bursts through the thin veneer of civilization.

If, in conclusion, we agree that there has been a well-defined historical tendency away from harsh social selection toward mild societal selection, we are obliged to admit that the bulk of social adaptation is no longer capitalized in instinct and race traits, but is taken out in adjustments on the slippery ground of habit and custom. Biologically speaking, social adaptation is in modification, not in congenital variation. If it is true that the modern social order develops no new social instincts, only new habits, then the wild orgy of counterselection we are indulging in throughout Europe should arouse us to the imperative need of more rational social selection. Although we stand committed against a return to the selective death-rate, we may yet consistently favor a selective birth-rate guided by the principles of the new science of eugenics. But, granted that we establish rational social selection in the form of the selective birth-rate of eugenics and mold a new race, how do we know that future conditions will suit this race? It may be said in answer that it is not a question of the future, but of the present. Natural and social selection have been restricted for so many centuries that man's present equipment in instinct (notably in the pugnacious, self-assertive, and acquisitive instincts) is adapted to conditions of long ago. There is need that the gap be reduced and that our equipment in instinct be caught up to modern requirements and responsibilities. This is all that rational social selection working in the form of a eugenic selective birth-rate proposes to do—to work out a better adaptation to contemporary conditions.

SURVIVAL OF PRIMITIVE CONTROLS IN FRONTIER OR RETARDED COMMUNITIES

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It was with some degree of mental reservation that I accepted the invitation to prepare this paper. My work in recent years has been such as to make it impossible for me to continue my interest in the study of the life of primitive peoples. I assumed, however, that I was asked to discuss this topic because of the special study that I made a few years ago of the practice of lynching in this country, and, further, I assumed that with this as my background possibly I have a point of view which is not generally held and which if properly set forth may lead to profitable discussion. I have ventured, therefore, to interpret the subject of this paper as in part raising the question whether there is evidence of the survival of primitive controls in connection with the practice of lynching in the United States.

At the beginning of a discussion of this question one must recognize that it involves an assumption which is not in all respects valid. Lynching as practiced in the United States is not confined exclusively to frontier and backward communities. Perhaps one may be permitted to say, for purposes of generalization, that it is practiced *chiefly* in such communities, but even that statement is really misleading to anyone unfamiliar with the history of the practice. No considerable section of the country has been entirely free from lynchings. To say nothing of any more remote period, we find that in very recent years lynchings have occurred in places such as Wilmington, Delaware; Springfield, Ohio; Springfield, Missouri; Springfield, Illinois; Danville, Illinois; Newark, Ohio; Atlanta, Georgia; Butte, Montana. These are instances selected mainly because of the amount of space they received in the daily newspapers, the details of which are

therefore still fresh in our memory. One cannot accurately describe any of these places today as frontier communities; nor can one say that they are backward and retarded—unless he wishes to undertake to indict the American people and to put himself in a position where he must defend the proposition that the typical American community is an example of backwardness and retardation in civilization.

We must bear in mind, too, that the practice of lynching is a phenomenon which peculiarly distinguishes American society and which sharply differentiates it from all other societies. The practice whereby groups of private citizens, on their own initiative, capture individuals suspected of what is regarded as a heinous offense, or take such persons from the officers of the law, and administer corporal punishment or execute them without any process at law, or break open jails and hang convicted criminals, *with almost complete impunity*, is not found in other societies of either high or low degree of civilization. For more than a century—indeed, from as far back as the very beginning of the American Revolutionary War—the procedure known as lynching has, from time to time, been adopted in the United States for the punishment of persons believed to be guilty of offenses for which there was, at the time, either assumed or alleged to be no adequate legal penalty. Riots and mob executions take place occasionally among other peoples on the face of the earth, but there is no such frequent administration of what may be termed popular justice which can properly be compared with lynch-law procedure in the United States. The frequency and impunity of lynchings must be regarded as forming an essential element in any adequate definition of American society.

The practice of lynching is clearly a form of social control. I would not, however, classify it as an effective form; its general effectiveness is open to serious question, I think. It is certainly very generally effective if viewed from the standpoint of the victim of the lynching; but I have not been able to verify its alleged wholesome effect upon wrongdoers in communities where lynchings have occurred, nor does it seem to promote greater orderliness and to contribute to an established conformity in

social relations. It is an unstable form of social control; it has its basis in an unusual stress and its culmination in a crisis; it is resorted to when there are plausible reasons for saying that it is made necessary by the exigency of circumstances. As a form of social control it is also open to the serious objection that it is easily copied and made to contribute to nefarious purposes. The wrongdoers, those who are expected to feel its restraint, may quickly adopt it themselves and use it quite as effectively as anyone else. Even in frontier communities it is a form of social control that is only temporarily effective.

I find no evidence that the practice of lynching is in itself a survival of some primitive kind of social control. It seems to me to be essentially different from anything that we find in the life of primitive communities. Primitive men practiced far more effective forms of social control than lynch-law procedure. Our vigilance societies in western frontier communities and the primitive secret societies have in common the element of secrecy, but a description of these two types of social organization would proceed from that point by contrast rather than by comparison. The blood feuds among our Southern Highlanders are probably the best example to be found in this country of the survival of primitive controls in retarded communities. These blood feuds, as they have been carried on by successive generations, present some of the characteristic features of tribal societies. They, too, however, show marked contrasts with these societies, while, on the other hand, they possess a measure of instability which makes them readily comparable with lynch-law procedure.

The practice of lynching differs from primitive controls in many important respects. Even where it has been carried on by well-organized groups with a pledge of secrecy as a condition of membership, there is nothing analogous to the puberty institution and there are no initiatory rites imposed and administered by the elders. No basic experience or test by ordeal is exacted of the initiates, on the transmission and perpetuation of which the life of the community is believed to depend. Distinctions based on age do not enter in any determinant way. There are no characteristic grades, or classes, or "degrees," in the membership of

the vigilance societies or of the Ku Klux Klan. Distinctions of this nature proceed no farther than the selection of a few officers —a minimum number—for the purpose of obtaining decisive and effective leadership. Such similarities as we find are illustrations of the essential unity of the human race and of the validity of the assumption that similar reactions will occur among peoples widely separated in time and space, when confronted with conditions that are somewhat similar.

A vigilance society or a Ku Klux Klan lacks essential characteristics of a tribal society. Emphasis is not put upon a blood-tie relationship; the sanction of ancestral ghosts is not invoked; no cult ceremonies are established. The features which in tribal societies secure permanency are totally lacking. Indeed, the members themselves look upon their organizations as largely emergency associations to deal with a temporarily disorganized state of affairs. Secrecy and such simple initiatory ceremonies as they have are not for esoteric purposes; they are for the purpose of promoting mutual understanding and a general knowledge of procedure for the accomplishment of certain ends. The ghost-like costumes adopted by the Ku Klux Klan came out of a knowledge of the Negro mind and were employed for the purpose of terrorizing the Negroes at a time when, during the period of reconstruction after the Civil War, other means of control seemed to be unavailable.

Lynch-law procedure has arisen because of the non-survival of primitive controls and the failure to establish effective substitutes to exercise the same functions. In our frontier communities there were no stable secret societies to exercise a measure of social control, there was nothing akin to a tribal organization, there was no chief, no recognized and responsible leadership. All were newcomers together. The political organization to which these newcomers were accustomed was non-existent, and no form of political control, adapted to the conditions of the frontier, was provided by the federal government. In our retarded communities, if we mean by that term isolated sections having little contact of any sort with the outside world, the situation is not very different. The absence of strong, centralized political con-

trol reaching out to all sections leaves many communities dependent upon such emergency measures as they can devise. Not until these communities succeed in establishing a political or governmental organization which embodies a leadership that commands the respect and confidence of the people do these extra-legal organizations finally dissolve and the practice of lynching come to an end. We are engaged in this country in the greatest experiment in democracy that the world has ever seen. The practice of lynching is one of the by-products of this experiment.

The history of lynchings, in common with practices followed by primitive peoples, offers many illustrations of the operation of the principle of "consciousness of kind." Those who are regarded as belonging to the group, those who show likeness, are not given summary treatment; lynching is applied to those who show unlikeness and who are regarded as more or less outside the group. Numerous lynchings have occurred in which the victims were Indians, Chinese, Italians, Mexicans, or Negroes. The recent lynching of Leo Frank near Atlanta is another case in point. Where a racial difference does not enter, an individual who gains an unsavory reputation in the community differentiates himself into a position of unlikeness and becomes a subject for treatment by summary methods. The lynching of Carl Etherington, a dry detective, at Newark, Ohio, and of Judge W. T. Lawler at Huntsville, Alabama, just after his renomination on a dry ticket following a bitter political fight, are analogous in principle to the treatment given abolitionists in the period preceding the Civil War. The fact that the abolitionists were directing an attack upon private property rights gave them no standing in communities where the slave-owning interests were strong; property interests are also involved in the dry versus wet campaigns. An individual who advocates too much radicalism may also put himself beyond the protection of the consciousness of kind, as witness the lynching of Frank Little, the I.W.W. leader, at Butte, Montana, last August and the summary treatment accorded Herbert Bigelow recently at Cincinnati.

Certain survivals can be noted in the practice of lynching itself when comparison is made between later periods and earlier

periods. The methods used by parties of White Caps in recent years and still more recently by Night Riders in the tobacco-raising districts of Kentucky are clearly survivals from the days of the Ku Klux Klan. There is also an interesting survival, from the time of the vigilance societies in California, in the action taken recently at the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce. In the midst of acute labor troubles in that city, a mass meeting was called, a fund of one million dollars was guaranteed, and the President of the Chamber of Commerce was authorized to appoint a "Law and Order Committee" with full power to spend this money and do whatever was believed necessary to put an end to labor troubles in that city. The people of that community are again resorting to a measure which will permit leadership to function quickly and decisively in matters of community concern. Distrustful of the city government, the courts, and the ordinary forms of social control, a powerful and influential committee of five persons is attempting to focus public opinion on a particular problem, and, in this case, to make business interests and modern commercial relationships work together for what is alleged to be the common welfare.

As I view the matter, it is much more profitable for the sociologist to study frontier life and the conditions in retarded communities from the viewpoint of adaptation than it is to undertake to discover survivals. In a frontier community one finds a growing population living under new conditions. The population is made up of people who have recently come from older, more densely populated communities, and they bring with them into a new environment the traditions, customs, and standards of these older communities. The question of adaptation to the new conditions is more important, more vital, than the question of survival of old practices and methods of social control. The center of sociological interest here is adaptation, not survival. In retarded communities it is the faulty or imperfect adaptation that is of primary sociological importance.

There is no better way to make the study of sociology seem barren and unfruitful than to give undue prominence to the matter of survivals. This is the pitfall which lies in the path of the man

who devotes himself exclusively to the investigation of origins and of primitive societal organizations. When he endeavors to avoid this pitfall and seeks to show the bearing of his data on present-day problems, he faces the additional peril of basing his conclusions on argument by analogy. But the man who totally disregards primitive origins may easily go to an absurd extreme and undertake to set up a normal state of society, an ideal society, a type of societal organization which embodies all that is best, which he believes to be the goal of social progress. Such phenomena as we find in frontier and backward communities offer to him interesting variations or radical departures from a normal state of affairs. The fact is, however, that his norm, his general standards and principles of what constitutes a normal life, exists nowhere except in his own mind.

The study of primitive origins is an indispensable part of the training of a sociologist. It is impossible to obtain perspective in any other way. If he confines his attention exclusively to this field, however, and is interested only in tracing survivals, his work will have about the same vitality and fruitfulness as that of the man who tabulates the use made of a certain Greek verb by men like Thucydides, Herodotus, Plato, and Aristotle. But if he undertakes to analyze societal phenomena from the viewpoint of adaptation, and shows that he does possess a perspective, even the proverbial man in the street will recognize the significance of his work. This is not a question of scientific methods of work; it is a question of using scientific methods to obtain profitable and significant results. An approach from the point of view of adaptation, in the study of social controls in frontier or retarded communities, as well as elsewhere and under other conditions, will yield better results, from the same material and the same amount of diligent effort, than an approach from the point of view of tracing survivals.

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE NORTHERN ALGONKIAN

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Investigators have now come generally to accept the fact that among the North American Indians three types of social structure prevail. One forms the type of organization known as the maternal exogamic clan, the other is that of the paternal gens, and the third is the non-totemic non-exogamic type with no exclusive line of descent to warrant its being called either a clan or a gens. Renewed interest has been manifested during the last few years in the interpretation of these social phenomena. The determination of the first two more or less well-known patterns of society was established some time ago by Morgan, whose theoretical and descriptive material has since been extensively used by sociologists. The third type is one of more recent establishment for which Dr. Swanton[1] and Dr. Lowie[2] have been responsible.

The older authorities (Morgan and McLennan) proposed a theory of evolutionary sequence in which the maternal (clan) grouping was regarded as the historical antecedent of the paternal (gens) organization. This theory for a time came to be accepted among ethnologists and sociologists as the more or less orthodox one, the latest exponent of which appears to be Mr. Hartland.[3] The assumption of these writers is, in short, that "the matrilineally organized tribes represented the primitive, at least the earlier, condition from which others had emerged by changing their laws of descent." The matrilineal state of society is usually

[1] J. R. Swanton (A), "The Social Organization of American Tribes," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. VII, No. 4, 1905; also (B), "A Reconstruction of the Theory of Social Organization," *Boas Anniversary Volume*, 1906.

[2] R. H. Lowie, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XX (1914).

[3] E. Sidney Hartland, "Matrilineal Kinship and the Question of Its Priority," *Memoirs American Anthropological Association*, Vol. IV, No. 1.

found to be the property of settled peoples whose principal activity is agriculture, while among those whose means of subsistence is hunting and fishing either father-right in some form or the loose undetermined line of descent is usual. This clan-gens hypothesis is confined to a certain extent by the fact that in Africa, Australia, and India the most advanced tribes are among those organized on the father-right or gens basis. In America, however, the social conditions do not lend themselves to the same interpretation, for the most advanced groups, among whom ideas of nationality, government, religion, ritual, and agriculture are most elaborate, conform to the matrilineal pattern. This is the case among the more sedentary cultures represented by the Creek, the Iroquois, and the Pueblo tribes. In America the simpler culture is usually co-ordinate with paternal descent, as is the case among the tribes of the eastern and northern woodland, including most of the Algonkian and Siouan tribes, and to a certain extent those of the plateau area.

Most of the material used in discussion by theoreticians heretofore has come from the more thoroughly known regions where either a definitely maternal or paternal type of organization is known. The defects of Morgan's construction, in particular, may be traced to his limited knowledge of social structure among the non-exogamic tribes, as Swanton puts it, "in the region which confirms the clan theory least."[1]

Hartland has been the last to reaffirm allegiance to the old clan-gens theory. Notwithstanding his advantage over predecessors in having at hand more extensive and critical ethnological data and discussions, he emphasizes the shortcomings of his predecessors by building upon them.

One particular feature emphasized by later American investigators is derived from the consideration of data concerning the loosely organized non-exogamic tribes of the North whose social type does not conform either to that of the clan or gens. It is maintained that this group constitutes as much a general type

[1] Cf. Swanton, *op. cit.* (A), p. 664, and A. A. Goldenweiser, "The Social Organization of the Indians of North America," *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, XXVII (1914), 412.

as either of the others, since its characteristics are no less distinct and its variations are no greater than are those of the clan or gentile organizations in their areas. The family organization occurs over a fairly contiguous area (including the subarctic, the northern woodland, the plateau, the northern Californian, and certain tribes of the prairie area). Accordingly, the importance of this type which has been described by Swanton[1] is very great, for in it may reside the elements which characterize the other two more advanced types. Dr. Swanton formulates his opinion very clearly by saying:

> My own explanation would be that the social customs of the two classes of totemic tribes are parallel developments from the looser stage represented by the non-totemic tribes, that, favorable conditions having given rise to the totemic complex, certain tribes have developed it along with mother-right and certain other things along with father-right. I am not prepared to deny in some case tribes with a fully developed totemic system have altered their method of reckoning from matrilineal to patrilineal, or the reverse; but the assertion that an entire class has so changed, especially that the change has always been in one direction, from matrilineal to patrilineal, this I say appears to me not borne out by the evidence at hand.[2]

Hartland adds:[3]

> That the highly organized system of totemic exogamy must have been evolved from a looser stage of some kind is obvious. Whether that looser stage is represented by any of the tribes extant within strictly historical times on the North American continent remains to be proved. When the attempt to prove it is made, it will be time enough to consider the hypothesis.

This challenge brings us directly to the purpose of this paper. Since the looser stage is actually characteristic of certain tribes of North America extant today, it becomes a pressing duty to present some aspects of their social life for discussion. The area of the northern and northeastern woodland has been the habitat of a number of Algonkian divisions, many of whom, in their more important vital activities and beliefs, have remained but little changed from early times. Dr. Swanton[4] enumerates, among the northern tribes demonstrating the family type, the eastern

[1] Swanton, *op. cit.* (A), p. 669.

[2] Swanton, *Anthropos*, IX, 297.

[3] Hartland, *op. cit.*, pp. 27–28.

[4] Swanton, *op. cit.* (A), p. 670.

Athapascans, probably the Cree, and the Algonkian bands east of Hudson Bay. Upon the evidence of investigation in the northern and northeastern region, the results of which have been published only in part, Swanton's inference concerning the Cree may be confirmed.[1] Concerning the whole area, moreover, of the lower St. Lawrence and the Labrador peninsula, including the habitat of the Mistassini, Montagnais, and Naskapi, north of the river, and the Wabanaki tribes (the so-called Abenaki, Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, Malecite, and Micmac) southward to the Atlantic, we find the family organization prevailing. The northern Ojibwa, too, are found to conform in part, being organized on a dual social basis, that of the gens and the family band combined. The culture of the northern Algonkian is, on the whole, quite simple, poverty-stricken. Their semi-nomadic life and the climatic severity of their environment have permitted little in the direction of ceremonial, political, or artistic development. Thus far research among these predatory northeastern Algonkian from the St. Lawrence and Great Lakes northward, east of Lake Winnipeg, and eastward through Labrador, northern New England, and the Maritime Provinces to the Atlantic shows that the tribal subdivisions are based, without exception, on the family grouping with patrilineal tendencies. The family group as the social unit comprises the individuals of one family connection, primarily through blood but also through marriage relationship, who hunt together as a herd within the confines of a certain tract of country. This district constitutes a paternally inherited territory retained more or less exclusively by the family by the right of usage. These simple conditions are universal in the area, as has been established by the writer through personal investigation there. Nowhere in this sweep of territory have true clans or gentes been reported, except in two instances: among the Ojibwa as just stated and among the so-called Abenaki, the latter instance resting on the sole authority of Morgan. To

[1] F. G. Speck, (A), "Family Hunting Territories and Social Life of Various Algonkian Bands of the Ottawa Valley," Memoir 70, Anthropological Series, No. 8, *Geological Survey of Canada* (1915); and (B), "The Family Hunting Band as the Basis of Algonkian Social Organization," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (1915).

account for the occurrence of the exogamous gens among most of the Ojibwa bands will involve an amount of understanding and information which we hardly possess as yet. Even here, however, the family band with its characteristic territorial association is of greater practical importance in native life than the gens.[1] The status of the Abenaki, established by Morgan, however, requires some attention and revision.

In a very short presentation Morgan[2] gives Abenaki material which by its linguistic form appears to be Penobscot. It would have been very helpful if he had told us, as he has in other places, who his informant was. Since, however, we cannot directly question his source, an internal criticism of his data is all that can be attempted. He notes fourteen gentes for the Abenaki, all of which coincide in name with family band names of the Penobscot, except five,[3] on the corrected basis, Morgan's Snake, Caribou, Crane, Porcupine, and Muskrat gentes. On the other hand, we have twelve in the authentic list which are not included in Morgan's (Perch, Otter, Water Nymph, Fisher, Raccoon, Whale, Insect, Toad, Eel, Sculpin, and Lobster and Crab). The list of family names furnished the writer by his informant, Newell Lyon, during a lengthy period of study of the Penobscot, can still to a large extent be verified among the families on Indian Island today. Moreover, Lyon's memory is clear and full on events of forty years ago, at the time (about 1878) when Morgan con-

[1] Speck, *op. cit.* (A) (Timagami), p. 12.

[2] Morgan, *Ancient Society*, pp. 174, 175.

[3] The name of "Spotted Animal" (gens No. 5 of Morgan's list) is given as Ah-lunk-soo. This is Penobscot *alánksu* "wolverine" (*Gulo luscus*). In gens No. 2, given by Morgan as "Wild Cat" (Black), Pis-suh, we recognize *pəsu'*, the term of "Bay Lynx" (*Felis ruffus*). There is no black wild-cat, so it is hard to account for Morgan's parenthesis unless it be that he was misled by the informant's confusion in an attempt to describe the animal in English. The Penobscot call the Fisher (*Mustela pennanti*, Erxleben) the Black Cat. This does occur as a family name in the tribe. Again, Morgan lists as No. 10, Pigeon Hawk, which he gives as K'-che-ga-gong'-go. In Penobscot pigeon hawk is *awe'ləs* and *ktci'gagago* is raven ("big crow"). Raven is also a family name, but pigeon hawk is not.

Morgan's Abenaki information is, on the whole, so misleading and fragmentary that were it not for his known reputation as an observer it could well be ignored. Without being tested linguistically, evidence of identity furnished by half-educated natives is very unreliable.

sulted his Abenaki interpreter. At this period the family organization was still strong and the territorial hunting system had not entirely decayed. Comparing, then, what we may consider as the more critical list of family names, those given by Lyon, with Morgan's, we are, I believe, justly obliged to correct and amplify the latter's. Morgan says that descent is now in the male line, which is also true of the family group. He says that intermarriage in the gens was anciently prohibited. If his informant meant intermarriage within the family, this, of course, is also true to a certain extent. Morgan finally says "the office of sachem was hereditary in the gens." If we interpret in his favor by choosing to make this mean that the office of leader of the group was hereditary in the family, then this is also true but not exact, because there was only a vague idea of headship in the family. This completes his contribution to our knowledge of the social life of the Wabanaki.

Turning now to the area proper we may reckon with certain prominent qualities of the family organization, some of which are common to all the related tribes while others are apparently local developments. The social characteristics of the northern Ojibwa and Algonquin of the upper Ottawa drainage area north to the Height of Land and west to Lake Nipissing have been described by the writer in one of the papers previously referred to.[1] Here, generalizing from the material, the family organization, numbering about fifteen divisions among the Temiskaming and twelve in the Timagami band, is prominent. The family, consisting of blood kinsmen and kinsfolk by marriage, forms a patronymic group. Individual nicknames occur, but they are not inherited nor formal. Furthermore, one-sixth of those recorded in the latter band are derived from "baby talk." The selection of personal names is arbitrary (Timagami) with the person who bestows the name upon the child, and there is nothing in the character of the name to betray the patronymic group, either that of gens or family. The family name,[2] however, serves as a desig-

[1] Speck, *op. cit.*, A pp. 3–17.

[2] The names of individuals are not the property of the family or the gens, as they are in the case of the Iroquois clan. They do not form a totemistic association. To

nation which is used among outsiders, so there are two name identifications aside from that of the gens. The possession of a common hunting district ("my hunting ground," "my land," in the native dialects) is a strong bond of union for the family. The districts are more or less fixed by fairly definite natural boundaries, with whom, of course, the natives are quite familiar to an extent which it is difficult for a stranger to understand. Trespass was formerly strictly resented in this region, sometimes even by homicide. The territories are inherited paternally, though the men often joined their wives' bands. A system of conservation was practiced to maintain the game. Totemic, exogamic gentes to the number of three (Temiskaming) and five (Timagami) occur, there being only one definite association, that of descent. It is interesting in view of the material soon to be presented from the Penobscot to know that there is some evidence here among the Ojibwa that the family patronymics are thought to have been derived from animals most abundant in the districts. In other words, they are suggestive of the "use totem" or "game totem" idea. Examining further in this region, Mr. Waugh,[2] without stating whether or not the gens is present, furthermore extends the institution westward in Ontario and asserts that he finds the

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demonstrate this important negative characteristic the following list of Timagami personal names, in their family and gentile groupings, is submitted.

White Bear family (Loon gens): Daylight, Nice-sky day, Right sun, Everywhere shining sky woman, Nicely combed hair, Clouds always moving, Goes around with daylight woman, Big flower, All over sky woman, Always be bird, Growing ripe, Moving shining sun woman, Nice daylight, Quick coming daylight woman, Rabbit woman, Top of daylight woman.

Hawk family (Rattlesnake gens): Lynx, Blue sky day, Fixed day, Cloud passing well woman, Standing well, Cloud going back and forth woman, There he is, Big girl, Big boy, Staying good cloud.

Standing solidly family (Kingfisher gens): Noise of wind sighing through trees man, Painter man, Little girl, Daylight rising on end woman.

Morgan (*Ancient Society*, p. 169) says, however, that the Shawnee gens had name property; "the name determined the gens of the person."

[2] Correspondence with the writer, October 5, 1917.

Further, concerning the Ojibwa in this respect, Dr. Lowie has pointed out Kohl, *Kitchi Gami* (London, 1860), p. 421, and Tanner, *Narrative*, etc. (New York, 1830), p. 91; and Da. Boas, A. F. Chamberlain, "Notes on the Missasanga Indians," *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, vol. i, p. 155. Cf. also Alexander Henry, *Travels in America* (New York, 1809), in reference to the Algonquin.

same thing true concerning the Ojibwa of Thunder Bay district. Relating to the Ojibwa of Minnesota the writer obtained social and geographical information from a member of the White Earth band.[1] The hunting districts of the present-day White Earth band about White Earth Lake are much restricted on account of crowding attendant upon the coming of the others to their midst.[2] Twenty-one family proprietors and their terrains were listed by the informant, of which eight were Mille Lacs, four were Otter Tail, and nine Gull Lake immigrants. A scale measurement showed that the partitions included approximately from 8 to 10 square miles each. The term of designation is "my land." The gentile group is also present here, fourteen of the listed proprietors belonging to the Bear gens. The personal names here have no totemic association so far as we can ascertain by analysis of the terms. Many of them, like the more northern Ojibwa already dealt with, had names based on the "day" idea, as Coming cloud, Fine day set, Every day, all of the Bear gens. The territories, we are informed, descend in the male line. In case, however, the owner has no son the wife's family inherit it. If no family is left by the deceased the land goes to his brother's children so that it may remain in the gens and family. Trespass is not regarded seriously.

Again, concerning the Waswanipi Lake band of Cree who are barely touched by my own survey, we have confirmative but somewhat indefinite material on hand on the authority of Mr. H. C. Cooke and Mr. Harry Cartlidge.[3] These authorities state that the Waswanipi band comprises about thirty families whose aggregate hunting territory covers some 14,000 square miles. On account of the great size of the general territory, no definite

[1] The informant, William Potter, was dealt with in Washington, 1915, for a short time in company with Dr. Michelson.

[2] The band of Ojibwa here is a composite group including families from the Mille Lacs and Gull Lake bands who moved there about fifty years ago, and the Otter Tail band came about thirty-eight years ago, according to the informant's estimate.

[3] Correspondence of Mr. Cartlidge with Mr. Cooke of the Geological Survey of Canada, Winnipeg, October 11, 1915, submitted, with Dr. Cartlidge's notes and map, to the writer by Dr. Sapir, December 7, 1915.

boundaries appear to exist between the hunting districts of one man and another. Each man keeps his own territory from year to year. At his death it passes to his children. Several cases in point indicate that it is customary for a man to hunt in the company of and on the territory of the father-in-law. We are not told anything further about possible name or taboo associations. The family band seems to be organized on a rather loose basis.

Still farther east as far as the mouth of the Portneuf River (about long. 69°20′) in southern Labrador and north to East Main River (about lat. 52°), the writer has obtained detailed information concerning the family divisions, their inherited hunting territories, and associational facts from the Mistassini Indians, the Lake St. John, Chicoutimi, Tadousac, and Escoumains bands of Montagnais.[1] Still farther eastward to the Moisie River, the family institution, as traced in a preliminary survey (1912), appears to be of the same general texture as that of the adjacent area. So we may summarize the social pattern for this whole Laurentian region as being uniform with the following two illustrations, which may pose as representative of the type.

The Mistassini band of about thirty-one families comprises about 187 individuals.[2] Totemic associations are entirely absent in this region. The principle of naming is that of the nickname, which is inherited only irregularly from father to son. That is to say, the proprietor's name forms a family surname as long as the direct male line is continued. Some of the Montagnais family names have remained in use for a period of seventy years at least,

[1] A. P. Low, "Report on the Labrador Peninsula," *Geological Survey of Canada* (1896), p. 50, refers to this in definite terms, saying, "Each family is supposed to own a portion of territory, with the exclusive hunting rights to it. The territory is generally divided into three parts, each part being hunted over in successive years, and in this manner the fur-bearing animals are allowed to recuperate, etc."

Father Drouilletes, *Jesuit Relations* (Thwaites ed., 1647–48), XXXII, 269, writes of events in the Montagnais country, having the hunting territory divisions in mind, and Father Lalemant, *ibid.*, XXXI (1647), 209, also remarks briefly on the hunting districts.

[2] By estimate in 1914, Mr. Low, *op. cit.*, p. 70, estimated their number at about twenty-five families (1892–95).

as we know from Hind's explorations.[1] Intermarriages have taken place with one family of Eskimo extraction and one Algonquin. The hunting territories are inherited paternally, though here again it is stated as common for a man to join his wife's family and hunt with her father and brothers.[2] The terrains, known by the local term "my district," are in this band fairly large and have a special, more or less descriptive, nomenclature generally applying to the river systems. The territories are conserved, though the boundary demarcations are not strict and trespass is not resented. As elsewhere a system of exchanging hunting privileges is present.

The same remarks apply in general to the Montagnais bands of sixty-eight family groups in the region covered by the survey mentioned above, so far investigated. To be specific in one instance, concerning the rules—or rather, lack of rules—of marriage, it may be stated that in the case of the Montagnais of Escoumains comprising eight families and about forty-four souls, there were in two generations five marriages with Canadian women and two with Indian men of other tribes (Cree, Wawenock). The latter were admitted to rights in the family hunting territory by their fathers-in-law.

I hardly need repeat again that no other social divisions are known to the people of the whole Labrador region, a conclusion which has been ascertained by persistent inquiry, nor have any group totemic concepts so far been found.[3] One exception, however, in the literature of the region has to be dealt with. This is based upon information furnished by the Jesuit Le Jeune (1634),

[1] H. Y. Hind, *Explorations in the Interior of the Labrador Peninsula* (London, 1863). The author speaks of meeting certain Montagnais and Naskapi hunters, whose names are still extant as family names among both the Mistassini and the Montagnais of the St. Lawrence coast.

[2] Hartland would presumably seize upon this mere economic development and interpret it as "vestigial" of a former matrilineal system.

[3] An interesting "symptom" of association, however, has developed in recent years among the Montagnais. Many of the families have adopted flags of their own selection. These they fly from flagpoles in front of their permanent houses at the Hudson Bay Company posts, upon their return from the annual hunt in the interior.

alleging that the Montagnais formerly had a matrilineal system of inheritance.[1]

After speaking of their moral laxity, Le Jeune remarks:

> Now, as these people are well aware of this corruption, they prefer to take the children of their sisters as heirs, rather than their own, or than those of their brothers, calling in question the fidelity of their wives, and being unable to doubt that these nephews come from their own blood. Also among the Hurons . . . . it is not the child of a Captain but his sister's son who succeeds the father.

It is quite unwarranted to take an isolated citation like the foregoing as valid evidence for the existence of a social grouping. The statement of Le Jeune implies the practice of a form of inheritance of some property the nature of which is not stated.

This account does describe a form of inheritance, but it does not describe a social type. A lone feature of the sort usually found among the characteristics of the exogamic group is not sufficient to establish the presence of such a group. In his very full and accurate report on the Montagnais, Le Jeune does not mention any social groupings. The reader of his words gets a strong impression that if any existed in Le Jeune's time they would have been known and mentioned by him. Hence a natural attitude toward such a situation is to assume that none existed. In the prevailing culture surroundings of the region the Montagnais do represent the loosely determined family band grouping, and since their culture conditions have remained on the same basis, practically a permanent one, it is fair to conclude that the existing social structure is the one proper to them until something else is proved on better grounds.

This matter raises an important and interesting point. In several Algonkian tribes whose social type is that of the patrilineal gens, the inheritance of office by the sister's children rather than by the brother's children or sons has been noted by Morgan, and Hartland has again employed these cases to exhibit as vestiges

[1] *Jesuit Relations* (Thwaites ed.), VI, 255. Hartland uses this citation for the support of his theory of matrilineal priority in an otherwise universally loosely organized group of tribes (Hartland, *op. cit.*, p. 38). He regards this testimony as sufficient to classify the Montagnais as definitely matrilineal.

of an older matrilineal type of society now passed over into the patrilineal one.

Basing his arguments on the occurrence of similar peculiarities of inheritance, Morgan[1] thinks that the present paternal system of the Ojibwa has developed through missionary influence from the maternal, as supported by evidence that descent was in the female line with respect to the office of chief.[2] He (pp. 169–70) infers that a certain laxity in paternal inheritance also tended "to show that at no remote period the descent among the Shawnee was in the female line." He does the same for the Menomini (p. 170). Again he says (p. 167) that the Cree "lost the gentile organization which presumably once existed among them." That several other Algonkian tribes (Delaware, p. 172; Mohegan, p. 174; Munsee, p. 173) do have the maternal descent he regards as due to the survival of an ancient form of descent universal among the Algonkian tribes (p. 172).[3]

One thing, I believe, is now fairly evident from the consideration of the matter presented in the preceding pages in its bearing upon this point. It is that the inheritance described in the foregoing cases, made so much of by Morgan and Hartland as a vestigial trait, may just as well be viewed as one of the measures commonly resorted to in the area of the family group type. The inheritance of name, the hunting territory privileges, and even some of the associational complexes may pass to individuals through the mother to her sons or through the sister to her children under certain arbitrary conditions among any of the hunting tribes having the loose organization. These conditions are shown farther on (see p. 98). The kinship classification is just as free from restrictive lines as the direction of marriage and the choice of family identity. We seem to find that none of the so-called

[1] Morgan, *Ancient Society*, p. 166.

[2] Morgan, *op. cit.*, p. 166, quoted by Hartland, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–48. Swanton, *op. cit.* (B), p. 168, ably shows the weakness of Morgan's supposition.

[3] Considering the extent to which the eastern Algonkian in general were impregnated by Iroquois culture, the Delaware Munsee and Mohegan (?) might possibly instance one case at least of change from a paternal to a maternal organization, though perhaps such a tentation, in view of Hartland's challenge (Hartland, *op. cit.*, pp. 28, 50) had better be expressed only in an undertone as yet.

vestiges of an older matrilineal state, emphasized by the disputants, is strictly inconsistent with the family organization. Other considerations should, of course, speak for reserve in making broad conclusions. From any angle of approach, however, an examination of the kinship terminology of the tribes of the whole region shows no pronounced tendency to maternal or paternal group classifications.

The main point here seems to be that none of the social peculiarities of the area under discussion is strictly irreconcilable with the form structure, such as it is, of the loose family organization. Its fundamentality is not, however, necessarily claimed as proved.

In the Wabanaki area south of the St. Lawrence the patronymic family group is likewise the basis of society. Specific data, however, as to the numbers, naming, and geographical location of the families have only been obtained from the Penobscot and Micmac[1] up to the present time, though indications point to the prospect that similar characteristics will be found among the Malecite[2] and Passamaquoddy.

The Penobscot were divided into twenty-two families, comprising about four hundred individuals. They were exogamic only in respect to kinship. As noted in the case of the other tribes, there was a general tendency for a man to affiliate himself with his father-in-law's family. I will refer, shortly, in more detail to the usual procedure in marriage selection. The family bands possessed paternally inherited hunting territories which were referred to by the individual as "my river." These were marked by boundary signs, either blazes or birch-bark representations of the animals from which the proprietors derived their names. Resentment against trespass was not noticeably strong. Tacit self-control answered for the prevention of trespass, or the policy of exchanging privileges nullified it. One important

[1] An outline of the material, which has not yet been published in full, was given by the writer in a short paper, "The Family Hunting Bands as the Basis of Algonkian Social Organization," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. XVII, No. 2, 1915, and again in part, in "Game Totems among Northeastern Algonkians," *ibid.*, Vol. XIX, No. 1, 1917.

[2] Since the completion of this paper, the writer, in a short trip to the field, has encountered the expected Malecite facts.

point here, however, is that, with the Penobscot, the families held themselves in a certain association with animals. These animals are those upon which they prey for their subsistence. This peculiar condition, so far as I know, is unique as a group institution in America, although in individual association it is not so uncommon in the northern area, as I have attempted to show in the second paper referred to above. The Penobscot family names in most instances were derived from the animals which gave identity to the hunting districts through their being most numerous in them. The members of the family were known generally by their patronyms. As regards personal nicknames we find that a suggestion of band identity is involved in them. A fairly large percentage of these are derived from "baby talk" terms, others are derived from peculiarities of speech and behavior and from humorous anecdotes concerning the owners. Some are "use" names, nicknames derived from the kind of game hunted. That the Penobscot nicknames sometimes betrayed a certain connection with the ideas characteristic of the animal associated with the family is shown by a few examples.[1] There is, moreover, still another imaginary association between the family and the animal eponym which appears in the idea that the families inherit some physical peculiarities from the animal. The members of the Whale family (Stanislaus) are pointed out as large, portly, and dark persons, those of the Rabbit family (Newell) as small, timid, and weak, those of the Bear family (Mitchell) as orderly and dignified, and so on. Their traits are thought to be traceable not only to descent but to the fact that they "used" them so extensively. A further psychological association exists between the family groups and their animal eponyms in the belief that certain (about thirteen) of them traced their descent indirectly to animal prototypes. This relationship is accounted for in a myth relating how the culture hero released the world waters from the belly of a monster frog which had held them back in his belly. After slaying him the culture hero frees

[1] One of the nicknames in the Sturgeon family (Sockalexis) was "Long mouth," in the Insect family (Newell) "Little spirit," "Little witch," in the Eel family (Neptune), "Fond of women."

the waters so that they flow again, forming the river systems of the Penobscot country, whereupon some of the people who had been dying of thirst became transformed into marine creatures as a result of overindulgence in quenching their thirst. The others who restrained themselves escaped transformation, to become the ancestors of the human families, assuming, however, the names and to a certain extent the identity of the particular animal into which their nearest relatives were transformed. Totemistic characteristics seem not to be wanting altogether in the case of the Penobscot. What interests us more at this time is the structure of their society as regards possible marriage relations. From the examination of notes on the principles of marriage selection among the Penobscot and throughout the whole northeastern region, as well as upon the deductions from marriage statistics in several bands (Montagnais and Penobscot), a summary of the procedure may be stated, I believe, with some degree of correctness. There are no formulated regulations of marriage between members of different families or bands. The only concern in forming marriage connections is that of blood kinship, the unions of first cousins as well as half-brothers and half-sisters being generally and strictly avoided. This arises from the fact that they are classified as potential brothers and sisters[1] through the operation of the levirate, which is an important social factor in this region.[2]

It is claimed by informants in general, in this as well as in the whole region under discussion, that intermarriages between the family groups were not regulated by any proscriptions. The claim, however, rests on actual practice dating back as far as the older people can remember and upon the tradition of practice. It devolves upon us to test the claim by examining the marriage statistical data from the several tribes where lists of marriage

[1] From this attitude has developed a taboo of social intercourse concerning the behavior of brother and sister. It is improper to indulge in joking and familiarity in the presence of one's sister, a restriction explained by the Penobscot as being a measure to prevent incestuous tendencies.

[2] This topic suggested by Dr. Sapir is discussed in a paper by the writer on "Kinship Terms and the Family Band among the Northeastern Algonkian," to appear in the fo. hcoming number of the *American Anthropologist.*

unions have been completed. The result of the test shows a corroboration of the general statement, for no restrictions of family intermarriage are observable in the recorded marriages among the Penobscot and the Montagnais, and none, except as concerns the gens regulations, appear to control marriage among the family units of the Ojibwa of New Ontario. To present one concrete case, a census of Penobscot marriages through four generations (in the case of some families going back from seventy to eighty years) shows that practically all the family groups have intermarried. During the same period, it is interesting to learn, there have been at least twenty-seven intermarriages with Passamaquoddy, fourteen with Malecite, fourteen with whites, five with Micmac, four with St. Francis Abenaki, and one with Iroquois (Lake of Two Mountains). This condition corresponds exactly with a type of organization in which there are exogamic moieties or phratries subdivided into gentes, the phratries being the gentes and the subdivisions the families.

Expedience governs the selection of residence of the son-in-law and daughter-in-law. The whole concern depends upon the number of sons and daughters in the family group, the conditions of physical ability of its members, whether the father is living, and the circumstances of the uncles, the conditions of the game as respects abundance, migration, and the like, the conditions of the hunting districts as respects fire, flood, or economic exhaustion, upon temporary climatic conditions, and even upon personal circumstances. The usual method of social procedure subsequent to marriage, however, appears to be capable of generalization. If there is one son he inherits his father's territory and remains on it after his marriage. The same takes place if the territorial proprietor has one daughter, provided the district is abundant in game. If there are many sons the oldest becomes the leader, as the father grows older, and inherits it when he dies, the other brothers and sisters remaining on it with him according to the size and economic quality of the tract. This, I may say, seems to be the ideal family grouping where a large family band can maintain itself in comfort on one inherited plot. Ordinarily, however, in the inhospitable north country such ideals are futile

and we find the most common practice to be for the other sons to join the family band of their fathers-in-law and raise their families as members of the wife's band. The privilege of return to the father's or mother's family is open to the second and third generation, should they be menaced by famine, orphanage, or destitution. This feature of the individual's association with the wife's family has been noted frequently in the north and elsewhere. It is not necessarily a manifestation of an earlier maternal stage of society, as may readily be understood by one whose knowledge of actual affairs in the primitive community is as great as his devotion to the harmonies of a sociological theory.[1]

Finally we have at hand the case of the Micmac, whose social structure is much like that of the Montagnais in simplicity.[2] The consanguineous family was, and to a certain extent still is, the basic factor in their organization. No marriage regulations are known to have been in force outside of the usual kinship restrictions. Even in several rather detailed accounts of the customs of these natives, written in the latter part of the seventeenth century by Denys and Le Clercq, this is confirmed. No totemic features in connection with naming, animal associations, or taboo have been learned of in connection with the family bands. The hunting territory feature, however, is present. The paternally inherited tract is known as "my hunting area." Its bounds are not strictly defined nor is trespass a matter of much concern.

Several interpretative problems are involved in the study of the family institution. One, for instance, is the question of the levirate as a factor in the development of kinship system characteristics in this region. For America, Lowie has established the probability that, in the terms of relationship, pronounced classification (the merging of lineal and collateral relatives) is largely coextensive with the exogamous practice.[3] Sapir, also emphasiz-

[1] Cf. Hartland (*op. cit.*, pp. 28–35). Swanton (*Social Organization of American Tribes*, p. 668) more logically assigns the foregoing characteristics to the type of organization, which he defines as neither clan nor gentile.

[2] A manuscript by the writer, "Hunting Territories of the Micmac Indians," is in the hands of the Anthropological Division of the Geological Survey of Canada.

[3] R. H. Lowie, "Exogamy and the Classificatory Systems of Relationship," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (1915).

ing the importance of sociological factors, has proposed the levirate as a contributing factor.[1] The operation of both these factors is illustrated by phenomena in the northeast, as the writer has attempted to show in another paper.[2] The game-totem idea,[3] so characteristic of this area, has likewise been briefly introduced in a previous paper, but its importance and its latent possibilities as a field of discussion are shown by the fact that it also occurs in Africa and Australia.[4] The economic side of the institution presents a fruitful prospect, because the occurrence of "use" rites based on the pre-emption of territory is by no means restricted to this group of tribes.[5] And the same is true of primitive

[1] E. Sapir, "Terms of Relationship and the Levirate," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. XVIII, No. 3 (1916).

[2] See footnote 2, p. 96.

[3] Speck, *Game Totems* (see footnote 1, p. 94).

[4] One area illustrating this is among the Makua, Wayao, and Makonde of East Africa. They include certain clans, Bee, Locust, Bamboo, Mussel, Manioc, whose names are derived from the animal or plant utilized by their ancestors. Cf. Karl Weule, *Native Life in East Africa* (translated by A. Werner, New York, 1909), pp. 310–13. Again it is stated of the Euahlayi tribe of Australia that there is no taboo against freely killing or eating the totem animal. Cf. K. L. Parker, *The Euahlayi Tribe* (London, 1905), p. 21, quoted by Goldenweiser, "Totemism, an Analytical Study," *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, LXXXVIII (1910), 257.

[5] Since the appearance of the paper previously referred to in the footnote on page 85, reference (B), the writer has had his attention called by Dr. Lowie, Dr. G. B. Grinnell, and Dr. E. W. Hawkes to several references extending the area where the territorial institution occurs. Cf. A. P. Niblack, *The Coast Indians of Southern Alaska and Northern British Columbia* (Washington, 1890), p. 298: "The whole of the territory of the Northwest Coast, adjacent to the Indian villages, is portioned out amongst the different families or households as hunting, fishing and berrying grounds, and handed down from generation to generation and recognized as personal property." Cf. also Krause, *Die Tlinkit Indianer* (Jena, 1885), p. 167. Mr. Louis Shotridge has also orally confirmed the matter as respects the Tlinkit. Cf. also E. W. Nelson, "The Eskimo about Behring Strait," *Eighteenth Annual Report*, Bureau of American Ethnology, 1896–97, p. 307; and concerning Aleut hunting rights cf. Petrof, *Report on Population and Resources of Alaska*, 1880 (quoting Veniaminof), p. 247. Also G. B. Grinnell, *Publications of the Harriman Alaska Expedition*, Vol. I (New York, 1910), speaks of paternally inherited family hunting and fishing districts. Dr. Grinnell cites a Chippewyan reference, Simpson, *Narrative of the Discoveries of the North Coast of America* (London, 1848), p. 75: "It is not perhaps generally known that in some parts of the Indian Territory the hunting grounds descend by inheritance among the natives, and that this right of property is rigidly enforced." Similar local rights in respect to game occur in certain Polynesian and South American areas.

practices intended to conserve the natural economic resources of habitat.

Thus the Algonkian tribes of the northern woodland of North America who depend for their subsistence entirely upon hunting and fishing are somewhat like the Eskimo, who are forced to move from one place to another for a living. Among both the climatic severity of their habitat, causing them great economic difficulties, has necessitated their formation into small biological groups of individuals related by blood or marriage under the direction of some able-bodied elderly leader, a family head. These groups or "camps" change their location according to the condition of the game supply. Consistent with these conditions, which are typical of both groups mentioned, we find that no complexities of social life, no artificial totemic groupings, no group regulations of marriage, no group ceremonies, have been evolved. Here, in short, the individual as such is more in the ascendent than among most other culture groups in America where society is complex in proportion to economic facilities. Especially is this apparent in the case of tribes pursuing agriculture intensively, contrasted with those in a hunting stage. Surveying the field in America, those regions where agriculture is dominant are socially and politically more elaborate, the maternal exogamous clan is general among them, totemistic and religious associations are more numerous and fundamental. In the area of the predatory tribes of the northern and plateau area the reverse contrast with these conditions is striking. This attitude has also been indicated in recent papers by Sapir and Goldenweiser, as well as by Swanton and Lowie.

Methodologically, it seems to be generally accepted that the phenomena of simplicity in society, in religious and ceremonial organizations, in technology and art, together with the absence of agriculture, are collectively the earmarks of a relatively older, more primitive phase of culture. The above portrays the conditions among the northeastern Algonkian and in this light lends considerable force to the argument of Swanton and his allies that the lack of system in social descent and group associations is logically more primitive than either the maternal clan system or that of the paternal gens.

DISCUSSION

THE "HALF-BREED" ASCENDANT

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The literature descriptive of primitive peoples would yield almost any desired amount of data similar to those presented by Dr. Webster's study of "Primitive Individual Ascendancy" and Dr. Chapin's study of "Primitive Social Ascendancy Viewed as an Agent of Selection in Society." Each writer has brought ample facts to prove that the thesis suggested in the title of his paper has been maintained. Primitive individual ascendancy exists; so also does the pressure of social ascendancy. The two factors are, among a non-migrating savage people, antagonistic, and are so mutually restrictive that the cultural *status quo* is almost never broken.

The field anthropologist finds the majority of these groups of people which are geographically isolated to be near the foot of the known existing cultural ladder. The Andamanese, the Australians, the Bushmen, the Ona, the Pygmies, the Seri, the Tasmanians, and the Yahgans are sufficient to illustrate the point.

Yet cultural development has been a fact among all primitive groups which at earliest times were, in their existing forms, on lower rungs of the cultural ladder. With this fact of primitive cultural development before us, is it possible to find any particular kind of individual who, on the one hand, is more likely than his companions to be equipped for ascendancy, and who, on the other hand, is less likely to be overcome by the normal pressure of social ascendancy? I believe it is possible. That individual is the mixed blood, the so-called "half-breed." Anthropological literature says little of him, but the field student knows him in all degrees of ethnic amalgamation.

It probably is unnecessary to call attention to the fact that as a matter of definition the "half-breed" is the offspring of parents of different ethnic groups—we will not here use the term "races." It is true that most commonly he is sired by a man from a group of people culturally superior to the one of which the mother is a member.

The "half-breed" is a marked man among his mother's people. Members of her group say of him, "He 'nother kind man," or "He does not belong," or "He born in the woods." The fact is he is considered "neither fish, nor flesh, nor good red herring." He probably possesses a psychic heredity different from that of the average member of both his mother's and father's group. On condition that his father is of a group superior to that of his mother (which is the rule among primitive people, as it is among cultured), I am assuming that the "half-breed" possesses an inherited intellectual capacity greater than that of the average member of his mother's people—the group in which it is usual for him to grow up.

We then have conditions right for individual ascendancy, namely, a marked man possessing inherent superiority.

Again, such a "half-breed" is usually recognized as less responsive to the pressure of social customs than are the other members of the group. Because

of his nonconformity he is not seldom spoken of in such words as these: "He no good," or "He bad man," or even in the words of a Samal Moro acquaintance who, in speaking to me of a certain "half-breed" datu, a Spanish-Samal man, said, "He no 'fraid God, he no 'fraid devil!" The "half-breed" is outside the group laws more than are his fellows. This fact is so patent that the modern world has gotten in the habit of speaking of the "half-breed" as an "outlaw." Among white men on or near American Indian reservations I have often heard some person, either white or Indian, who possessed noticeable independence spoken of as a "regular d——d half-breed." Again the person not easily handled in some situation is frequently told not to be "a half-breed about this thing." On Turtle Mountain Reservation, North Dakota, the storekeeper was having difficulty collecting a debt of a mixed-blood Indian. I overheard him say to his debtor: "Come, be a white man and pay your debt, or be an Indian and I will carry you till annuity; don't be a lying half-breed about it." The fact is that the "half-breed" is generally a nonconformist. The commonly expressed judgment concerning nonconformists is that they are "bad," whereas, of course, they may be only inventors, or introducers (to their group) of new customs.

No claim is made here that the "half-breed" among decidedly primitive groups is a respected leader of his mother's people; the only claim is that he is generally a nonconformist. Nonconformists are never or seldom followed among primitive peoples by the majority of the people, any more than they are among modern peoples. But if and when some person is bold enough not to conform, the chances are that others will imitate him if the threatened dire penalty is seen not to follow the offense. So in this sense the nonconformist among primitive people is often a leader to his group against the pressure which is sufficient to restrain the average member.

The field student knows that social intercourse and sexual intercourse between two ethnic groups, one of which is more primitive than the other, are usually coeval. Cultural assimilation and ethnic amalgamation go hand in hand. Among primitive peoples "wives" are commonly furnished visitors as a mark of friendship and a matter of hospitality. When to the fact of amalgamation is added the fact of the diffusion of early culture, the anthropologist has greater reason than formerly[1] to realize the part the "half-breed" has played in assisting, even against their will, his mother's more backward people in fixing strange beliefs, social practices, and material devices into their customs.

Definite examples of the iconoclastic "half-breed" American Indian may be had on any reservation in the United States. I know of no pure-bred Indian farmer in Minnesota who noticeably operates a farm, except in the records of the reservation agents and the Department of the Interior. The

[1] I refer to the strength of the theory of cultural diffusion by suggestion, imitation, or deliberate teaching, rather than the theory of multiple independent inventions, as an explanation of cultural parallels.

Minnesota pure-bred Ojibwa was never and is not now a farmer. Those Minnesota Indians who are farmers are, without exception, mixed-blood Indians. Again, in Minnesota, the midéwiwin society, commonly called the "grand medicine society," is the repository of most of the professional religious and medicinal knowledge, lore, and practice of the Minnesota Ojibwa. Most of its members are pure-bred or nearly pure-bred Indians. There may be genuine half-breed members, but I do not know of any such. Neither do I know of any active members who are even one-fourth white. The "half-breeds" feel themselves to be distinctly superior to the midéwiwin members and poke fun at their beliefs and practices.

These illustrations are typical among American Indians. I believe it is the rule among our Indians today that the iconoclast, or the individual ascendant, is a "half-breed," and that it is also the rule that the pure-bred Indian is a conservative or one very largely under the pressure of the established social customs.

Illustrations of "half-breed" ascendancy may be taken wholesale from the American Negroes. Probably most informed Americans will agree that Booker T. Washington is the greatest member of his people yet produced. He was at least one-half white, but probably only one-half. He at one time said that he believed his father was an Italian. Dr. Washington was a great leader. His greatness consisted, first, in his capacity for surmounting the difficulties which were too great for the people of his mother's stock and in his endurance in surmounting them; and, second, in his rare ability to see and to make his people see their own problems and their solution from the point of view of a white person. Of the present various American Negro leaders of national prominence, even in the minds of their own people, I know of only one who they claim is pure Negro.

Again, we see it is the "half-breed" who is most commonly inherently capable of individual ascendancy, and it is the "half-breed" who overcomes the pressure of the social custom which is too great for the pure-bred members to overcome unaided—when such "half-breed" lives among his mother's more backward peoples.

Another illustration, most convincing because of its completeness, let me bring from the Philippine Islands. From pre-Spanish days Chinese traders had visited the Philippine archipelago. Chinese blood, by amalgamation, existed in all the Christian tribes when the Americans acquired the Islands.

I had early noted the evidence of Chinese blood in the Filipino leaders of national, provincial, and pueblo matters. It was so plain to the anthropologist that the Chinese-Malayan Filipino was superior to the Malayan Filipino that I one day mentioned to the then governor-general, Luke E. Wright, the unwisdom of the application of the American Chinese Exclusion act to the Philippine Islands. His predecessor, Mr. Taft, had decided that the Exclusion act followed the flag to the Philippines. Mr. Wright told me he was aware of the superiority of the Chinese-Malayan Filipino, and he also

told me how surprised and enlightened he had been only a few weeks previous by an incident which I attempt here to relate after a lapse of twelve years. The Governor-General, with other members of the Insular Civil Commission, was being entertained in one of the spacious wealthy Filipino homes in a southern island. He was attracted by the evident Chinese appearance of an elderly Filipino woman. On remarking his observation to a distinguished Filipino member of his Commission, Mr. Wright was told that the woman did possess Chinese blood. In fact his informant told him that every prominent Filipino family in the Islands possessed Chinese blood. Mr. Wright then said: "But have you Chinese blood?" and his Commissioner answered him that his grandfather was a Chinaman.

Investigation showed that many a Filipino woman preferred and deliberately chose a Chinese husband, and for two main reasons. One reason was that the Chinaman was a better provider because he was superior to the Malayan Filipino man. The other reason was because her children would have better chances. In other words, she chose to bear half-breed children because (in the language of this discussion) of their inherent qualities for, and social chances of, ascendancy. History abundantly attests her wisdom in choice. The Filipino names you read, the names of men who did things during the stirring days of the Insurrection and of the American Occupation, are names of Chinese-Malayan "half-breeds." Such names as Rizal the patriot, Aguinaldo the politician, Mabini the brains of the Insurrection, Arellano the jurist, Luzuriaga the commissioner, and all the host of capable leaders attest to "half-breed" ascendancy over the pure-bred members of the mother's stock.

If the "half-breed" plays an important rôle in primitive ascendancy, there should be two kinds of valuable evidence obtainable now and then in anthropological literature—which, for the most part, is quite mute touching amalgamation. First, the most backward or lowly groups would, if the theory be true, not favor amalgamation; second, those groups amalgamating would tend to more advancement than those opposed to amalgamation.

Fortunately there are certain, though scanty, data available.

Mr. Man gives us the following very definite facts about the absence of adult "half-breeds" among the Andamanese. It will be recalled that that people were so lowly that Mr. Man had great difficulty trying to teach them the rudiments of agriculture. They preferred to dig up and eat planted cocoanuts, instead of waiting for unbelievable orchards. They preferred to kill and eat the female dog-in-the-hand rather than believe she would produce a pack with which more successfully to hunt the jungle hogs. Mr. Man says:

> With the exception of three children of mixed parentage [Hindoo fathers and Andamanese mothers], none of whom survived more than seven or eight years, no examples are known of the existence of a cross-breed among these tribes. . . . . Judging from the exceptional cases above mentioned of a cross-breed occurring among them, it seems improbable that the existence of a mixed race in their midst would be

tolerated, for all three of the children met their death by violence or neglect, not at the hands of their mothers, but of the male members of the tribe.[1]

The very general absence of "half-breeds" in Australia has been noted by several travelers. Mr. Calder in the following lines tells why they are absent. He also groups the Tasmanians with the Australians in his information.

Instances of infanticide did, indeed, come within Robinson's knowledge; but then the victims were half-castes, whom the savage woman both of Australia and Tasmania is known generally to have hated.[2]

Mr. G. W. Stow, who has given us the best data on the now practically extinct Bushmen (than whom probably no more lowly people have been recorded by history), tells us definitely and specifically that those most advanced owe the fact of their advancement to their friendly intercourse with more advanced Bantu tribes. And he also writes that Mr. Campbell said that the Bantu Korana men frequently married Bushmen women of the Vet River valley —that valley wherein the Bushmen were most advanced.

The Bushmen occupying this river valley [Vet] were said to be more civilized than that part of the nation which inhabited the more western parts of Africa. . . . . This improvement in their condition we shall discover as we proceed was mainly, if not entirely, attributable to the friendly intercourse that had existed for a considerable time between themselves and the Leghoya, the only tribe which ever intruded itself into Bushman territory that . . . . attempted to establish just and friendly relations between themselves and the aborigines.[3]

In the following quotation Mr. Stow also shows that the Bushmen were not disposed to favor intercourse with the white Boers:

They [the Bushmen] were said to be particularly vindictive to any of their own countrymen who had been taken prisoners and continued to live with the Dutch farmers.[4]

The lowly and wretched Ona and Yahgan tribes of the extreme southern lands of South America have been gradually crowded toward sure extinction by white sheep herders, as the ranges have been extended over the Indian's bleak and pitiless hunting lands. I can find no data to show that either tribe favored or practiced amalgamation with the whites or has assimilated the white man's civilization so to raise either men, women, or children one degree above their native culture.

Captain Burrows tells us that the Pygmies neither amalgamate with, nor assimilate the culture of, the more advanced Bantu tribes who have, though

[1] E. H. Man, "On the Original Inhabitants of the Adaman Islands," *Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, XII, 80.

[2] James Erskine Calder, "Some Account of the Wars of Extirpation, and Habits of the Native Tribes of Tasmania," *op. cit.*, III, 14.

[3] G. W. Stow, *The Native Races of South Africa*, pp. 308–9.

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 153.

sparsely to be sure, overrun all the area at one time in the sole possession of the forest-dwelling Pygmies. He writes of them:

> They [Pygmies] are, however, quite independent and consider themselves under no obligation to the people of the tribe they may for the time be associated with. Thus they preserve their freedom, of which they are intensely jealous, and hold themselves entirely aloof from other natives, among whom they neither marry nor are given in marriage.[1]

Professor McGee's study of the Seri Indians[2] presents the Seri as probably the most lowly tribe in North America, and the study nowhere reveals assimilation of any superior culture. Neither do they tolerate amalgamation, as the following quotation reveals:

> The once considerable Seri stock has been reduced to a single tribe by reason of deep-seated animosity to alien peoples and constant warfare. They are probably the most primitive people in North America. . . . . [Among them] tribal endogamy is probably more complete than in any other American tribe now extant—in Seri ethics the deepest vice is conjugal relation with alien peoples, just as the noblest virtue is the shedding of alien blood.[3]

No anthropologist will question the statement that the several primitive peoples noted above are as lowly in cultural scale as any whom history has recorded. Consistently, according to available records, they have avoided both amalgamation and assimilation. The one exception is that of the Vet River Bushmen, who did amalgamate and, *pari passu*, had an "improvement in their condition."

Other groups might be added, though such others would be of higher grades of primitive culture. For lack of time I will add but one. The Seminoles of Florida exclude conditions of both amalgamation and assimilation so far as their white neighbors are concerned. Dr. Clay MacCauley says of them:

> The white half-breed does not exist among the Florida Seminoles, and nowhere could I learn that the Seminole woman is other than virtuous and modest. The birth of a white half-breed would be followed by the death of the Indian mother at the hands of her own people. The only persons of mixed breed among them are children of Indian fathers by negresses who have been adopted into the tribe. . . . . The Seminoles have accepted and appropriated practically nothing from the white man. The two peoples remain, as they have been, separate and independent.[4]

It seems to me that the instances cited are sufficient to prove that the "half-breed" among primitive people is not only a nonconformist, but is very

[1] Captain Guy Burrows, *The Land of the Pygmies*, p. 179.

[2] "The Seri Indians," *Seventeenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology*, Part I, 1895–96, pp. 1–344.

[3] W J McGee, "The Beginning of Marriage," *American Anthropologist*, IX, 375.

[4] Clay MacCauley, "The Seminole Indians," *Fifth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology*, pp. 479, 531.

likely to be an ascendant. He is the individual best fitted by nature to be such an ascendant among his mother's more backward people, and is socially also best fitted to ignore or overcome the normal conditions of social pressure among such a group of backward people.

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I wish to call attention to a standpoint from which to view the problem of social control, bringing "primitive" and "civilized" social control under the influence of the same factors. This standpoint views the shiftings between social and individual ascendancy as a result of the degree of activity in which any group is engaged. An illustration from the realm of sexual ascendancy will make clear what I mean.

The Roumanians of Macedonia, the Aromunes, are a semi-nomadic people. Living on the hills of the Pindus, they manage to eke out an existence by pasture and a primitive sort of agriculture. In the winter they go down to the valleys below, into Greece, where they supplement their earnings by acting as muleteers and itinerant merchants. In these wanderings both husband and wife take part and share in the hardships, vicissitudes, and experiences of the journey to a degree consistent with their respective powers. As a result, the relations between the man and the woman are those of friendly comradeship: the woman being for all intents and purposes the equal of man. Contrast with this the status of the Greek woman in the valley, where the inhabitants lead a settled life. There the woman is completely under the domination of the man, in conformance with the standards familiar to us in civilized society. If the situation there is slightly worse than in western communities, it is a matter of degree and not of kind, to be ascribed, perhaps, to the particular turn given to Balkan affairs by the presence of the Turk. It is quite evident that the difference in ascendancy in these two groups is due to the fact that the Aromunes, having constantly to readjust their life to a changing situation, the requisite stability which makes for the ascendancy of the man being absent, they are thrown back on a closer relation between achievement and control, between demands and performances.

Another illustration: Social ascendancy in semi-primitive communities is found in the institution of the Zadruga, until recently the most striking characteristic of Serbian village life. In Roumania, on the other hand, the Zadruga does not exist and has not existed for a long time. Remnants of it, however, are found, chiefly in the Moldova, the northern section. There is no doubt that the Zadruga existed in full force during a given time in Roumanian history. Its maintenance in Serbia and disappearance in Roumania is simply a historical phenomenon connected with the Turkish invasions and rule. Roumania has been far more under Turkish (and Greek) rule than Serbia, and the agricultural-economic life of Roumania has suffered a great deal more

disturbance than that of Serbia. So it came about that the Zadruga, a patriarchal system of social control, survived in Serbia, where the social continuity was more or less unbroken and life more stable, and did not survive in Roumania, where social stratifications were never allowed to settle by the constantly recurring invasion of the Turkish Pasha with his Greek taxgatherer.

It takes but a little thought to find instances in our living present and in history to further illustrate the contention that a group in which life is systematized more or less completely, where it is more or less definitely settled, a group in which activities are of routine character and few in number is one in which deviations have a minimum possibility of existence. It is further evident that a group which is not called upon to meet an unexpected situation, which is not disturbed by outside or inside crises, will tend to establish a rigid system of social control, whether that group be primitive or civilized. On the other hand, a group constantly in need of new readjustments, whether forced by geographical, economic, or social vicissitudes, will tend to give greater possibility of expression to deviations from the established ways and means of doing things, and will enable the individual to shake himself loose from the traditional form of social control. It is at such times that leaders arise and in such manner that the appearance of leadership is accounted for.

If in primitive life the group seems to be in ascendancy and individuality seems to be less in evidence than in civilized groups, the reason is not to be found in any particular mystery of primitive mind or primitive social organization or primitive characteristics of any kind. The explanation lies simply in the fact that the occupations of primitive groups are few, definite, and inelastic, owing to the immediacy with which retribution follows a false step. There being no surplus to speak of in their economic life, no leaveway between what they produce and what they need, fear prevents any varied and extensive experimentation and so limits the range of activities. The vicious circle then runs thus: fear, limitation of activities, devotion to accustomed ways and means, resentment of innovation, stringent social control, ignorance, superstitution, fear.

And yet here also I find it difficult to keep my peace of mind and to rest satisfied with a general statement of primitive conditions. The gypsies that I have known are surely much more primitive than the Roumanians among whom they wander. My observation, however, is that social control is far greater among the "civilized" or semi-civilized Roumanians than among the "primitive" gypsies. It is not primitiveness that accounts for it, but nomadism and stability of habitat. Similarly the "primitive" Roumanian peasant is far less under the domination of group standards than the "civilized" bourgeois city dweller. In modern society it is the middle class, stogy, stolid, and stable, which is controlled by group standards rather than the volatile idle rich or foot-loose idle poor.

Incidentally, I wish to call attention to another fact in the method of interpreting the phenomena of primitive life. I have mentioned the case of

sexual ascendancy among the Vlach mountaineers of Macedonia, as determined by the particular form of economic life which prevails among them. Now the same or practically the same situation, to which is added one other factor, has produced precisely the opposite result. I will give as an instance the relations between the sexes among the Albanian mountaineers. The man and the woman journey together, and while they do not lead the nomadic life to the extent that the Vlachs of the Pindus do, yet they too may be said to be a semi-nomadic people, owing to the barren soil of Albania, which has tended to foster a degree of division of labor requiring frequent trips away from home in order to exchange the products manufactured for others equally needed. Yet the man is the lord and master and the woman is the beast of burden. On the road she carries all the bundles and does all the heavy work. Arrived in the village she disposes of the products, while the man sits in the *khan* smoking cigarettes and drinking coffee, but always with his gun across his knees. And here lies the difference. An Albanian mountaineer is always in the midst of a blood feud, is always owing blood or having blood coming to him, and while the rule of the game is that no member of the family of the blood debtor is to pay with his life as long as the blood debtor himself is alive and accessible, the custom of carrying guns has of course settled and every Albanian expects to have to participate in a blood feud. The woman being immune, she naturally was chosen as the one to transact the family business and take care of family interests.

It has occurred to me that a realization of the fact that social attitudes and forms of social control are connected with a complicated set of historical phenomena working on each other in all possible directions, where the introduction of one factor upsets the whole scheme, will convince us that it is not safe to draw conclusions as to primitive mental attitudes by a mere enumeration of apparently similar situations over a wide area or among many different peoples. Any conclusion as to the relation between sexual ascendancy and economic factors or geographical factors or racial factors (there is evidence that both the Aromunes and the Albanians are of the same racial stock) will be misleading. Equally misleading will it be if one should attempt to draw conclusions as to the relations between the sexes in semi-primitive communities or as to form of property holding among the same. I venture to suggest that the sooner we get rid of such blanket terms as "primitive" and the like, the fewer obstacles we will have in the way of understanding social phenomena as found among all types of communities and the sounder will be our generalizations made from a study of such phenomena. Spencer's method of "speculation fortified by illustration," where the speculation comes first and the illustration is its handmaiden, has done its duty in the past. It might not be inadvisable to discard it for another, perhaps a genetic-historical one. But this is no more than a tentative suggestion; the advocates of such a new method will be very much of a voice crying in the wilderness until they have established its claim by using it. Yet I think it is not unworthy of the attention of sociologists. I give it for what it is worth.

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Primitive men have handed down a heavy burden to us in the matter of social control. Backward communities are even now trying to keep the individual down, often by means of superstition, and they use the modern means of the printed page for this purpose. As an illustration I may refer to my own case.

At the age of seven I had mastered the art of reading in German sufficiently well to try my hands at short connected narratives. An almanac which was sold in thousands of copies was about the only means to satisfy my desire. One of the stories was intended to convey a warning against atheism and infidelity. It contained only ten or twelve lines, but made a deep impression on me which I have not been able to overcome to this day.

The gist of the story may be summed up in one sentence. "A hog-dealer who had grown rich, became an atheist, threatened to shoot God, and was turned into a pig; he was a Serbian." Two pictures were added to make the text impressive—one showing the Serbian in the midst of a large gathering aiming his shotgun toward the sky; the other showing him still in that attitude, but turned into a pig. The expression of the bystanders was correspondingly one of horror in one case, and of joy in the other. Text and pictures supplemented each other neatly.

There are five points in that short story, each exercising some control. The man was a hog-dealer, therefore an inferior individual of whom one must beware. He had grown rich, and naturally became an infidel, thus illustrating the biblical saying that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the Kingdom of God. Class hatred taught with a vengeance. The man was a Serbian—the implication being that in a well-regulated German community such dreadful blasphemy could not take place, although it might happen in far-away Serbia with its inferior, if not barbarous, people. He was turned into a pig—the lowest and most unclean domestic animal. This act of God was a complete vindication of His own existence and of religion.

I read the story several times in order to get its full meaning. It effectively cured my budding disbelief for a number of years, and implanted an ineradicable race prejudice in me. One of my colleagues at the university suffers from it. Although he is a fine fellow and excellent scholar, and notwithstanding the fact that we are good friends, an emotional chasm opens up between me and him when I speak to him. The prejudice of race implanted many years ago still survives emotionally, although intellectually it is dead.

The present European war is, at least to a certain extent, the result of unmitigated race hatred, especially in the Balkans.

THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE ACQUISITION OF WEALTH

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A generation ago the upshot and conclusion of both economics and sociology could almost be summed up in two words: *laissez faire*. Economists following the lead of Adam Smith and sociologists following the lead of Herbert Spencer taught that any attempt at social control of the acquisition of wealth would be absurd meddling and muddling, destined to make things worse instead of better. The social scientist believed that he was only a little less helpless to control the phenomena he studied than the astronomer, who can observe and explain the movements of the stars but would make himself ridiculous if he should attempt to influence their courses.

The socialists threw this doctrine of *laissez faire* to the winds. Economists and sociologists in general have not become socialists, but they have observed that in most sciences increase of knowledge has made possible new forms of control. Before the time of Benjamin Franklin a *laissez faire* policy with reference to lightning was eminently justified, but now a policy of control with respect to electricity at high voltages is at many points successfully carried out. The early attempts at social control of economic processes were like playing with lightning. We are sure that today we should not make *the same* blunders, and begin to have the courage to think that here as elsewhere in mundane affairs knowledge is power. We believe in very cautious exercise of this new power, yet we begin to suspect that, with our present insight into economic and social processes, to continue to preach the doctrine of *laissez faire* is little better than poltroonery and cowardice and shirking the duty of social leadership.

Unlike mere agitators, nearly all economists and sociologists are in an attitude of extreme circumspection in regard to the exercise of new-found powers of social control. We are not willing to countenance any absurd and premature ventures. But neither are we willing to be poltroons—as the men of Columbus' day would have been if they had refused to put to sea after the mariner's compass had been invented.

There has always been a philosophy to justify the *status quo*, and, as a rule, every established *status quo* was good until it was outgrown. All economists and sociologists recognize, for instance, that slavery has had a necessary and useful place in social history. And it was defended by a philosophy that was proclaimed by Plato and Aristotle. Similarly, the centralized rule of kings was essential during the passage of society out of the bloody turmoil of the Dark Ages; and that institution was defended by the doctrine of "the divine right of kings," and to call that doctrine in question in that day made one a traitor and an intellectual outcast. Later, revolutionary democracy played its essential rôle, and Rousseau, Jefferson, and their colleagues gave to it intellectual acceptance in France and in America by substituting for "the divine right of kings" "the social contract theory." All these philosophies were false, but each served to defend the social policy that was expedient in its day. And in the recent past exploitive individualism, by organizing the agencies of production, has played a constructive rôle in social evolution as slavery, unlimited monarchy, and revolutionary democracy did in their time, and like them it illustrates the generalization that the established social policy of any age has always the backing of an appropriate philosophy. The philosophy of exploitive individualism is the doctrine of *laissez faire.*

The doctrine of *laissez faire* has been sustained by very subtle but specious arguments, such as the "dogmatic optimism" of the Physiocrats, the Malthusian "iron law," the "wage fund theory," and the "residual claimant theory." Economists have exposed the speciousness of one only to replace it with another equally fallacious, and have always been willing to acknowledge the fallacy of all except the last, which was waiting its turn to be exposed. A few minutes later I hope to show that the "specific productivity theory,"

just now in vogue, though interesting as a speculative doctrine, is as futile as any of its predecessors as the defense for a policy of *laissez faire.*

Before going any further let me make it clear that the social control of the acquisition of wealth which we are considering does not aim at equality of possessions. Equality of possessions is neither possible nor desirable. Aristotle was right in saying that justice is not absolute equality but an equality between proportions. It is proportionate, both to their deserts and to their needs, for some men to have more and others to have less. Moreover, no form of social control ever ought to be or can be the sole factor in determining how much more or how much less men will have. That will always depend largely upon the personal qualities of the different individuals.

Having said so much by way of introduction, I will spend the remainder of the time allotted me upon three propositions:

First, while rightly and inevitably there will be differences between the possessions of different men, these inequalities may become excessive and in fact they have become excessive to the point of absurdity.

Second, without the exercise of social control over the acquisition of wealth, such excessive inequalities are inevitable and not only sure to continue but likely to grow worse.

Third, the time has come when we are justified in hoping for a considerable measure of success in a courageous and constructive program for the social control of the acquisition of wealth.

Our first proposition, then, is that the inequalities in the distribution of wealth have become excessive to the point of absurdity. I shall not base the argument for this proposition upon the condition of "the submerged tenth." Many who have given prolonged attention to the facts assert that the condition of the submerged tenth affords a powerful argument in support of our proposition, but just how powerful that argument is we cannot estimate here, because there is not time to discuss the question how far the poverty of the submerged tenth is due to their physical, mental, and moral defects, or how far, on the other hand, their physical, mental, and

moral defects are due to poverty. The condition of the submerged tenth, therefore, however important it might be in a more prolonged discussion, may be passed over for the present occasion. Neither do I base the argument on the condition of the most skilled or best organized classes of laborers. There are three other classes whose condition more unmistakably, and quite strikingly enough, exhibits the fact that inequalities in the distribution of wealth have become excessive to the point of absurdity.

The first of these three classes is the great mass of physically, mentally, and morally normal laborers who are engaged in unskilled or semiskilled employments. I do not refer to those who will not work or who cannot hold a job, but to those who do work when they can get a job—to the normal rank and file of ordinary privates in our great industrial army.

No competent student of the subject thinks of denying that millions of Americans, who are neither lazy nor feeble-minded but industrious and normal, fail, even when they have regular employment, to earn enough to support their families so as to have a reasonable chance of attaining the physical, moral, and cultural values and satisfactions of human life; and that, when any of these millions of wage-earners have children who are too small to go to work in the factories or to allow their mothers to do so, these children, by millions, are obliged to live under such conditions that, while some of them retain their decency and competence, it is a foregone conclusion that armies of them will sink to a place among the physical and moral derelicts of the submerged tenth.

The unbearableness of this condition of things in a democracy so rich as ours is sufficiently obvious upon any theory of the quality of common men. I merely remark in passing, and not as in any way essential to the argument, that in the opinion of nearly all anthropologists, and of such of our own number as Professor Veblen and Professor Thomas, "native gifts of intelligence, sensibility, and personal force will occur as frequently in proportion to their aggregate numbers among the common mass" as among the children of the economically well-to-do. And I also recall parenthetically the work of Professor Ward to the effect that more than

three-fourths of the exalted talent born into the world fails to make any notable contribution to civilization because of lack of opportunity for the personal development of its possessors. However low our estimate of common but normal humanity, not until the last reasonable effort has been made to alter it should any of us accept as final a state of social organization or disorganization which is responsible every year for the otherwise needless death of hundreds of thousands of the usual sort of men, women, and children, and for the fact that millions in each generation bring into the world the common normal heritage of capacity for life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness and go out of the world without ever having realized any due modicum of the happiness and worth which they might have attained. At present in America it is as true of human life as it is of the "word of the Kingdom" that some falls in stony places and some by the wayside where the unclean fowls of the air devour it up. The agricultural scientists say that the crop of the most fertile state in the corn belt might be doubled by better cultivation. It is at least as well within bounds to assert that the harvest of joy and worth in human life in our nation as a whole might be doubled if we would better prepare the economic and social soil in which life grows.

The second class that unmistakably exhibits the fact that inequalities in the distribution of wealth have become excessive to the point of absurdity is composed of the very rich. It is true that most of their vast wealth is invested in productive industry. But it has been demonstrated that by the device of corporate organization small investments owned by many can be effectively administered in industry; and concentrated control of the nation's capital places in the hands of a single class power over the common welfare which imperils, if it does not destroy, democratic equality of opportunity. Moreover, the great amounts of invested capital held by the rich yield a stream of income by which they are inundated and from which it is impossible to extract the full utility. Consequently our whole economic and social system may be compared with a man who is sick with excessive blood pressure in the head to the point of apoplexy and at the same time with anemia in the limbs to the point of degeneracy of the tissues.

According to Professor King's recent investigation[1] 65 per cent of our people are poor, that is, they have little or no property except their clothes and some cheap furniture, and their average annual income is less than $200 per capita; 33 per cent of our people compose the middle class in which each man leaves at death from one to forty thousand dollars' worth of property, the remaining 2 per cent comprise the rich and the very rich; and these 2 per cent own almost one and a half times as much as the other 98 per cent together. Dr. Spahr[2] calculated that the richest 1 per cent of American families, by virtue of their ownership of property, were in a position to receive *without* work as much as the poorest 50 per cent of American families receive *by* work. This calculation was made by Dr. Spahr in 1896, and Dr. King believes that the concentration of wealth and income has now grown distinctly worse than that.

The absurdity of our present distribution of wealth, or rather of our failure to distribute it, and the need for some form of control of the acquisition of wealth are illustrated by the rapidity with which property is collected in the hands of the managers of industry. We are popularly supposed to have one billionaire. There have not been a billion minutes since Christ was born. To accumulate a billion dollars at the rate of $10,000 a year would require a thousand centuries. If economic tendencies were working out their nice adjustment in accordance with the specific productivity theory (which is the present formulation of the doctrine of *laissez faire*), there would be no such thing as pure profits. Yet even one of our more moderately successful multimillionaires who acquires a fortune equal to only 2 per cent of that which Mr. Rockefeller is supposed to possess has a sum the accumulation of which at the rate of $10,000 a year would require a longer time than has elapsed since the birth of Christ. So much for the poor and the rich.

The third class of our people whose condition illustrates the absurdity of our present distribution of wealth is the so-called middle class.

[1] W. I. King, *The Wealth and Income of the People of the United States* (New York, 1915), pp. 64 f. and chap. x.

[2] C. B. Spahr, *The Present Distribution of Wealth in the United States* (New York, 1896), p. 69.

This class, as I have already stated, may be thought of as comprising about 33 per cent of our population; men of this class at death leave property worth from one to forty thousand dollars. This middle class includes many of the skilled and organized laborers, the great bulk of the retail business men, and of the teachers, ministers, newspaper men, artists, musicians, scientists, lawyers, and doctors, that is to say, the vast majority of those who do all the higher grades of work except manufacturing, banking, and other kinds of big business. Our present social organization confers as a special privilege upon those who engage in business the opportunity to acquire twice or ten times or a hundred times or a thousand times as much as men of equal ability in other walks of life. The middle class contains those who are sufficiently well-to-do to excite the emulation of ambitious and able youth, and not so rich as to excite instead hopeless envy; rich enough to be inclined to cautious conservatism, and not rich enough to pervert the organs of public opinion and social control; rich enough to attain security and culture, and not rich enough to be plunged into wasteful extravagance and decadent excesses. One who has regard for the general social welfare will look upon the decline of the middle class as one of the worst possible forms of failure in the distribution of wealth. Concerning this middle class I will pause to say only this, that as compared with the very rich, and even as compared with the moderately rich, the position of the middle class is growing worse. The poor are in a far more pitiful plight, but, though they are so poor, they are not rapidly growing poorer; on the other hand, in the present concentration of wealth in the possession of 2 per cent of the population, it is the middle class who are suffering the greatest decline in relative position.

Our first proposition, that the inequalities in the distribution of wealth have become excessive to the point of absurdity, has now been defended. It has been defended with cautious conservatism of statement, and many of you can emphasize and substantiate the proposition by additional evidence drawn from your own knowledge.

We pass now to the second proposition, namely, that without the exercise of social control of the distribution of wealth excessive

inequalities are inevitable and not only sure to continue but likely to grow worse.

The distribution of wealth according to unregulated economic tendency is nothing more nor less than distribution according to bargaining power. Bargaining power depends upon utility *with scarcity*. Utility, however great, without scarcity confers no bargaining power. Under ordinary conditions the atmosphere we breathe, though its utility is measureless, has less bargaining value than a bottle of smelling-salts, and the light and heat of the sun, upon which all life depends, has less bargaining value than a tallow candle or a match, because the atmosphere and the sunlight are not scarce. Likewise common labor, just because it is common, has little bargaining power. Only some form of artificial scarcity can give to air or sunlight or common labor a bargaining value proportionate to its utility. If you take a man by the throat and tell him that you will not stop choking him till he gives up every dollar he owns, you create an artificial scarcity of air, and air acquires a bargaining power proportionate to its utility. Similarly, if there should be a general strike that strangled industry it would confer on labor a bargaining power proportionate to its utility. But under unregulated economic tendency few things are so cheap as common human life, except the air we breathe and the light of heaven. Labor is not a commodity to be bought and sold. It is a man working. It is the basis of a claim to one man's share in the proceeds of industry. Condillac pointed out that "the wage earner cannot exercise his rightful claim to his own work, but simply surrenders the claim in return for a money price."[1]

That scarcity without which there is no bargaining power may be due either to limitation of the supply by nature, as in the case of diamonds, gold, and corn lands, or to cost of production, as in the case of manufactured commodities. The supply of human life is not definitely limited either by nature or by cost of production. In the case of any *commodity*, the supply of which is dependent upon human volition, there is a normal bargaining price which is protected by the cost of production. For labor there is no such

[1] Charles Gide and Charles Rist, *History of Economic Doctrines* (D. C. Heath & Co., Boston, p. 49).

thing as a normal price protected by the cost of production. When the price of a manufactured article falls below the cost of production, manufacturers curtail their output, or store it in warehouses, and so produce a scarcity which restores prices if the commodity has utility as a staple article. But the laborer cannot store his labor for future sale—if not used today it is gone forever—and the only way he could curtail the output would be to commit suicide. In fact, when times are bad and wages fall, the supply of labor offered, that is, the number of men seeking jobs, instead of being diminished is actually increased. If the fall of wages in any country or any industry is permanent, the standard of living is undermined, and the standard of living is the only hoped-for check upon the birth of children. Consequently in the second generation the supply of laborers, badly reared in abodes of misery and seeking the lowest and worst-paid forms of labor, is still further increased. Thus under the uncontrolled operation of economic tendency the mass of misery at the bottom of the ladder tends to grow. Today we are suffering from this result and have more of the undervitalized, stimulant-craving, untrained, and incompetent and a smaller proportion of capable and efficient laborers than we should have if custom and law had enabled the laborers of preceding generations in Europe and America to maintain the proper standard of living. Economic tendency, uncontrolled by custom and law, cannot be expected to produce any decent approximation to a just distribution of wealth, because it is nothing less than the operation of bargaining power, which depends upon scarcity, and common labor is common and not scarce. We have assumed that unregulated bargaining power is a form of might that automatically makes right. It does not make right, it makes wrongs.

In the second place, unregulated economic tendency can be depended upon to produce an unjust, unreasonable, and intolerable distribution of wealth because uncontrolled economic tendency produces centralized business organization. Within limits this is a good thing from the point of view of efficiency in production. It is the survival of the fittest. The interests of all classes in society are one in calling for the greatest efficiency in production. But the

interests of different classes clash when it comes to dividing the product. In the division of material goods, what one gets another does not get. A high degree of organization *under unregulated economic tendency* means efficiency in production and injustice in distribution. A high degree of organization implies concentration of control; it gives to a few men who are on the inside of the management power to exploit the laborers, the investors, and the consumers.

First, the laborers are exploited because the management sells the entire output of industry and receives the entire price, and the laborers must get out of the hands of the management such a fraction of that total return as they can by force of bargaining power.

Second, the small investors are exploited, perhaps less than the laborers or the consumers. They are more silent under their losses, partly because they hope themselves to profit by "business methods." The fact of their losses is illustrated by the relative decline in economic position of the middle class. Misleading prospectuses and more misleading newspaper reports, watered stock, bonuses, manipulated fluctuation in the value of securities, and other devices less easy to indicate in a phrase enable the insiders to pile up their millions.

Third, the consumers are exploited. Except in time of war bread is 5 cents a loaf irrespective of the price of wheat, and beer 5 cents a glass irrespective of the price of barley. Thus a large class of articles, bought for daily use by people in general, may fluctuate in cost of production even as much as 50 per cent without effect upon the retail price. Another large and important class of articles change in retail price by jumps of 25 cents, 50 cents, $1.00, and $5.00. Thus an increase of 10 cents or even 4 cents in the cost of an article at the mill has been followed by an increase of 50 cents to the consumer, and an increase of 37 cents at the mill has been followed by an increase of $1.00 to the consumer. It is true that in some instances a small per cent of decline in the cost of production is followed by a reduction of 25 cents or 50 cents or some other "round" sum in the price to the consumer. But this also indicates that the price charged before the reduction was excessive, and both classes of facts justify the

statement of Professor Henry C. Emery, based upon information gathered while a member of the United States Tariff Board, that "the relation of the price which the producer receives for his commodity to the price which the consumer pays for it seems to follow no rule of logic."[1] In war time bread joins the class of commodities with fluctuating prices to which meat always belongs. On October 8 the price of a pound loaf of bread in this country varied from 6 to 15 cents, the high price being in the great food market of the Middle West and the low price in the manufacturing district of the East. Perhaps no other equally expensive article is so often purchased for American homes as a piano. I am credibly informed that a $300.00 piano costs $65.00 at the factory. That wide margin between cost of production and consumer's price which "seems to follow no rule of logic" is a field of operation for those who sit in the seats of management. Who shall estimate how many hundreds of millions annually this condition invites the managers to transfer from the pockets of the consuming public to their own bank accounts, and will so long as there is no social control, and "business is business." The exploitation of the consumer by illogical retail prices pays for the concealed profits of the manufacturer as well as for the obvious wastes of competitive merchandising.

We have briefly pointed out two reasons why unregulated economic tendency cannot be expected to result in a tolerable distribution of wealth. The first reason is that distribution according to economic tendency is distribution according to sheer bargaining power, and that common labor, like light and air, has not bargaining power in proportion to its utility, nor proportionate to any tolerable basis of distribution, that labor is not a commodity to be bargained for, but a man working, and the basis of a claim in equity to a share in the product of industry. The second reason is that economic tendency is toward organization here and disorganization there, which confers upon those who sit in the centers of management the power and opportunity to exploit not only the laborers but also the investors and perhaps most of all the consumers.

We must pause here to consider "the specific productivity theory" which, as was remarked in our introduction, is the form

[1] *American Economic Review*, V, 536.

of defense for a policy of *laissez faire* just now in vogue. That theory asserts that if we had unlimited competition, then capital and labor each would automatically receive just what each produces. As a substitute for that theory let me ask you to consider what may be called *the organic theory of distribution*, based on the following considerations:

First, in an organized industry it is the organization as a whole that produces, and it is impossible to pick out a definite share in the product that should be ascribed to capital or to labor, just as it is impossible to say what per cent of my utterance is attributable to the lungs and diaphragm and what per cent to the mouth and throat.

Second, when we thought that we identified the share *produced* by one factor in organized industry, what we really did was to recognize the share *conditioned* by that factor, which is a very different thing. The factors in an organization are so dependent on each other that the impairment of one factor may not only subtract from the product of the organization what that factor produced, but may also impair the productivity of the remaining factor. The specific productivity theory goes wrong at the start by assuming that what labor would produce with no-rent land and no-rent machinery is the specific product of labor when normally supplied with capital, and that all the balance of what is produced in normal industry is due to capital. Neither the product of labor nor of capital can be measured in that way. By almost wholly withdrawing one factor in organization you can find out something about what that factor *conditions*—that is, what could not be produced without it—but you find out in that way nothing definite about what that factor produces when the two are working together normally. The amount conditioned by one factor in an organization is normally greater than the amount *produced* by that factor. Thus one essential nut in a locomotive *conditions* the movement of an express train; but it would be absurd to say that the *nut produced* the movement of the train. If you pay for one factor according to what it *conditions* there will not be enough left to pay the other factor according to what it *produces*. In an organization the factor that can most easily be withheld (in industry, capital) is in

a position to hold up the whole process and demand approximately all that it conditions and to rob the factor that can least easily be withheld (in industry, common labor). To pay the owner of capital all the difference in product that his capital *conditions* is to pay him part of what labor *produces*. Thus goes by the board the whole current theory of rent and of interest—not indeed as an explanation of what happens, but as a justification for what happens.

Interest on perishable capital goods is less obviously exploitive than rent on land, because the former must be renewed out of interest. But if, as leading teachers of the specific productivity theory hold, capital renewed out of its own earnings becomes eternal, it soon outlives those who are entitled to wages of abstinence, so that any further use of interest for purposes of consumption becomes exploitive.

According to the specific productivity theory free competition eliminates pure profits. This contention becomes relatively unimportant if rent and interest can be exploitive. However, it is worth noting that the elimination of profits even by the freest competition is very doubtful. Adequate investigation would probably show that those instances in which capital is not "fluid," instead of being negligible exceptions, really are the rule.

The question whether free competition would eliminate pure profits is not only rendered extremely doubtful by the fact that under the freest competition capital is not fluid, and rendered relatively unimportant by the fact that rent and interest can be exploitive, but is at present merely academic. Pure profits have not been eliminated. As nearly as we can tell from the census, profits, in times of peace, amount to 27.5 per cent of the total national income, or 58 per cent as much as all wages and salaries.

We do not have and probably cannot get that unlimited competition without which the specific productivity theory has no claim to validity. Every defense of *laissez faire* implies free competition, but a policy of *laissez faire* ultimately destroys free competition. Even if social control, which is the opposite of *laissez faire*, did its utmost to preserve unlimited competition it is doubtful whether we could get it. How will you make men compete when they find it more profitable to have an understanding? If we did

get unlimited competition we should do so at enormous sacrifice of efficiency in organization. Such competition and bad business habits surviving from former competition as we now have cost us hundreds of millions annually, and at this moment are causing business men like Mr. Frank Vanderlip and economists like Professor H. C. Adams to call for social control to check competition in order to avoid the wastes that diminish our efficiency for war. If we *could* get unlimited competition at the enormous sacrifice of efficiency which it would involve, probably it would not eliminate pure profits; even if it did eliminate pure profits it might depress wholesale prices till labor could not be paid a decent wage; at the same time, since retail buyers are relatively inefficient competitors it would not lower retail prices so as correspondingly to enhance the purchasing power of wages; and rent and interest could still be exploitive.

The only way to secure justice to labor is to get away from the effects of unlimited competition. The specific productivity theory is right in pointing out that under free competition the wage of any class of laborers sinks to the level of the least productively employed labor in that class, or that can enter that class.

From the causes above set forth it is clear that there is no reasonable meaning in the theory that under free competition labor would receive its specific product. The organic theory of distribution is that the specific product of one factor in organization is not automatically distinguishable from the product of the organization as a whole, that what a factor in organization *conditions* is an absolutely illogical test of what it *produces* or of what it should receive, that under private ownership it is expedient to pay for the use of land and capital enough to prevent their withdrawal from productive use, but that only men—whether laborers or capitalists—have rights, and that distribution of products among the men who participate in production presents a problem in equity that can logically be solved only by principles of justice and expediency formulated by intellectual leaders and established in custom as well as in law.

We have now arrived at our third proposition, namely, that the time has come when we are justified in hoping for a considerable

measure of success in a courageous and constructive program for the social control of the acquisition of wealth.

The power of law and custom to affect the distribution of wealth has been sufficiently demonstrated by experience. Even an institution so repugnant to the principles of justice and the instincts of human nature as the law of primogeniture can be made to work, provided it has the sanction of public opinion. And it has gone far in promoting and perpetuating the concentration of wealth in England.

The power of custom, even unaided by law, to standardize prices is illustrated by the facts I have cited concerning bread and beer and a large class of important articles of daily consumption.

Our business magnates have defended the operation of economic tendency in their dealings with labor, but have often defied and controlled it in their dealings with one another, with investors, and with the consumers. Consequently the colossal fortunes and absurd concentration of wealth in our new country do not more aptly illustrate the natural effects of unregulated competition than they do the power of artificial control over competition. They illustrate the fact that the ultimate economic tendency is the disposition of economic tendency to defeat itself by enlisting for its own abatement the agencies of control. And the broadest generalization upon this theme that is justified by the facts of experience is this, that the policy of *laissez faire*, or unregulated individualism, is inherently a temporary policy, a policy that is sure to make itself intolerable—intolerable, first, to the great survivors of the competitive struggle who temporarily have profited by it but who continue to prosper only by controlling it, and intolerable, secondly, to the masses who temporarily have been exploited by it, and who slowly but surely become sufficiently enlightened and sufficiently organized to unite in securing their freedom from its exploitation.

Experiments in the control of the acquisition of wealth in the interest of society at large have not yet been carried so far as experiments in its control in the interest of the ruling economic class. Yet they have accomplished enough to demonstrate that there is nothing illogical or visionary in talking about the control of the acquisition of wealth in the interest of social policy. It is hardly

open to reasonable doubt that society *could* socialize the unearned increment or even the rental value of land—and that without serious injustice to present owners and without impairing the right of occupancy of their heirs. Nor is it open to serious doubt that society *could* extend the policy of public ownership of capital; or that society *could* further limit the transmission of wealth by inheritance; or that society *could* greatly extend the sphere of operation of minimum wage boards; or that society *could* diminish the opportunity to swell private fortunes by banking and dealing in corporate securities; or that society *could*, without necessarily assuming the conduct of manufacturers, become the only jobber and retailer and so eliminate the waste of competitive merchandising and secure the absolute control of prices. I am surprised that no one seems to have proposed and advocated this simple and effective method of securing social control of industry.

It would be out of the question in the moments remaining to attempt the advocacy of any specific methods for social control of the acquisition of wealth.

I have now discussed, as far as time allowed, the three propositions: First, that while rightly and inevitably there will be differences between the possessions of different men, these inequalities may become excessive and in fact they have become excessive to the point of absurdity. Second, without the exercise of social control over the acquisition of wealth, such excessive inequalities are inevitable and not only sure to continue but likely to grow worse. Third, the time has come when we are justified in hoping for a considerable measure of success in a courageous and constructive program for the social control of the acquisition of wealth.

Permit me to add a few observations by way of conclusion.

First, the production of wealth without reasonable distribution of it does not constitute economic success for the nation. However much we may extend our railway mileage, increase our balance of trade, and swell our bank clearances, still our economic system is mostly a failure if 2 per cent of the people are inundated with income while for lack of a reasonable distribution of wealth hundreds of thousands annually die needless deaths and millions more live stunted, perverted, and blighted in body and in mind, and the

middle class declines. The problem of production we have *measurably* solved. The problem of distribution now confronts us.

Second, this problem can never be solved as a mere problem in exchange—in unregulated bargaining; *neither can it be solved by the mere passage of laws.* Its solution depends also upon public opinion, which may be misguided and supine, upon custom, which may be an outgrown survival unadapted to the exigency of the present, and upon morality, which may be only embryonic at this point. History shows repeated and impressive instances in which what had been wholly impracticable became practicable when and only when the requisite change was made in the state of mind of the public.

Third, to permit the heaping up of swollen fortunes not only inflicts upon the nation an economic injury, but also perverts the standards of ambition and misdirects the national energies. The ambitious strive for success as success is defined by the society to which they belong. American society can have that type of achievement which it most highly rewards and appreciates in any amount and degree up to the very limits of human possibility. We can have science, art, literature, incorruptible administration over the affairs of our cities, and social organization which makes the joys and worth of human life accessible to every normal citizen, provided such achievements command our highest rewards and our most pronounced approvals. There may have been a time when the organization of production was our prime need. It is so no longer; and if we continue to offer to business success such disproportionate rewards, that will be a potent factor for the abortion of our national development.

It even perverts our conception of success in business itself. We assume without question that business success is measured by acquisition, not by production. Yet this attitude of ours is an absurdity. We measure the success of a captain of industry, not by the welfare of the detachment in the army of industry which he commands, not by the production of utilities which his detachment in the army of industry pours into the current of the nation's economic life, but we measure it by the amount that he can appropriate to himself out of the utilities created by the nation's industry.

Usually he contributes something in return for all he takes; sometimes he contributes much, and sometimes, as in the case of the mere speculator, it is impossible to prove that he contributes anything. In any case it is not what he produces but what he takes that is the popular measure of his success. That this absurd standard for the judgment of success seems to us normal and inevitable is an exhibition of the degree to which the present disorganization of distribution has perverted our own minds.

Fourth, money is power. Sovereignty is nothing more nor less than the predominant power. All government is an exercise of power. When predominant power is exercised by one class we have autocracy or oligarchy; when it is exercised by the responsible agents of the people according to forms devised by the responsible agents of the people, we have democracy. Power is of three kinds: first, physical force represented by the policeman's billy and the soldier's bayonet; second, money is power; third, knowledge is power.

Ancient despotisms rested mainly upon physical force, upon militarism. The first development of democracy was to remove from any one class of society the exercise of predominant physical force. This first step is a great accomplishment. The forms of freedom which we now cherish provide fairly well for liberty from arbitrary physical compulsion. The second form of power, the power of money, is exercised by governments chiefly through the funds raised by taxation and by the imposition of fines. It is a maxim of political science that where the taxing power resides there resides the sovereignty. A few dozen Americans exercise a taxing power which emperors might envy, and millions of other Americans live under the control of economic pressure in comparison with which the pressure exercised by the laws that are enforceable by fines is slight. Because of this economic pressure our carefully protected freedom from physical compulsion, our freedom *de jure*, is often accompanied by unfreedom *de facto*. A distinguished member of the American Economic Association has written: "Whoever controls the property of a nation becomes thereby the virtual ruler thereof." And nearly three-fifths of the property of the United States is declared to be in the possession of 2 per cent of its people.

I am not responsible for these facts and only state them. We are all responsible if we do not face them.

The third form of power is the power of ideas. Only provide the organization for forming and expressing the common will and the dictum of Comte becomes practically true: "Ideas rule the world." The theory of democracy is that when discussion is free those ideas which accord with the facts in the long run will win public assent, so that public action will be an adaptation to the requirements of the actual situation. The schools and the press are the chief agencies by which the facts are discovered and given to the public; therefore the schools and the press are the citadels of democracy. To have the schools and the press controlled in the interest of a class would be little if anything short of abandoning the hope of fulfilling the purposes of democracy. To have the great dailies owned by those who have been brought up under the influence of the opinion-complex of one class is almost equivalent to giving to that class the autocracy of the nation. The sincerity with which that opinion-complex is held only increases the intolerance with which that power is exercised. Ruling classes are usually well convinced of their right to rule. Mere assertion and assumption reiterated in the public ear have power to form the public mind, still more if backed by biased discussion and a biased presentation of facts.

It betokens an unnatural and artificial situation, resulting from class control of the organs of opinion, that in this democracy we have no great liberal party. The conservatives appear to have captured the "machines" of both of the great political organizations. If one of them and its organs of publicity should become cautiously but courageously and constructively liberal, it would come into scarcely disputed power. The public of a democracy naturally divides into three groups. First is the conservative group, largely composed of elegant, cultivated, and kindly people who assent to only such minimum concessions in the direction of increased democracy as are forced from them, as the condition of keeping in the main the *status quo*. At the other extreme are the malcontents and the radicals, who also may think themselves just but who care for little, save the interest of their own group, and are willing to resort to

vagaries or even to violence. Between them is a truly liberal group not, on the one hand, grudgingly yielding concessions nor, on the other hand, tolerating violence or incautious experiments, but courageously and constructively seeking for justice and the gradual realization of the nearest feasible approach to the fulfilment of the ideals of democracy. To this third group, swayed by no partisan considerations but governed solely by knowledge of the facts and regard for the public good, the members of our two associations should naturally belong.

MOTIVES IN ECONOMIC LIFE

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The first quarter of this century is breaking up in a riot of economic irrationalism. The carefully selected efficiency axioms of peaceful life are tossed on the scrap heap, and all society seems to be seeking objects and experiences not found in any of our economists' careful descriptions of the modern industrial order. War allies refuse to unify their military policy, Russia is called on to exhibit a sedate and stable economic life when she lacks wholesale all the attributes to it. And we Americans, despite the notorious record of stringent social accounting imposed by the standards of war efficiency, still lean with fine confidence upon the structure of genial optimism which dominates so much of our national psychology. We look hopefully to see patriotism flow pure and strong from an industrial stratum whose occasional phenomena are Lawrence, McKees Rock, Patterson, Colorado Fuel and Iron, the Durst hop ranch in California, Everett in Washington, Butte in Montana, Bisbee in Arizona. Though strikes have increased some 300 per cent over peace times, though the American labor world is boiling and sputtering disturbances, bewildering in their variety and rapidity of appearance, our cure is a vague caution to "wait until casualties begin to come," an uneasy contemplation of labor conscription, or a wave of suppression.

Though national unity, economic and military, seems the obvious and essential aim of the patriotic citizen, much done in the name of unification seems to be curiously efficient in producing disunity. The following commonplace incident illustrates this. Note first that Seattle is in a state of extreme industrial unrest. During a single short period this summer, that city had a two weeks' strike paralysis of its street-car system, had a threatened

walk-out of the gas workers, was the strike center of a complete tie-up of the lumber industry of the state, experienced a building trades strike involving the entire city, had a walk-out of 30,000 shipbuilders, an express drivers' strike, a candy workers' strike, a newsboys' strike, and enjoyed the beginning of an organization of domestic servants. This city so described becomes the environment for the following incident.

The I.W.W. is strong in the Pacific Northwest, and though it bitterly fights the American Federation of Labor, some of the federation trade-unions found in the rough-handed trades, such as lumbering, stevedoring, and even shipbuilding, have drifted toward syndicalism and many of their members even carry secretly the red cards of the I.W.W. The federal government has met the anti-war agitation of the I.W.W. with fair cleverness. When arrests have been made, publicity has been given to the alleged treasonable activity of the leaders and the government case sustained before the public. The economic activities of the rank and file of the I.W.W., however, have not been interfered with, and their meeting halls in the Northwest continue thronged and the center of their strike activity. A Mrs. Sandburg, a Finnish woman, widow, with two children of three and six, lives on a small farm near Seattle. Being destitute she had been awarded a mother's pension by King County. On November 17 of this year this pension was cut off and the woman recommended for deportation because federal officers asserted that "she was actively working in the interests of the I.W.W., meetings had been held at her home, and members of the organization had visited there frequently." Nothing could have been more ingeniously done to focus the interest of a large unrestful labor group in the state of Washington on syndicalism than this incident. This well-intentioned and conventionally patriotic act is not merely inopportune, it is unhappily creative. The great emotional outflow stimulated into existence by the startling announcement of our national danger is being transferred from its desirable nationalistic object and focused on such activities, distressing, both socially and economically. It seems an accurate example of the Freudian *übertragung*, the transference of emotional expression.

It is a far cry from pseudo-politico-economic problems to a consideration of the delinquencies of modern economics, but there is a vital relation. Our conventional economics today analyzes no phase of industrialism nor the wage relationship, nor citizenship in pecuniary society, in a manner to offer a key to such distressing and complex problems as this. Human nature riots today through our economic structure with ridicule and destruction, and we economists look on helpless and aghast. The menace of the war does not seem potent to quiet revolt or still class cries. The anxiety and apprehension of the economist should not be produced by this cracking of his economic system, but by the poverty of the criticism of industrialism which his science offers. Why are economists mute in the presence of a most obvious crisis in our industrial society? Why have our criticisms of industrialism no sturdy warnings about this unhappy evolution? Why does an agitated officialdom search today in vain among our writings for scientific advice touching labor inefficiency or industrial disloyalty, for prophecies and plans about the rise in our industrialism of economic classes unharmonious and hostile?

The fair answer seems this: We economists speculate little on human motives. We are not curious about the great basis of fact which dynamic and behavioristic psychology has gathered to illustrate the instinct stimulus to human activity. Most of us are not interested to think of what a psychologically full or satisfying life is. We are not curious to know that a great school of behavior analysis called the Freudian has been built around the analysis of the energy outbursts brought by society's balking of the native human instincts. Our economic literature shows that we are but rarely curious to know whether industrialism is suited to man's inherited nature, or what man in turn will do to our rules of economic conduct in case these rules are repressive. The motives to economic activity which have done the major service in orthodox economic texts and teachings have been either the vague middle-class virtues of thrift, justice, and solvency, or the equally vague moral sentiments of "striving for the welfare of others," "desire for the larger self," "desire to equit one's self well," or lastly, that labor-saving deduction that man is stimulated in all things economic

by his desire to satisfy his wants with the smallest possible effort. All this gentle parody in motive theorizing continued contemporaneously with the output of the rich literature of social and behavioristic psychology which was almost entirely addressed to this very problem of human motives in modern economic society. Noteworthy exceptions are the remarkable series of books by Veblen, the articles and criticisms of Mitchell and Patten, and the most significant small book by Taussig, entitled *Inventors and Moneymakers*. It is this complimentary field of psychology to which the economists must turn as these writers have turned for a vitalization of their basic hypotheses. There awaits them a bewildering array of studies of the motives, emotions, and folk ways of our pecuniary civilization. Generalizations and experiment statistics abound ready-made for any structure of economic criticism. The human motives are isolated, described, compared. Business confidence, the release of work energy, advertising appeal, market vagaries, the basis of value computations, decay of workmanship, the labor unrest, decline in the thrift habit, are the subjects treated. A brief list of these economic psychologists is impressive: Veblen, Thorndike, Hollingworth, Dewey, James, Watson, Holt, Thomas, Stanley Hall, Jastrow, Patrick, Hobhouse, MacDougall, Hart, Shand, Wallas, Lippmann, Freud, Prince, Southard, Glueck, Brill, Bailey, Paton, Cannon, Crile, and so on. One might say with fairness that each one of these has contributed criticism touching the springs of human activity of which no economic theorist can afford to plead ignorance. The stabilizing of the science of psychology and the vogue among economists of the scientific method will not allow these psychological findings to be shouldered out by the careless a priori deductions touching human nature which still dominate our orthodox texts. The confusion and metaphysical propensities of our economic theory, our neglect of the consequences of child labor, our lax interest in national vitality and health, the unusableness of our theories of labor unrest and of labor efficiency, our careless reception of problems of population, eugenics, sex, and birth control, our crass ignorance of the relation of industry to crime, industry to feeble-mindedness, industry to functional insanity, industry to education, and our

astounding indifference to the field of economic consumption—all this delinquency can be traced back to our refusal to see that economics was social economics, and that a full knowledge of man, his instincts, his power of habit acquisition, his psychological demands and endurance, were an absolute prerequisite to clear and purposeful thinking on our industrial civilization. MacDougall, the Oxford social psychologist, said in direct point: "Political economy suffered hardly less from the crude nature of the psychological assumptions from which it professed to deduce the explanations of its facts, and its prescriptions for economic legislation. It would be a libel not altogether devoid of truth to say that the classical political economy was a tissue of false conclusions drawn from false psychological assumptions."

What then are the facts of human nature which the newer psychology offers as the beginning of economic theorizing?

Man is born into his world accompanied by a rich psychical disposition which furnishes him ready-made all his motives for conduct, all his desires, economic or wasteful, moral or depraved, crass or aesthetic. He can show a demand for nothing that is not prompted by this galaxy of instincts. He is a mosaic of unit tendencies to react faithfully in certain ways when certain stimuli are present. As MacDougall has graphically put it:

> Take away these instinctive dispositions with their powerful impulses and the human organism would become incapable of activity of any kind; it would lie inert and motionless like a wonderful clockwork whose mainspring had been removed or a steam engine whose fires had been drawn. These impulses are the mental forces which maintain and shape all the life of individuals and societies, and in them we are confronted with the central mystery of life and mind and will.

Thorndike, the Columbia psychologist, in his analysis of human motives, has written, "The behavior of man in the family, in business, in the state, in religion, and in every other affair of life, is rooted in his unlearned original equipment of instincts and capacities. All schemes of improving human life must take account of man's original nature, most of all when their aim is to counteract it."

Veblen wrote in his book, *The Instinct of Workmanship*,

> for mankind, as for the other higher animals, the life of the species is conditioned by the complement of instinctive proclivities, and tropismatic aptitudes

with which the species is typically endowed. Not only is the continued life of the race dependent upon the adequacy of its instinctive proclivities in this way, but the routine and details of its life are also, in a last resort, determined by these instincts. These are the prime movers in human behavior, as in the behavior of all those animals that show self-direction or discretion. The human activity, in so far as it can be spoken of as conduct, can never exceed the scope of these instinctive dispositions by initiative of which man takes action. Nothing falls within the human scheme of things desirable to be done except what answers to these native proclivities of man. These native proclivities alone make anything worth while, and out of their working emerge not only the purpose and efficiency of life but its substantial pleasures and pains as well.

John Dewey wrote in his *Democracy in Education*, "The instinct activities may be called, metaphorically, spontaneous in the sense that the organs give a strong bias for a certain sort of operation—a bias so strong that we cannot go contrary to it, though by trying to go contrary we may pervert, stunt and corrupt them."

Cannon, the Harvard physiologist, has said, "More and more it is appearing that in men of all races, and in most of the higher animals, the springs of action are to be found in the influences of certain emotions which express themselves in characteristic instinctive acts."

Instincts to their modern possessor seem unreasoning and unrational, and often embarrassing. To the race, however, they are an efficient and tried guide to conduct, for they are the result of endless experiments of how to fight, to grow, to procreate, under the ruthless valuing mechanism of the competition for survival. These instincts have in the most complete sense of the word survival value. In fact, outside of some relatively unimportant bodily attributes, the instincts are all that our species in its long evolution has considered worth saving. When one considers the unarmed state in which the soft-bodied human is shoved out in the world to fight for his existence against creatures with thick hides, vise-like jaws and claws, it becomes clearly evident that if man had not been equipped with an instinctive and unlearned code of efficient competition behavior, his struggle on this earth would have been brief and tragic. And also in contrast with his own remote ape ancestors, one could in retrospect see that the survival of the human species must have had as a prerequisite a rich and varied instinct equipment which removed man from the necessity of

learning a complete scheme of behavior via the dangerous trial and error method. The species, without some unlearned and protective capacities, would not have lasted the instruction. Within the past ten thousand years nothing in our brilliant experiment with the environment called civilization has been long enough adhered to to bring about a psychical adjustment capable of physical inheritance, and so the basic motives of the business man today remain those of his cave ancestor. The contribution of civilization has been merely an accumulation of more or less useful traditions touching habits, accidental in character and questionable in desirability.

All human activity, then, is untiringly actuated by the demand for realization of the instinct wants. If an artificially limited field of human endeavor be called economic life, all of its so-called motives hark directly back to the human instincts for their origin. There are, in truth, no economic motives as such. The motives of economic life are the same as those of the life of art, of vanity and ostentation, of war and crime, of sex. Economic life is merely the life in which instinct gratification is alleged to take on a rational pecuniary habit form. Man is not less a father with a father's parental instinct interest just because he passes down the street from his home to his office. His business raid into his rival's market has the same naïve charm that tickled the heart of his remote ancestor when in the night he rushed the herds of a nearby clan. A manufacturer tries to tell a conventional world that he resists the closed shop because it is un-American, it loses him money, or it is inefficient. A few years ago he was more honest when he said he would run his business as he wished and would allow no man to tell him what to do. His instinct of leadership, reinforced powerfully by his innate instinctive revulsion to the confinement of the closed shop, gave the true stimulus. His opposition is psychological, not ethical.

The importance to me of the description of the innate tendencies or instincts to be here given lies in their relation to my main explanation of economic behavior which is:

First, that these instinct tendencies are persistent, are far less warped or modified by the environment than we believe, that they

function quite as they have for a hundred thousand years, that they, as motives in their various normal or perverted habit form, can at times dominate singly the entire behavior and act as if they were a clear character dominant.

Secondly, that if the environment through any of the conventional instruments of repression such as extreme religious orthodoxy, economic inferiority, imprisonment, physical disfigurement, such as short stature, or a crippled body, repress the full psychological expression in the field of the instinct tendencies, then a psychic revolt, a slipping into abnormal mental functioning, takes place with the usual result that society accuses this revolutionist of being either wilfully inefficient, alcoholic, a syndicalist, supersensitive, an agnostic, or insane.

Convention has judged the normal man in economic society to be that individual who maintains a certain business placidity, is solvent, safe and not irritating to the delicate structure of credit. Trotter, the English social psychologist, has said that today's current normality has nothing to do with either stability of institutions or human progress. Its single important characteristic is that it is conventional. He urges the imperative need of a new concept of economic normality.

Perhaps one should stop to most seriously emphasize this concept of a new human normality and also to appreciate the handicap to discussion which comes whenever every analyzer at a round table has a very different brand of human normality in mind. There is that theoretical 100 per cent. normality which is gained for the individual by free mobility plus a full environmental equipment of persons and instruments, and which results in a harmonious and full expression of his psychic potentialities. Since each vigorous life lived under these conditions would generate wisdom in direct proportion to it, I think that an evolutionary and also conventionally desirable progress could be prophesied as a result. This progress has no so-called idealistic goal or direction. It has merely a potentiality for more wisdom and that wisdom might lead to any of countless possible developments.

A second normality would be that produced by that freedom in instinct expression and that environment which would give far

more unconventional experimentation, far more wisdom than we now have, but not the amount which would crack social life by hurrying the change of traditions too much, or destroy those civilization institutions which could be modified with some hope of their higher usefulness. Conscious that man will change, if he is to change, to this latter compromise normality concept, it is such a normality that I have in mind when I use the term.

In establishing a catalogue of instinct unit characters, one must first meet Thorndike's criticism of such a scheme. He sees the evolution in instinct theorizing toward an acceptance of the theory that there are innumerable special situations and special stimuli each possessed of its particular behavior reflex. All the important new evidence seems to back up this Thorndike contention. However, if the behavior analysis is a less delicate one and laboratory exactness is not demanded, and if merely consistent behavior tendencies are the objects of classification, it seems not unreasonable to build up a working hypothesis in the concrete form of general unit characters of behavior. The innumerable distinct reflex acts described by Thorndike separate out, as he in truth has separated them, into useful groups. These groups can, with great analysis efficiency, be used as unit characters and, properly named, can make up a usable catalogue of man's inherited social tendencies. This the writer has attempted.

The following catalogue of instincts includes those motives to conduct which, under observation, are found to be unlearned, are universal in the species, and which must be used to explain the innumerable similarities in behavior, detached in space and time from each other.

1. *Gregariousness.*—This innate tendency is exemplified in two ways. Modern economic history is full of that strange irrational phenomenon, "the trek to the city." Even in thinly settled Australia, half the population lives in a few great cities on the coast. In South America and on the Pacific Coast, this same abnormal agglomeration of folk has taken place. The extraordinary piling up of labor masses in modern London, Berlin, New York, Chicago, has created cities too large for economic efficiency, for recreation or sanitation, and yet, despite their inefficiencies and the food and

fire risk, the massing up continues. Factory employment, though speeded up and paid low wages, grows popular for it caters to gregariousness, and domestic service is shunned for it is a lonely job. Huddle and congestion seem the outstanding characteristics of the modern city.

The second exemplification is seen in man's extreme sensitiveness to the opinion of his group, which is an irrational gregarious reflex. This instinct is the psychic basis for his proclivity to react to mob suggestion and hysteria. In a strike, each striker has a perfectly biological capacity for violence if the group seems to will it. Because of this same gregariousness a panic can sweep Wall Street, or an anti-pacifist murmur turn into persecution and near lynching. The crowd members find themselves fatally gripped in the mob drift, they press forward willingly, all yell, and all shake fists and the most gentle spirited will find himself pulling at the lynch rope. Royce has said, "Woe to the society which belittles the power and menace of the mob mind." The lonely sheep herders become in the end irrational, and solitary confinement ends in insanity or submission.

The slavish following of fashion and fads is rooted in gregariousness, and the most important marketing problem is to guess the vagaries of desire which the mob spirit may select. A great crowd or festival is satisfying for its own sake. The installation of a president of a university needs behind the rows of intellectual delegates a mass of mere humanity, and it gets it by various naïve maneuvers. Crowds seldom disperse as rapidly as they might. They are loath to destroy their crowdishness, and therefore irrationally hang about. If gregariousness should weaken, a panic would seize municipal values, and professional baseball, the advertising business, and world-fairs and conventions would become impossible.

2. *Parental bent: motherly behavior: kindliness.*—In terms of sacrifice this is the most powerful of all instincts. This instinct, whose main concern is the cherishing of the young through their helpless period, is strong in women and weak in men. The confident presence in economic life of such anti-child influences as the saloons, licensed prostitution, child labor, the police control, and

juvenile delinquency can be well explained by the fact that political control has been an inheritance of the socially indifferent male sex. The coming of women into the franchise promises many interesting and profound economic changes. What little conservation exists today goes back to the male parental instinct for its rather feeble urge.

The disinterested indignation over misery-provoking acts which comes from this instinct is the base stimulus to law and order and furnishes the nebulous but efficient force behind such social vagaries as the anti-saloon league, society for the prevention of cruelty to animals, the associated charities, the movement for juvenile courts, prison reform, Belgian relief, the Child Labor League. The competitive egotism of pecuniary society has stifled the habits which express the parental bent.

3. *Curiosity: manipulation: workmanship.*—Curiosity and its attendant desire to draw near and if possible to manipulate the curious object are almost reflex in their simplicity. Of more economic applicability is the innate bent toward workmanship. Veblen has said that man has "a taste for effective work, and a distaste for futile effort." This desire and talent that man has to mold material to fancied ends, be the material clay or the pawns in diplomacy, explains much of human activity while wages explain little. Prisoners have a horror of prison idleness. Clerks drift out of stereotyped office work, and the monotony of modern industrialism has created a new type of migratory worker. As James has said, "Constructiveness is a genuine and irresistible instinct in man as in the bee or beaver." Man is then not naturally lazy, but innately industrious. Where laziness exists it is an artificial habit, inculcated by civilization. Man has a true quality sense in what he does—there is, then, a "dignity of labor," and it is the job and the industrial environment that produce the slacker, and not the laborer's wilful disposition.

4. *Acquisition: collecting: ownership.*—Man lusts for land, and goes eagerly to the United States, to South America, to Africa for it. It is the real basis of colonial policy and gives much of the interest to peace parleys. A landless proletariat is an uneasy, thwarted militant proletariat. The cure for unruly Ireland is proven to be

peasant proprietorship, and the social menace in the American labor world is the homeless migratory laborer. Russian peasants revolted for land, and this is the single consistent note in the anarchy chaos in Mexico. Man, much of the time, acquires for the mere sake of acquiring. A business man is never rich enough. If, however, making more money uses his acquisitive capacities too little, he may throw this cultivated habit activity into acquiring Van Dykes or bronzes or Greek antiques, or on a smaller and less aesthetic scale, postage stamps, signatures, or shaving mugs. Asylums are full of pitiful economic persons who, lost to the laws of social life, continue as automatons to follow an unmodified instinct in picking up and hoarding pins, leaves, scraps of food, paper. The savings banks in large part depend on this inborn tendency for their right to exist.

5. *Fear and flight.*—Man has the capacity to be fearful under many conditions. His most important fear from an economic standpoint is the stereotyped worker's or business man's worry over the insecure future. This anxiety or apprehension which is so plentiful up and down the scale of economic life has a profound and distressing influence on the digestive tract, and in turn on the general health. Much of nervous indigestion so common in the ruthless economic competition of today is "fear indigestion," is instinct reaction, and can only be cured by removing the cause. This removal of the cause is performed many times by an equally instinctive act, flight. Flight in business may take the conventional form of retirement or selling out, but often adopts the unique method of bankruptcy, insanity, or suicide.

6. *Mental activity: thought.*—To quote Thorndike: "This potent mover (workmanship) of men's economic and recreated activities, has its tap root in the instinct of multiform mental and physical activity." To be mentally active, to do something, is instinctively satisfying. Much of invention springs costless from a mind thinking for the sheer joy of it. Organization, plans in industry, schemes for market extension, visions of ways to power, all agitate neurones in the brain ready and anxious to give issue in thought. A duty of the environment is not only to allow but to encourage states in which meditation naturally occurs.

7. *The housing or settling instinct.*—In its simplest form, the gunny-sack tents of the tramps, the playhouses of children, the camp in the thicket of the hunter. The squatter has a different feeling for his quarter section when he has a dugout on it. Man innately wants a habitation into which he can retire to sleep or to nurse his wounds, physical or social. The Englishman's home is his castle.

8. *Migration: homing.*—To every man the coming of spring suggests moving on. The hobo migration begins promptly with the first sunshine, and the tramp instinct fills Europe with questing globe-trotters. The advice, "Go West, young man," was not obeyed on account of the pecuniary gain alone, but because the venture promised satisfaction to the instinct to migrate as well.

9. *Hunting.*—Man survived in earlier ages through destroying his rivals and killing his game, and these tendencies bit deep into his psychic make-up. Modern man delights in a prize fight or a street brawl, even at times joys in ill news of his own friends, has poorly concealed pleasure if his competition wrecks a business rival, falls easily into committing atrocities if conventional policing be withdrawn, kills off a trade-union, and is an always possible member of a lynching party. He is still a hunter and reverts to his primordial hunt habits with disconcerting zest and expediency. Historic revivals of the hunting urge make an interesting recital of religious inquisitions, witch burnings, college hazings, persecution of suffragettes, of the I.W.W., of the Japanese, or of pacifists. All this goes on often under naïve rationalization about justice and patriotism, but it is pure and innate lust to run something down and hurt it.

10. *Anger: pugnacity.*—In its bodily preparation for action, anger is identical with fear, and fear constitutes the most violent and unreasoning of purposeful dispositions in man. Caught up in anger, all social modifications of conduct tend to become pale, and man functions in primordial attack and defense. Anger and its resulting pugnacity have as their most common excitant the balking or thwarting of another instinct, and this alone explains why man has so jealously, through all ages, fought for liberty.

Pugnacity is the very prerequisite of individual progress. Employers fight a hampering union, unions a dogmatic employer; every imprisoned man is, in reality, psychically incorrigible, students rebel against an autocratic teacher, street boys gang together to fight a bully, nations are ever ready, yes, hoping to fight, and their memory of the cost of war is biologically rendered a short one. In fighting there is a subtle reversion to the primitive standards, and early atrocities become the trench vogue of later months. Patriotism without fighting seems, to western nations, a pallid thing. Most of the vigorous phases of modern civilization remain highly competitive and warlike. Ethics has a long psychological way to go in its vitally necessary task of sublimating the pugnacious bent in man.

11. *Revolt at confinement: at being limited in liberty of action and choice.*—As above noted, man revolts violently at any oppression, be it of body or soul. Being held physically helpless produces in man and animals such profound functional agitation that death can ensue. Passive resistance could only be possible when nearly all of man's inherited nature was removed. In primitive days, being held was immediately antecedent to being eaten, and the distaste of physical helplessness is accordingly deep seated. Belgium would rather resist than live; an I.W.W. would rather go to jail than come meekly off his soap box; the militant suffragettes go through the depravity of forced feeding rather than suffer their inequality, and the worker will starve his family to gain recognition for his union. Man will die for liberty, and droops in prison. So psychically revolting is confinement that the alienists have been forced to create a new disease, a "confinement insanity," a prison psychosis.

12. *Revulsion.*—The social nausea which society feels toward discussions of sex, venereal disease, leprosy, certain smells, is not founded on wilfulness. It is a non-intellectual and innate revulsion to the subject. It is only within the last twenty-five years that the scientific attitude itself has been able to overcome this instinctive repugnance and attack these problems intimate and perilous to human society which have languished under the taboo.

13. *Leadership and mastery.*—It often appears that man seeks leadership and mastery solely because their acquisition places him in

a better position to gratify his other instinctive promptings. But there also seems a special gratification in leading and mastery for their own sake. Modern life shows prodigious effort, paid only in the state of being a boss of the gang, a "leading" college man, a "prominent citizen," a secretary or a vice-president, a militia captain or a church elder. A secret ambition to some day lead some group on some quest, be it ethical or economic, is planted deep in our nature. Every dog longs to have his day.

14. *Subordination: submission.*—In contrast to leadership, man longs at times to follow the fit leader. Soldiers joy in a firm captain, workmen quit a lax though philanthropic employer, instructors thresh under an inefficient though indulgent department head. Eternal independence and its necessary strife are too wearing on the common man and he longs for peace and protection in the shadow of a trust-inspiring leader. To submit under right conditions is not only psychically pleasant, but much of the time to be leaderless is definitely distressing.

15. *Display: vanity: ostentation.*—This old disposition gives the basic concept for Veblen's remarkable analysis of the economic activities of America's leisure class. The particular state of the industrial arts with its trust control and divorce of producer and consumer, plus political peace, has taken from man his ancient opportunity to show his unique gifts in ownership of economic goods and in valor. So he is driven in his yearning for attention to perverted activities. He lives to waste conspicuously, wantonly, originally and, by the refined uselessness of his wasting, show to the gaping world what an extraordinary person he is. The sensitiveness of social matrons to mention in the society columns, the hysteria to be identified with the changing vagaries of the style, the fear of identification with drab and useful livelihoods, offer in their infinite variety a multitude of imporant economic phenomena.

16. *Sex.*—Of the subjects vital to an analysis of life, be they aesthetic or economic, sex has suffered most from the revulsion taboo. Manifestly an instinct which molds behavior and purposeful planning profoundly, sex as a motive concept is barred from the economic door. Despite the proven moral and efficiency problems which arise with the postponement of marriage due to modern

economic conditions, the massing of unmarried immigrant men into tenement rooms, or the condemning of some millions of migratory workers to a womanless existence, conventional morality meets every situation by denying the sex instinct, by a blind belief that in some strange way modern economic civilization allows its inmates "to mortify the deeds of the body."

While at any particular moment in our behavior we are a blend or composite of many instinct activities, it is accurate to describe much of behavior as dominated at any one time by either a single instinct or at most two or three. A certain environment can habituate man to a specialization in gratification of a single or a pair of instincts. For instance, war matures and educates habits gratifying the instincts of pugnacity and hunting. At the war front this habit bent gives basis for gradually sloughing off the humane restrictions governing the fighting, and armies mutually obey their new psychology. Machine-gun men know they will not be taken prisoner and their service is now known as the suicide squad. Hospitals or undefended towns are bombed, a very conventional minimum of attention is fixed for the enemy wounded, the primitive method of warfare of the French African troops which at first disturbed the ethics of the Allies is now forgotten in the more liberal interpretation under the revamped war psychology. At home the citizens of the belligerent countries gain a cathartic for their overstimulated pugnacious bent by rioting the People's Council, or tar and feathering the I.W.W., or organizing a man hunt for a lately immigrated Austrian or German. It is quite natural that the actors in these domestic dramas should build up explanatory rationalizations for their activity. It is their mild bow to the fast-dimming conventions and traditions of peace. As a gentle and aged lady deplored, "I cannot fight, but I can at least go about and listen and report on the unpatriotic."

The tongue-tied and paralyzed after-dinner speaker is a single-minded expositor of the strange instinct of subservience. The worried father of a sick child seated at his office desk is not an economic man. His behavior is dominated by the parental motive, and in this fact is found the only explanation of his distracted conduct. Veblen in a shrewd analysis of industrial evolution noted

that the early pre-capitalistic culture with its handicraft production and small intimate social groups stressed the habits which express the instinct of workmanship and the parental instinct. With the industrial revolution and the immergence into the pecuniary scheme of things of a small property-owning class and a large proletariat, life presented habit opportunities which stressed in the master class the so-called egotistical instincts of leadership, hunting, ostentation, and vanity, and for the working class removed the opportunities to express the instinct of workmanship and reduced and restricted the other avenues of expression or perverted them to non-evolutionary or anti-social behavior. Instinct perversion rather than freely selected habits of instinct expression seems broadly a just characterization of modern labor class life. Modern labor unrest has a basis more psychopathological than psychological, and it seems accurate to describe modern industrialism as mentally insanitary.

A remarkable analysis of instinct dominance over behavior is illustrated by the experiments at the Harvard Medical School and described by Professor Cannon. He notes that among the instinct emotions active in man, those which are identified with a physical struggle for existence have both a physical and mechanical authority over all other instinct urges to conduct. Like the military general staff, they shoulder aside in times of stress the aesthetic and peaceful enthusiasms and mobilize every mental and physical efficiency to their war purpose. The central nervous system is divided by Cannon into three parts, all of which, under peace, function normally. If, however, the brain be stimulated to fear or anger, one of those parts, the so-called "sympathetic part," becomes the dictator. Its particular nerve fibers are of the three parts by far the most extensive in their distribution and permit immediate mobilization of the entire body. Its mobilization consists in

secession of processes in the alimentary canal, thus freeing the energy supplied for other parts, the shifting of blood from the abdominal organs whose activities are deferrable to the organs immediately essential to muscular exertion (the lungs, the heart, the central nervous system), the increased vigor of contraction of the heart, the quick abolition of the effects of muscular fatigue, the mobilizing of energy-giving sugar in the circulation—every one of these visceral

changes is directly serviceable in making the organism more effective in the violent display of energy which fear or rage or pain may involve.

But the most unique war footing activity of the body in this vigorous preparedness is the functioning of the adrenal gland. To use Cannon's words:

> Adrenin, secreted by the adrenal glands, in time of stress or danger, plays an essential rôle in flooding the blood with sugar, distributes the blood to the heart, lungs, central nervous system and limbs, takes it away from the inhibited organs of the abdomen, it quickly abolishes muscular fatigue and coagulates the blood on injury. These remarkable facts are furthermore associated with some of the most primitive experiences in the life of the higher organisms, experiences common to man and beast—the elemental experiences of pain and fear and rage that come suddenly in critical emergencies.

The conclusion seems both scientific and logical that behavior in anger, fear, pain, and hunger is a basically different behavior from the behavior under repose and economic security. The emotions generated under the conditions of existence-peril seem to make the emotions and motives generative in quiet and peace pale and unequal. It seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that the most vital part of man's inheritance is one which destines him to continue for some myriads of years ever a fighting animal when certain conditions exist in his environment. Though, through education, man be habituated in social and intelligent behavior or, through license, in sexual debauchery, still at those times when his life or liberty is threatened, his instinct-emotional nature will inhibit either social thought or sex ideas, and present him as merely an irrational fighting animal.

Since every instinct inherited by man from his tree and cave ancestors, literally sewed into his motivating disposition, has survival value, an environment which balks or thwarts his instinct expression, arouses directly and according to the degree of its menace this unreasoning emotional revolt in him. The chemical proof of this emotional revolt is found by Cannon even in individuals suffering from vague states of worry or anxiety. Here the single problem is the manner in which the angry or fearful person coins his revolt emotion into behavior, and this largely depends upon

the right and proper method which society has selected for expressing psychical dissatisfaction. There are folk ways of distress behavior just as certainly as there are of religious enthusiasm or patriotism. Since the emotional tone stimulated by the balking of "minor" instincts would naturally be lower than that intense tone generated by a threatened rendering of one's flesh, or imprisonment, to the same degree is the behavior stimulated by the lower-toned emotions less vivid and noteworthy than the blind and frantic resistance to the direct physical threat. The behavior reflex to the emotions generated in a state of worry, anxiety, economic servility, or personal humiliation, instead of expressing itself in violent revolt, is shown in states of mental inertia, loss of interest and power of attention, labor inefficiency, drifting off the job, drink, and drugs. These behavior states which under conventional and economic moral theorizing are barrenly and inaccurately described as wilful acts are elemental, irrational, and blind reflex activities. Under conditions which allow the satisfactory expression of man's original inherited proclivities, this warlike specialization of the mind and body is avoided. There the cranial or sacral sections of the peace-footing "automatic" section divide with the warlike "sympathetic" section the authority over the body. Health and nerve reserve is built up, a quiet brain permits rational orderings of the associations of the mind, social-behavior habits can influence the order and connections of the neurones and insure their perpetuation; in short, intellectual progress becomes possible.

The instincts and their emotions, coupled with the obedient body, lay down in scientific and exact description the motives which must and will determine human conduct. If a physical environment set itself against the expression of these instinct motives, the human organism is fully and efficiently prepared for a tenacious and destructive revolt against this environment, and if the antagonism persist, the organism is ready to destroy itself and disappear as a species if it fail of a psychical mutation which would make the perverted order endurable.

Even if labor-class children evade those repressive deportment traditions that characterize the life of the middle-class young, at a later date in the life of these working-class members certain powerful

forces in their environment, though they work on the less susceptible and less plastic natures of mature individuals, produce obsessions and thwartings which function at times, exclusively almost, in determining the behavior of great classes of the industrial population. The powerful forces of the working-class environment which thwart and balk instinct expression are suggested in the phrases "monotonous work," "dirty work," "simplified work," "mechanized work," "the servile place of labor," "insecure tenure of the job," "hire and fire," "winter unemployment," "the ever found union of the poor district with the crime district," and the "restricted district of prostitution," the "open shop," the "labor turnover," "poverty," the "bread lines," the "scrap heap," "destitution." If we postulate some sixteen instinct unit characters which are present under the laborer's blouse and insistently demand the same gratification that is with painful care planned for the college students, in just what kind of perverted compensations must a laborer indulge to make endurable his existence? A western hobo tried in a more or less frenzied way to compensate for a general all-embracing thwarting of his nature by a wonderful concentration of sublimation activities on the wander instinct. The monotony, indignity, dirt, and sexual apologies of, for instance, the unskilled worker's life bring their definite fixations, their definite irrational inferiority obsessions.

The balked laborer here follows one of the two described lines of conduct.

First, he either weakens, becomes inefficient, drifts away, loses interest in the quality of his work, drinks, deserts his family; or,

Secondly, he indulges in a true type inferiority compensation, and in order to dignify himself, to eliminate for himself his inferiority in his own eyes, he strikes or brings on a strike; he commits violence, or he stays on the job and injures machinery, or mutilates the materials. He is fit food for dynamite conspiracies. He is ready to make sabotage a part of his regular habit scheme. His condition is one of mental stress and unfocused psychic unrest, and could in all accuracy be called a definite industrial psychosis. He is neither wilful nor responsible, he is suffering from a stereotyped mental disease.

If one leaves the strata of unskilled labor and investigates the higher economic classes, he finds parallel conditions. There is a profound unrest and strong migratory tendency among department store employees. One New York store with less than three thousand employees has thirteen thousand pass through its employ in a year. Since the establishment in American life of big business with its extensive efficiency systems, its order and de-humanized discipline, its caste system, as it were, there has developed among its highly paid men a persistent unrest, a dissatisfaction and decay of morale which is so noticeable and costly that it has received repeated attention. Even the conventional competitive efficiency of American business is in grave question. I suggest that this unrest is a true revolt psychosis, a definite mental unbalance, an efficiency psychosis, as it were, and has its definite psychic antecedents, and that our present moralizing and guess solutions are both hopeless and ludicrous.

The dynamic psychology of today describes the present civilization as a repressive environment. For a great number of its inhabitants a sufficient self-expression is denied. There is, for those who care to see, a deep and growing unrest and pessimism. With the increase in knowledge is coming a new realization of the irrational direction of economic evolution. The economists, however, view economic inequality and life degradation as objects in truth outside the science. Our value concept is a price mechanism hiding behind a phrase. If we are to play a part in the social readjustment immediately ahead, we must put human nature and human motives into our basic hypotheses. Our value concept must be the yardstick to measure just how fully things and institutions contribute to a full psychological life. We must know more of the meaning of progress. The domination of society by one economic class has for its chief evil the thwarting of the instinct life of the subordinate class and the perversion of the upper class. The extent and characteristics of this evil are only to be estimated when we know the innate potentialities and inherited propensities of man, and the ordering of this knowledge and its application to the changeable economic structure is the task before the trained economists today.

DISCUSSION

FRANK A. FETTER, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

The two papers to which we have just listened cover a wide field, ranging from the very origins of economic action to its ultimate results. The connection between the two papers may at first be difficult to see. However, they are both jeremiads; they both indict our economic system for failure, on the one hand, to secure a necessary measure of equality in the distribution of wealth and, on the other hand, to satisfy the fundamental needs of human nature for the masses of men. Both papers alike declare that this failure appears at the two extremes of society, among the very rich and the very poor.

From another point of view, the indictment appears to be brought against contemporary economic thought for its failure, on the one hand, to solve the problem of economic inequality and, on the other hand, to recognize the complex and fundamental psychological nature of man. The reply to these accusations cannot be a simple one. It must in part be confession, in part extenuation and avoidance, and in part denial of the statements of facts and of the inferences drawn from them.

Are economists neglectful of questions of distribution and human welfare? The reply to this depends largely on one's conception of the true function of economics as a special discipline. Economics is far from being the whole of social philosophy. It is far from having the sole responsibility for the guidance of social action and social legislation. Its special field is the ascertainment of the facts, and the exact scientific analysis of the problems of value and price. The framing of a policy of social action is the work of the social philosopher and statesman and involves considerations not merely of an economic nature, but legal, ethical, political, and religious as well. There is risk that in becoming a universal oracle any social science will lose its intellectual poise and its judicial authority. This modesty of economics may seem inexplicable to some of our sister sciences, which are restrained by no such considerations. As an individual, as a man, and as a citizen, the economist, to be sure, is impelled to frame for himself an ideal of social action. Contemporary economists are not ignoring or neglecting the problems of human welfare. One has but to recall the subjects and to review the discussions in this Association for the past thirty years, and particularly in the last decade, to see how the thought of economists has taken practical, constructive, and concrete directions in such matters as the protection of labor, immigration, land policy, tariff legislation, and the development of democratic forms of taxation.

The first paper is, in the main, an attack on the doctrine of *laissez faire*. The writer implies that this doctrine still has some vitality, although he suggests that it began to lose its force a generation ago. At least his chronology needs revision. I began the study of economics a generation ago, and I was taught then that *laissez faire*, as a doctrine, had long been dead. Indeed, looking back over the history of the past century, one may doubt whether

anyone has put faith in that doctrine excepting a little group of selfish interests whenever they wished to favor their own policies. As early as the thirties and forties of the last century began in England that protective labor legislation which has spread to the ends of the earth in defiance of *laissez faire.* There was little evidence of *laissez faire* in the enormous grants of land and money by the public to railroads and other corporations in the United States from 1850 on. A thousand important public policies of the past half-century are evidence that *laissez faire* has long been dead. But its image, like that of Guy Fawkes, is still brought out each year to be hung up in derision to make a sociological holiday.

The first paper devotes considerable time to an attack upon the theory of specific productivity as developed by John B. Clark. I yield to no one in my respect for Clark's theoretical work, considered as a whole, but this part of his theory I utterly rejected in a review of his work as early as 1901. Referring to his claim to present a "vindication of the existing distribution of incomes," I called this a *non sequitur* from his economic analysis. I declared that Clark had not proved and could not prove by his analysis that, as he said, "there is assigned to every one what he has specifically produced." This judgment I believe to have reflected not only my own view but that of many economists at that time. My colleague, Professor Adriance, has more recently in a detailed and effective refutation given to the doctrine of specific productivity its *coup de grace* (*Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November, 1914). It is true that various phrases with the flavor of specific productivity still linger in the textbooks, but the authors render to the doctrine a mere lip-service. Certainly when such economists as Taussig and Seager, with their well-known social sympathy, speak of "specific productivity," they mean no justification of prevailing abuses, no ethical vindication of the existing inequality of incomes.

Of the other economic questions raised by the first paper, I will refer only to the confusion throughout of competition with lack of regulation. In a number of the examples cited, the evils are due not to competition but to monopoly, to a one-sided competition. Regulation is needed either to restore competition or to control combination and monopoly, not to suppress competition.

The first paper is filled with admirable ethical fervor and brings to us a message that it were well to heed. The theme of the second paper, the importance of a broader biological and psychological basis in our economic theory, deserves our respectful hearing, and in most respects our cordial acceptance. The economic man is dead, as dead as *laissez faire.* The motives in economic action are complex and are derived from all the elements of man's complex nature. It is well to have presented in this interesting form the fruits of the behaviorist psychology. Doubtless we have not more than begun to realize the strength of the primitive impulses and instincts in man's nature; but these studies of the biologists and psychologists, and the newer volitional psychology, have already found their way into the economic literature and even into the

more advanced general texts in economics. I attempted fifteen years ago to give some recognition to these ideas in the concept of psychic income. The thought in this is that in all problems of valuation the psychic element is of primary importance and the physical goods are but secondary. What a man or what a nation shall secure in welfare and happiness depends more on the spiritual state of man than it does on the physical objects over which he disposes. We need a new evaluation of industrial institutions in the light of these new doctrines. It may be admitted that many economists have been slow to recognize these truths. I, for one, welcome most heartily the work of Professor Parker and the main thesis of his paper.

I would in closing suggest a few difficulties, however, in some of the applications he makes of his psychological doctrine. He seeks by it to explain the temper and outbreaks of the mass of the members of the I.W.W., whom he defines in a recently published article (*Atlantic Monthly*, November) as members of the hobo class. Now every careful application of mental tests to the class of vagrant casual workers, tramps, and hobos has revealed a large amount of mental defectiveness, extending even to feeble-mindedness. (Of course one need not assert this of the more capable leaders.) So far as this is true we have to do here with the expression not of normal psychology but of defective mentality. This, too, is a psychological explanation of some features of the problem, but is very different from the one which Professor Parker has suggested.

Again he seems to try to explain through these primitive psychological traits the outbreak of strikes, which in the West have been of late three times as numerous as before. But what light can the behaviorist psychology throw upon this increase of strikes? Has the primitive nature of these hobo workers become suddenly three times as strong as before? That primitive nature is the fixed fact. Is not the explanation to be found in this case in some change in the environment? And there is one important change to which the author has made no reference, namely, the rapid rise of prices since 1914. It is a general truth of history that when prices rise rapidly, wages lag behind and strikes multiply. It is this fact that would seem to explain the recent wave of strikes much more simply, more prosaically and less dramatically, than is done by Professor Parker.

Finally, I would raise the question as to whether throughout this paper the author has not greatly exaggerated the biological elements in the analysis and underestimated the cultural or educational elements. Man in society from its primitive beginning has been a product of the union of biological and cultural influences. The untutored savage is a myth; nature-folk everywhere are rigorously tutored in the customs and traditions of their tribes. Their primitive biological nature is shaped and molded from infancy by their social environment. Wherever this educational process in any nation or any class of society is omitted or slighted, there unsocial acts result. The explanation of these acts therefore is not so much in the biological nature which the lawbreakers

share with all law-abiding men, but in the lack of education—the education which they have failed to share. The rapid growth of our industrial institutions has given us many unsolved problems of education. We have not adequately developed institutions making for thrift in the new conditions, nor have we sufficiently safeguarded the mass of men against the accidents of industrial life. We have not provided for them the industrial training that would mold them into habits of industry, and give them the possibility of modest success. These facts help to explain many continuing evils in our industrial relations. In so far, therefore, Professor Parker's paper leaves a distorted impression. We decline to make again of economics a "dismal science." We refuse to believe that all our industrial ills are due to the innate wickedness of men and to our inevitable heritage of original sin.

Wesley C. Mitchell, Columbia University

All of us who heard Professor Irving Fisher's presidential address before the American Association for Labor Legislation have doubtless been thinking of the similarity between the burden of his speech and what Professor Parker has said tonight. Circumstances have directed the attention of both men to the industrial unrest which is so prevalent at the present time. One in New Haven, the other in Seattle, have concluded that to understand and deal efficiently with existing conditions we must recognize factors not dreamed of in orthodox economic theory. Both men contend that modern conditions of factory production are seriously and needlessly exasperating to the mass of the wage-earners. Disputes between employers and employed they attribute quite as much to this emotional state of irritation as to a desire to drive a better bargain. Man inherits, both tell us, certain instincts, and any life which thwarts the activities that these instincts prompt will inevitably breed discord.

All the men who have for years been declaring that economic theory must pay more intelligent attention to the problems of behavior will be encouraged at the coincidence of these two addresses. They will be particularly pleased by Professor Fisher's adhesion to this viewpoint, inasmuch as in the remarkable dissertation with which he began his scientific career he protested against the foisting of psychology upon economic theory. The same men will feel further encouraged by the welcome that Professor Fetter has just extended to Professor Parker's analysis. They may even hope that Professor Fetter will some day explain definitely what the "American Psychological School" has to do with psychology. I have been inclined to think that Professor Fisher was logically justified in protesting against the foisting of psychology upon the type of economic theory which he propounded in 1892. Similarly Professor A. C. Whitaker has protested against the mixing of psychology with the type of economic theory which Professor Fetter propounded in 1915. Will not

Professor Fetter take early occasion to show just how the ingenious variant of orthodox economics with which his name is associated really connects with such a discussion as we have heard?

Concerning Professor Parker's paper I have but one remark to make, and that remark is by way rather of supplement than of criticism. Professor Parker has given us a list of some sixteen instincts which, as is usual nowadays, he conceives to be inherited from generation to generation without substantial change. So far as this factor in human behavior is concerned he suggests that men at the present time are practically the same as men in the Stone Age. It is, however, groundedly believed that human behavior in modern Christendom differs materially from the behavior of cave men. Some factor in behavior has undergone *great* modifications, and that factor has not been mentioned in Professor Parker's analysis.

The omitted factor is of course the institutional factor. Under this term there are included the socially prevalent habits which in any given group standardize the behavior of individual members. For the social sciences this factor in behavior is of peculiar importance, since it makes possible cumulative change. So far as these sciences can contribute to progress, they find their opportunity in purposive, intelligent control over institutions. One of the hopeful results of the present war is that it has demonstrated to all that our social economic institutions are far more malleable than had been supposed. Those men like Professor Parker and like Professor Fisher who see a conflict between man's inherited instincts and present living conditions are justified in pressing vigorously for such changes of our present institutuons as will accord on the one hand with the original nature of man, and on the other hand with our present notions of productive efficiency.

E. C. Hayes, University of Illinois

It has been interesting to observe the difference of opinion between the two gentlemen who have discussed my paper as to what is or is not dead in economic theory.[1] From what appears in the economic textbooks and from what is heard in the utterances of economists one is forced to conclude that if the doctrine of *laissez faire* is dead it must be reckoned as one that "being dead yet speaketh." I am glad to find myself in agreement with the President of the American Economic Association that if the doctrine of *laissez faire* is dead, at least its obsequies still require to be decently celebrated.[2] One who says that the doctrine of *laissez faire* was dead a generation ago must mean that the first exceptions to the universality of its application had been admitted.

[1] Referring to what Professors Fetter said about *laissez faire* and the specific productivity theory.

[2] Referring to the treatment of the doctrine of *laissez faire* in Professor Common's presidential address.

As the reigning theory it resembled a king who had lost some outlying provinces, but who still asserted full authority over most of his realm and lustily resisted further encroachments, to say nothing of total dethronement.

If the time allowed I should gladly renew debate over the proposition which has been expressed by one gentleman this evening, that the way to rectify distribution is to maintain freedom of competition, and in doing so should willingly begin at a point selected by my critic, namely, retail trade. The objection to present retail methods is not so much that they enrich the merchants as that they wrong the consumers. And I should admit with alacrity that in the very instances in which merchants are enriched the methods of merchandizing are extravagantly costly. This of course shows that these unregulated methods can at the same time waste profusely and also enrich the dealers, doing both out of what is taken from the consumers.

I recall the statement made by one speaker, that he had noted down the points to be remarked upon after reading my paper in advance of its presentation here, and therefore I am allowed to hope that he would not understand me to say that the problem of production has been fully, finally, or adequately solved after hearing the emphasis with which I read the statement that "the problem of production we have *measurably* solved," and that "the development of production is no longer our *prime* need."

Whether the specific productivity theory is already dead, as one speaker has declared, or whether it is thoroughly alive, as the other emphatically asserts, I venture to hope that after further considering what I have said you will agree that it *ought to be dead.* It is still in textbooks used in American colleges as the definitely elaborated or the implicit foundation of the theory of distribution. Nothing has been said tonight to invalidate either the three main propositions of my paper, or my objections to the specific productivity theory. So far as anyone has shown there seems to be no objection to my distinction between, on the one hand, what a factor in industry *conditions,* and can prevent by its withdrawal and demand as the price of its participation and, on the other hand, what it actually *produces;* or to my contention that what labor produces when using only no-rent land or no-rent machinery is no fair test of what it normally produces and should receive, and that present theories of rent, interest and wages, while they do *explain* what happens, do not even by implication *justify* what happens.

The world is indebted to the economists for an achievement of very great practical and scientific importance in that they have shown what must take place if economic tendency operates uncontrolled. And here there appears to be no argument against the further conclusion that this which must take place under unregulated economic tendency, instead of being that in which we must and should acquiesce, is that in which we need not, and in which as just and courageous men we cannot, acquiesce.

IMMIGRATION AS A PROBLEM IN SOCIAL CONTROL

HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD
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Next to winning the war, the problem of immigration is certainly one of the most important, if not the very most important, problem before the people of the United States. While hostilities have brought about a practical cessation of foreign arrivals, thereby diverting attention from immigration itself, yet the critical situation has thrown into clearer light than ever before the complexity and gravity of the conditions which result from immigration, and there is reason to believe that when communication with Europe is restored the American people will be more ready than ever before to give serious thought to the problem of immigration, to consider it soberly in its broad outlines and in its multitudinous details, and to be guided in their action by sound scientific principles. The present is therefore a peculiarly appropriate time to reflect upon the meaning of this great movement, to consider its bearing upon the social life of America and of the world, and to study how the principles of social control may be applied to it.

The general question of the application of social control to immigration presents five distinct aspects: the possibility of control, the right to control, the necessity of control, the purpose of control, and the method of control. These may profitably be considered in succession.

The possibility of the control of immigration rests upon the fact that true immigration always crosses a national boundary, and is therefore subject to arrest by either one or both of two states. Furthermore, effective control must take the form of state control for the reason that, inasmuch as the members of two distinct societies are concerned, the less authoritative and positive forms of control—broadly described as public opinion—will not operate.

History affords instances of efficient control by the country of source as well as by the country of destination. Until recent years Turkey had strict laws governing the emigration of her subjects, and while there were many evasions there was no real emigration current. At the present time emigration from Japan to the United States is held in check by the action of the Japanese government. This sort of control, however, is becoming increasingly difficult for modern nations. The growth of democratic ideas has caused even the most despotic nations to be exceedingly chary of attempting to restrain their subjects by force from emigration.

At the present time most of the effective restrictions upon immigration are placed by the receiving nations. This is certainly true of immigration to the United States. The character of the immigration stream is essentially what we choose to permit. The possibility of this form of control is enhanced by the fact that most European nations tacitly approve of any American measures which operate to keep their able-bodied subjects at home. Within recent years there have been no serious objections even to our measures for excluding foreign criminals and paupers. It is significant that the nations which are popularly supposed to threaten the possibility of our control in the future are oriental nations, with a largely redundant population, which until now, however, have lacked the force to impose their will upon us.

Granting, then, that we have for the present the possibility of controlling immigration, the next question is whether we have a right to avail ourselves of this possibility. The whole question of rights lies so largely in the field of abstract speculation and intuition that it may seem incongruous to introduce it here. Particularly in the field of international relations we are witnessing an imposing demonstration of the facts that there can be no rights except on the basis of law and that there can be no law without an authoritative force to maintain the law. The notions that any of us may have as to what are rights vanish into thin air, and the agreements that nations make among themselves become scraps of paper, when the passions of men are turned loose without any force to restrain them. It might seem, then, that any nation had a right to control immigration as long as it was powerful enough to

enforce its will, but that that right would disappear as soon as another nation whose interests were opposed rose superior to it in power.

The fact is, however, that many people in this and other countries question our intrinsic right to exert a control over immigration which involves keeping out from our territory those from foreign lands who wish to enter. Assuming that we have the power, these persons hold that it is an unethical act to exercise that power against the wishes of foreign individuals. Prominent among the exponents of this view in this country is Mary Antin, who speaks axiomatically of "the right of free men to choose their place of residence,"[1] and denies that we have the right to impose on foreigners any further restriction than we in fact put upon our own people.[2] There are many others in this country who hold similar views, and the superficial humanitarianism of their arguments lends them a strong appeal. With a certain group of writers this contention takes an individualistic form. They maintain that it is selfish and inconsiderate to shut out from the benefits of American life suffering and ambitious residents of other lands. Still more important, perhaps, is that form of the rights argument which rests upon international grounds. There are those in foreign countries, and there are those in the United States, who support them, who deny that this government has the right to forbid entrance to the subjects of friendly nations, or at least the right to discriminate between friendly nations in granting admission.

The most imminent example of this at the present time is Japan. According to many authorities, as, for example, Mr. J. F. Steiner,[3] the Japanese believe—or profess to believe—that they have a right to enter America, which is to say that we have not the right to keep them out. According to some students of the oriental situation it is the denial of this abstract right, rather than any actual interference with the movements of Japanese, that lies back of whatever animosity toward the United States there may be among the Japanese on account of the immigration situation. It is clear,

[1] *They Who Knock at Our Gates*, p. 10.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[3] *The Japanese Invasion*, p. 194.

then, that the question of the ethical right of this nation to control immigration is not merely an academic question, but has an intensely practical bearing on public affairs.

Now no question of abstract right was ever settled by argument, and no attempt will be made to settle this one. All that is sought in the present connection is to throw into clear relief the basic importance of sound, logical thinking on the subject. It need only be observed, in passing, that if there are any inherent national rights at all, certainly foremost among them is the right to determine what constituent elements shall go into the body politic and into the electorate—that is to say, the right to control immigration and naturalization. Or perhaps the issue may be clarified by stating it in this way: Are national rights of land ownership similar in any respect to individual rights to land? No one questions the right of the individual to keep others off his land. The "right to choose a residence" does not imply that any stranger has a right to come and settle down in your residence or mine.

An ironically humorous light is thrown upon the whole rights argument by the fact that it was Thomas Jefferson, whom Mary Antin sets in a class with Moses,[1] who expressed the wish that there were an ocean of fire between this country and Europe, so that it would be impossible for any more immigrants to come here.

Having established the possibility of controlling immigration, and the right of any nation, which has the power, to control immigration, the next question is: What is the necessity of controlling immigration? To understand this question it is necessary to consider briefly the nature of the immigration movement.

Immigration is a great natural phenomenon. Like all natural phenomena, it results from the operation of natural forces, and, like all sociological phenomena, these forces play through human beings. The basic force which lies back of immigration is hunger, which in its more developed form becomes the desire for wealth. In response to this force men from time immemorial have sought to gain possession of the ultimate source of all wealth, which is land, and immigration is merely the modern aspect of the world-old movement of men from poorer to better land areas, or from crowded

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 27.

to thinly settled areas. The social control of immigration does not imply the annihilation or transformation of this natural force—that is impossible; nor does it imply the encouragement of people to respond to this force—that is superfluous. It implies the placing by society of deliberate restraints, checks, or guides upon the way in which individuals respond to this force.

Why then is it necessary for societies to place arbitrary restraints upon the individual response to a purely natural force? The answer to this question is found in the ignorance, stupidity, and selfishness of the human individual. The essence of all applied science is the diversion or manipulation of natural forces to subserve human ends. The untrained individual does not know how to do this, and the lone individual often has not the power. In social science, where the human being is at the same time the controller and the object of the force, the problem becomes doubly difficult. Individual human beings do not sufficiently understand the nature of the forces which play upon them, nor the methods of controlling the operation of those forces, to be intrusted with the task of manipulating those forces; and, furthermore, those exceptional individuals who have the knowledge are likely to use it to control the situation in their own selfish interest, rather than in the interest of the group of which they are a part, or of society at large.

These generalizations apply with special aptness to the phenomenon of immigration. Those who feel the pressure of the motive force most directly and most powerfully are on the whole the less fortunate, less intelligent, and less informed elements of the population. They are the ones least able to comprehend the full meaning of the movement of which they are a part, to themselves, or to humanity. Their processes of thought are primitive, and their outlook very restricted. They do the thing which on the surface seems to promise them immediate advantage. And in this connection it is well to bear in mind the profound truth quoted by Norman Angell,[1] that, as far as human conduct is concerned, "not the facts, but men's opinions about the facts, are what matter." Men emigrate because they *think* they are going to profit thereby.

[1] *The Great Illusion*, p. 341.

Social control of immigration, then, is necessary for the protection of the migrating individuals themselves. But this is not all. A social movement so extensive as immigration is sure to have effects upon all the countries concerned, but particularly upon the receiving country. In books dealing with all sorts of social and public problems in the United States nothing is more striking than the uniformity with which the authors assert that one of the great complicating factors in the problem which they are discussing is immigration. This is easily understandable. Immigration influences the very make-up of the American people, and therefore affects every one of the activities and interests of this people. These effects may be good or bad, desirable or undesirable, from the point of view of our society as a whole. Because the expedient of emigration offers, or seems to offer, advantages to the people of European countries, it does not at all follow that it will result in advantage to the United States. It is certain that some, at least, of the results of uncontrolled immigration will be unfavorable. Social control is therefore necessary for the protection of the receiving society.

This control is made all the more necessary because, in the absence of social control, intelligent and alert individuals will manipulate the immigration movement for their own personal profit, in ways that may be very deleterious to society. Examples of such action are furnished by capitalistic employers who wish to import contract laborers from abroad, by steamship companies who would gladly stimulate an artificial immigration of those elements which are almost certain to fail in this country and therefore will eventually furnish a remunerative return cargo, and by panders who might reap rich profits from the white-slave trade. The simple fact is that the possibilities of immigration are too great ever to be left uncontrolled. If they are not controlled by society, they will be controlled by more or less unscrupulous individuals.

We come now to the question of the purpose of control. All social interference with natural movements, to have any justification at all, must be intelligent, deliberate, and scientific. This implies a clear conception in advance of the ends sought. Much of the immigration legislation of the past has been opportunist in

character. It is time that the people of the United States formulated on broad grounds a general idea of exactly what they wish to accomplish by immigration regulation. The statements which follow represent of course only the convictions of the present writer.

Broadly stated, the purpose of the social control of immigration should be to protect and advance the welfare of the American people, and to safeguard and preserve those qualities of our national life which make this country an attractive and desirable place of residence for individuals of all classes. This involves several things: First, the preservation of our political ideals and standards, so that the United States may continue to be a favorable field for the growth of pure democracy. Any aspect of the immigration movement which threatens our democratic institutions calls for social restraint. Secondly, to safeguard the standard of living of the American working class. This object is closely associated with the foregoing, for one of the essentials of stable democracy is a comfortable, well-nourished, and well-nurtured common people. It is probably the most important concrete desideratum of immigration legislation at the present time. Thirdly, to protect the mental and intellectual standards of the American people. Those who regard immigration from the eugenic point of view are calling constant and much-needed attention to the appalling menace to our intellectual standards which inheres in the enormous numbers of immigrants annually admitted in ordinary times who are of inferior, if not absolutely abnormal, mental caliber. Fourthly, another eugenic consideration—the preservation of a certain physical standard of the American people, a standard, not only of health and efficiency, but of stature, bearing, and appearance. Fifthly—something which perhaps includes all of the foregoing—the maintenance of a degree of homogeneity in the American body politic which will enable it to deal harmoniously and consistently with the great social problems which will confront the nations of the future in increasingly complex and difficult forms, and with an increasing insistence and gravity. No national policy could be more suicidal in a democracy than one which limits or destroys the possibility of its people dealing with public questions in a spirit of mutual sympathy and understanding.

It may seem to some that the ideal of national self-seeking which has just been presented is narrow and illiberal. Even if it were narrow, it would not follow that it was unjustifiable, for the first law of nations, as of individuals, is self-preservation. Fortunately for any controversy, however, it is not a narrow view, but the broadest which can be taken. For the welfare of mankind demands that the peculiar advantages and merits of the social system of the United States, as represented concretely by our common standard of living, be preserved at all hazards for future generations. The narrow point of view is that which would sacrifice one jot or tittle of our national superiority in the interest of the transitory welfare of the individuals of this generation. In a very special sense the United States is the custodian of the future of the common people, and she would be recreant to her trust if she relinquished her hold on any of the guaranties of the progress of the common people in response to the specious pleas of a shortsighted, individualistic, sentimental humanitarianism. Social control of immigration is necessary in the interest of future generations.

As to the methods of control of immigration, little need be said here. That is the technical side of the question, and the details change with changing conditions. All that needs emphasis in this connection is that, in determining and applying practical methods of controlling immigration, social rights and interests rise paramount in every instance to individual rights and interests. Granting this principle, the question whether control is to take the form of a literacy test, or a percentage restriction, or a minimum-wage provision, or a physical examination may be left to experts, to be decided upon grounds of practicability and expediency, and the probability or certainty of results.

THE IMMIGRANT AS A PROBLEM IN COMMUNITY PLANNING

GRACE ABBOTT
Federal Children's Bureau

In the discussion of immigration during the past century attention has been concentrated almost wholly on what immigrants we should exclude from the United States and little attention has been given to the admitted immigrant. Since the beginning of the Great War a new interest in the foreign born who is here in our midst has developed. With the stimulation of nationalism there has come a new consciousness of the diverse elements in our population. As a result the indifference of some native Americans has been changed to distrust and suspicion of all the foreign born; many have come to feel that what they call the "alien element" constitutes a very heavy national burden. Some are asking whether anything that is really thoroughgoing has been done to Americanize the immigrant in the past; they are now saying that we ought to "mold" the newcomers after some approved American pattern and are eager to get them into a room and tell them about "American ideals." Curiously enough these enthusiastic Americanizers see no reflection on ourselves in the assumption that the immigrant could live among us for several years and never guess what our ideals are from our practices. Generally speaking the demand for a vigorous and what some call a "red-blooded policy of Americanization" gets a wider hearing today than formerly, and there is in consequence some danger of committing ourselves to the kind of well-planned and well-financed schemes of aggressive assimilation which have failed in Germany, in Austria, in Hungary, and in Russia in the past.

Even those who are trained in judging historical evidence disagree as to what have been our ideals in the past, and those

of Anglo-American stock as well as those of foreign-born parentage disagree fundamentally among themselves as to what should be our ideals in the future. No reference to the achievements of our own ancestors or denunciation of any other nationality will convince either ourselves or the immigrant of our worthiness. No assertion of the superiority of Americans will make us superior, but such claims will make it more difficult for us to deal with other national groups.

To those who have been in close touch with the immigrant, and especially the non-English-speaking immigrant in America, it seems especially important that the new interest in the foreign born which has come with the war should not result in increased race consciousness and mutual distrust, but should result in a frank consideration of what are the problems of the immigrant in our midst and how we can go about solving them.

The sources of immigration during the decade which preceded the war and the numbers in which they came during that period are well known. The numbers that will crowd the steerage after the re-establishment of peace and the parts of the world from which they will come cannot now be determined. But the principles on which we should attempt the solution of the community problems which come with a complex population can be settled without that information.

The duty and the opportunity of the national government and of the local community to the admitted immigrant were and still are (1) to protect him against fraud and exploitation, so that such traditions as he cherished with regard to America might not be lost in his first contacts with us; (2) to give him an opportunity to learn the English language and secure such a working knowledge of our laws and institutions as would enable him to join us in the work of making the United States a really effective democracy; (3) to make such adjustments of our political and social machinery as the peculiar needs of the various elements in our complex population render necessary or desirable. Failure to protect the immigrant's journey from the port of entry to his home has meant that the non-English-speaking young girl and young man have begun their life among us by experiencing the peculiarly

mean and ugly forms of exploitation which the lowest elements among us organize to practice on the unsuspicious; because we have provided no place where the immigrant could secure reliable information as to the best market in which he might sell his skill and training or where he could turn to best account the health and strength which he brings, both the immigrant and the native worker have suffered needlessly. We have been satisfied to leave to the evening-school teacher, who has had no training in the teaching of adults, who is poorly paid and who receives no professional recognition for her work in the evening schools and who, like those whom she instructs, comes to the night school wearied by a full day's work—to this teacher and to the party-machine organization we have intrusted the preparation of the immigrant for American citizenship. There is no necessity to continue to point out what the immigrant has suffered needlessly because of community neglect.

Let us assume that a community asks how it may prevent unnecessary failures among its foreign-born members and how it may utilize to the fullest the potential contribution of each national group. Such a community would have to determine, as its first step, whether the present institutions were established and administered with a view to serving only a homogeneous Anglo-Saxon population, or whether the needs of the real instead of the imaginary population had been considered. To determine this it is necessary to know the political, social, and economic life of the peasants in their European homes as well as the special difficulties which they are encountering here in the United States.

Everyone knows that the immigrants coming to the United States usually change from a simple to a highly specialized and complex industrial life when they come from Galicia, or Croatia, or Russia to America. During their first years in this country they must, in consequence, abandon many old customs and adopt new standards of social relationship. They are usually young and suddenly released from the restraints which the village life at home imposed upon them and they have had no experience on which to draw during the critical period when they are becoming adjusted to the new conditions. Most of them meet this

crisis simply and, in a measure, successfully. Sometimes, however, a tragic moral collapse or a general demoralization of family standards results from the inability of the immigrant to adjust his old standards to the new. Before any progress can be made toward eliminating the hardships of adjustment to American life these difficulties must be recognized and understood. The school teacher, the social worker, the judge of the juvenile or the municipal court, is unable to help the immigrant out of his confused bewilderment unless he understands, not in a general way but quite concretely, the conflict with traditional standards of judgment which his life in the new world has brought.

To many Americans the so-called foreign colonies in New York, Chicago, Pittsburgh, or Cleveland seem to be reproductions of sections of Italy, Greece, Poland, or Russia. But to the immigrant the street on which he lives here is so unlike the one on which he lived at home that he believes it to be thoroughly American. These "foreign neighborhoods" of ours are neither Italian, nor Polish, nor Russian, nor Greek. Nor are they American. A sympathetic knowledge of the life and hopes of the people of these un-American American neighborhoods is rare among us. An understanding of the racial history, of the social and economic development and of present political tendencies in the countries from which the inhabitants of such a neighborhood come is much more unusual. A knowledge of both their life here and their life at home is necessary for intelligent community planning. In the attempts made to help those who have been unable to make the necessary adjustments to the new conditions they encounter here, we have usually acted quite without the information which is necessary for the proper diagnosis of the source of their difficulties, and as long as individual cases are not properly diagnosed successful treatment is only a happy accident and cannot form the basis for a program of prevention.

In general, it is safe to say that the immigrant does not create new problems that can be solved apart from the general problems of our community life. This is not saying that he does not complicate American life. The barriers of language, the inherited antipathies and religious prejudices, cannot be ignored

as sources of difficulties. These constitute serious complications which must be taken into account in our social planning.

To illustrate, our failure to effect an organization of the employment market has resulted in unnecessary hardships for all those who seek employment. The development of a system of labor exchanges is recommended as a remedy. But a system of public employment agencies would not serve the immigrant who is so peculiarly in need of disinterested help when he offers himself in the labor market, if such an agency has no interpreters, and if those who undertake to advise the immigrant about his industrial future cannot evaluate his European training or experience or the lack of both, and if they do not understand the peculiar industrial problems which the non-English-speaking immigrant encounters here. A recreation program which is designed to reduce delinquency among girls will not meet the needs of the immigrant girl until special forms of recreation have been discovered which will appeal to the young people of each nationality and which will not run counter to the social traditions of their parents. A public-health program will not reach the immigrant when he most needs it unless it is related to his old-world experience and given to him in a language he can understand. Because he is changing from an outdoor to an indoor life, from a village to a city, he especially needs to be reached by the public-health propaganda long before he has had time to learn the English language and become acquainted with local conditions.

It is apparent to a growing number of people in the United States and Europe that fundamental changes in our social and political organization must be made in the near future. The causes which make this necessary and the evils to be corrected, while differing in degree, are the same on both continents. With us, because the immigrant is the weakest industrially he suffers most from the evils of the present system. His peculiar problems and difficulties must therefore be considered in any plans for the democratization of industry.

The problem of the immigrant in relation to our community life is then not so much a problem in assimilation as in adjustment. To assist in such adjustments, we must take account, first, of those

traditions and characteristics which belong to the immigrants by reason of their race and early environment and, second, of the peculiar difficulties which they encounter here. These two elements in the problem must be known before we can hope to reach conclusions.

It need not be pointed out that it is impossible to work out any permanent scheme of adjustment. Changes in the sources of immigration must be constantly kept in mind. Advancing social and educational standards will make for both the immigrant and the native American what is adequate today, inadequate tomorrow. But what we are trying to do will remain the same. We should ask ourselves what special provision must be made to protect those among us whose helplessness makes their need of protection so great; what should be done to supplement the immigrant's as well as the native American's lack of training and experience; how, in other words, to make the best that is in all of us available for the service of the whole community.

There are Americans who resent the immigrant as an oustider, whose troubles they should not be asked to consider. Some feel that to take account deliberately in our social planning of differences in customs and traditions would be a dangerous recognition of un-Americanisms. But as a rule neither of these reasons has determined our course. It is usually because of ignorance and indifference that in our social policies we have failed to consider the complex character of our population and have built our social and political institutions with a view to meeting the needs of an imaginary homogeneous people.

Those Americans who resent the immigrant as an outsider and are, in consequence, impatient of any demands which his presence makes upon their time or thought or money are the same people who stand in the way of meeting in a large sense the needs of the native born. They consider our institutions more important than the ends those institutions were created to serve. We may feel sure that if our administrative officers understand the necessity of individualizing the needs of the American born they will be willing to individualize the needs of the immigrant groups.

An intelligent recognition of the complications and possible disadvantages of our cosmopolitan population does not mean that we should ignore its advantages. How many of what are called American traits are due to geographical influence, to frontier life, or to diverse racial contributions cannot be determined by conjecture. To what extent the Scandinavians have made the history of Minnesota different from the history of North Carolina or Colorado or Massachusetts cannot be exactly determined. It is even more difficult to say what influence the Scandinavians might have exerted were they not controlled or limited by the common insistence on what is regarded as an American standard. But that into the development of Minnesota have gone Scandinavian intelligence, hard work, and devotion to the larger public welfare cannot be questioned.

It has always been embarrassing to Americans to have distinguished visitors from abroad call attention to the fact that the United States is not a "nation" in the European sense of the word. It is true that unity of religion, unity of race, unity of ideals do not exist in the United States. Whether such unity should be sought in a democracy need not be considered here. From the beginning we have been the representatives of many nationalities; now we are scattered across a continent with all the additional differences in interest and occupation that diversity of climate and geography brings. But instead of being ashamed of the "American" character of our population it is time that we recognized its peculiar values.

The demand for a recognition of "nationalism" in Europe is the democratic demand that all the peoples should be free to associate together as equals. They have argued that equality is impossible if a people is not free to speak the language which they prefer and to develop their own national culture and character. Here in the United States we have the opportunity of working out a national life which is founded on democratic internationalism. If the English, Irish, Polish, German, Scandinavian, Russian, Magyar, Lithuanian and all other peoples of the earth can live together, each making his own distinctive contribution to our common life; if we can respect the differences that result

from different social and political environment and see the common interests that unite all people, we shall meet the American opportunity. This will mean that we shall endeavor to use both at home and in our international relationship the possibilities which are ours because we are of many races and are related, by the closest of human ties, to all the world.

Out of the very fact that here in the United States all the races of the world are working together in a single city, in a single industry, or are united in a single union local should come a new kind of power. As never before we are realizing the international aspects of what have seemed to be merely national or local problems. It remains to be seen whether we will use our national international resources in their solution.

"Americanism" is much more a matter of the future than of the past. The social and political theories of '76 cannot adequately meet the social and political problems of 1917. It is to be hoped that we can bring to the problems of the present an intelligence and understanding which will enable us to meet the opportunities and responsibilities of the present.

CONTROL OF IMMIGRATION BASED UPON THE TRUE DEMAND FOR LABOR

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The maintenance and perpetuation of population types through selective immigration is a principle of social control as old as group-awareness itself. The annals of primitive Israel, of Japan, of other "hermit nations" or "peculiar peoples," and the history of Colonial New England teem with illustrations. Wherever you find well-developed ethnocentrism, there you are altogether likely to find more or less conscious attempts at immigration restriction designed to assert power over the alien, to compel him into conformity with established norms of language, religion, wage-levels, standards of living, etc. Both public opinion and formal law reflect the principle still in modern national life. The methods of securing this form of control vary according to the social group's sense of what is most worth while in life, that is to say, its own attitude toward itself as a focal point in civilization. The more highly egotistic or fearful a group is the more its policy approaches the extreme negative pole of absolute exclusion. The modern world, however, has seen a pretty general acceptance of the principle of peaceful access and the right of a man to elect his own national adherence. Thus modern immigration policy has to do rather with special methods of restriction, special tests bearing largely upon questions of assimilability, capacity for citizenship, and the like. The cruder issues of race affinity and religious orthodoxy crop out only sporadically, as in the Know-Nothing Party, the A.P.A., and the Japanese-Korean Exclusion League.

All of these control methods were based upon quasi-instinctive emotions and untested opinions, and were therefore weak and not calculated to work efficiently. Our American immigration legislation has scarcely a better basis. It was dictated (as in the case of the Geary Chinese Exclusion Act) largely by political exigencies.

Our present laws as revised this year (1917) are still a makeshift, an evasion, a crazy quilt. I mean in particular the latest attempt at selective restriction through the so-called illiteracy test. So far as I am able to make out, there are only three arguments that carry any weight in its favor. First, the argument of the man in the street that some form of restriction is desirable and that the illiteracy test would keep down the numbers somewhat anyway. But anybody who has read the act and the administrative rules based upon it would hesitate to prophesy that the inability to read forty words in their own language is going to debar many intending immigrants. The second argument comes from certain labor leaders who wish to prevent corporations from forming "alien pools" and keeping them away from labor publications. In other words, the illiteracy test prevents employers from agitation-proofing the immigrant. There is some shadow of validity in this plea; the report of the Immigration Commission seemed to show that immigrant labor was more or less resistant to unionization, and thus, indirectly at least, tended to retard the upward movement of wages. The third argument is that of the present-day Know-Nothings, who frankly advocate the illiteracy test as a means of barring Catholics, whom they conceive as illiterate and ignorant and dangerous.

Whatever cogency these arguments have almost if not altogether disappears in face of the fact that the whole principle of the illiteracy test fails to meet the issue squarely. It is a process of side-stepping, with a great deal of buncombe and claptrap about it. Both consciously and unconsciously interested groups insist on thus shifting the real issue from the plane of cold business to the planes of religious and political freedom, aesthetics, or natural rights. I do not know whether all race prejudice is at bottom a mode of economic self-defense; there may be certain subtle and inherent biological antipathies; but it is very certain that economic suspicion plays a very prominent and definite rôle in it. And it is even more certain that, on the other hand, economic motives prompt to an overwhelming degree the modern immigrant in his change of residence. Ninety-nine per cent of recent immigrants to the United States were seeking superior economic opportunity.

And a very considerable percentage of this migration had been artificially stimulated by vitally interested industries—large employers of unskilled labor, employment agencies, transportation companies—and their political agents.

The modern immigration problem is primarily and predominantly economic and will probably continue to be so after the war. The labor organizations have recognized this fact, and their legislative policy (as worked out, for example, in fifty years of California history) has been dictated by it. The recent hysterical demands for easing up the immigration law on the grounds of labor shortage indicate an awareness that the issue is fundamentally industrial. New York, Utah, Texas, Oklahoma, and the Pacific Coast (somewhat less urgently) have pleaded their shortage. But invariably their pleas have reduced to a demand for very cheap labor. For example, Texas wanted to admit Mexican cotton pickers for a wage of eighty-five cents per hundred pounds, although they were paid a dollar per hundred last year with cotton at a lower selling price. Oklahoma offered two dollars a day for farm labor that formerly received two and a half to three dollars. Parenthetically we may observe that there are at present three potential sources of the belief in a real scarcity of labor: (1) the shift of workers to the munitions factories, attracted by high wages; (2) the draft army (heretofore felt by employers largely, however, merely as an emotional forecast of what *might* happen); (3) low wages. Temporary scarcity there may be, due to dislocations like the present war, or refusal to recognize the principle of adequate wage; but there is nowhere in America a chronic state of real labor shortage.

After the war the industrial situation will press upon us more intensely than ever, what with the transformation of war plants back into peace industries, the dilution of labor by the entrance of women and youths into industry, the re-education of soldiers and sailors to the vocations of peace, to say nothing of the possible dumping of war-sick alien labor upon our shores. Nobody can forecast with exactitude the outworking of these situations. But it at least ought to be clear enough that whatever of the immigration problem remains after hostilities cease and the period of reconstruction begins, must be faced, if it is to be faced scientifically and

effectively, upon an economic basis, with a long range and not a mere hand-to-mouth policy.

All things considered, I am renewing in this paper a demand for the control of immigration upon a basis of the true demand for labor—a frank program for meeting the economic issue, which I have already urged repeatedly.[1] The essential outlines of this program are (1) to ascertain the *true demand for labor;* (2) to organize the labor market; (3) to abolish the contract labor provision and the illiteracy test in our existing immigration law, and to introduce the principle of the sliding scale as a guide to admitting immigrant labor.

By the true demand for labor I do not mean of course the cry of labor shortage. I do not mean merely the registering of calls for labor. For, as Mr. Gompers pointed out in a recent interview, much demand for labor is either the result of using up productive labor as flunkies, valets, and other "unnecessary servitors," or is merely a call for odd-job men. And we might add that perhaps the biggest item to be deducted from an inflated demand for labor is the enormous labor turnover due to the common—I was going to say "system," but a sense of truth forbids!—practice of hiring and firing. Moreover, it is a matter of common knowledge, through frank confession of the interested parties, that large industrial employers have made it a definite part of their practice to maintain a reserve labor force of the unemployed, a regiment ready to jump to the rescue when labor unrest began to brew, when wages threatened to go up or hours to go down. In other words, just as some corporations "watered" their stock others "watered" their labor force and thus padded the general demand. Again, the true demand for labor relates also to the habitually unemployed, the casual, the vagrant, and perhaps more than all else to the sweated. Hence this true demand considers the factors of wages offered, living conditions tolerated, facilities for organization, vocational guidance, etc. It matches the figures of calls for labor with statistics of unemployment, wage schedules, cost-of-living tables, and industrial education. Hence it necessitates some governmental

[1] See *The Unpopular Review* (July–September, 1914), pp. 45–58; *The Survey* (January 20, 1917), pp. 452–53.

machinery for securing and constantly renewing the vital facts in our labor market. But since the same machinery would naturally in consequence undertake the organization of the labor market I shall consider it under that heading.

By organization of the labor market I do not contemplate such a reconstruction as would work social revolution. I mean simply the utilization and extension of existing agencies or principles. An unemployment research commission or a permanent industrial commission or a co-ordination of investigative and administrative functions in the federal Department of Labor could accomplish all I have in mind, which is to establish a chain of labor intelligence offices so linked up and so manned that we could get the necessary facts. It is significant that the Department of Labor has actually under consideration such a scheme for employment exchanges and a national clearing-house. Assistant Secretary Post showed me recently an outline of this plan, which has been held back for want of money. It proposes to utilize the existing employment service of the Department of Labor consisting of 88 offices in 27 states, the post-offices, the Bureau of Farm Management in the Department of Agriculture, the state labor exchanges in 22 states, the municipal labor exchanges, the state councils of defense (with their employment departments and plans for conscripting the idle and vagrant), labor organizations, technical societies, and other private agencies operating employment departments. It further aims to reduce this complex and almost bewildering variety of services to some show of order. It is evident upon the face of things that some sort of clearing-house is necessary. This the plan proposes to secure through co-ordinating the diverse agencies into district exchanges (congressional areas), leading up to state employment exchanges, which in turn lead up to zone exchanges, which finally clear through the National Labor Department at Washington. This plan, I may say, has not only the approval but the enthusiastic approval of Secretary Wilson, Assistant Secretary Post, and others. If it can be put through it will give us at least the beginnings of a technique for ascertaining the true demand for labor and organizing the market, without which I believe we can never reach a successful solution of the immigration problem.

Now we are in a position to tackle the third element in our plan for immigration control, namely, repealing the contract-labor provision of the present law and utilizing the sliding scale as a principle for admissions.

Certain sections of American industry, both employers and workmen, have long fought the contract-labor exclusion feature in current immigration law. Suppose we frankly admit that it is much better for the immigrant to come over here to a definite job than to wander about for weeks after he arrives, a prey to immigrant banks, fake employment agents, and other sharks. Suppose, accordingly, we repeal the law against contract labor—it is constantly violated in letter and spirit anyway. Let the employer contract for as many foreign laborers as he likes or says he needs. But make the contractor liable for support and deportation costs if the laborers become public charges. Also require him to assume the cost of unemployment insurance. Exact a bond for the faithful performance of these terms, guaranteed in somewhat the same way that national banks are safeguarded. Immigration authorities now commonly require a bond from the relatives of admitted aliens who seem likely to become public charges, but who are allowed to enter with the benefit of the doubt. Customs and revenue rules admit dutiable goods in bond. Hence the principle of the bond is perfectly familiar, and its application to contract immigrants would be in no sense an untried or dangerous experiment. It would establish no new precedent; for precedents, and successful ones, are already established, accepted, and approved. It would be understood that all admissions of aliens can be only provisional. It would be understood further—and the plan would work automatically if the contractor were made such a deeply interested party—that intending immigrants must be rigidly inspected, that they be required to produce consular certificates of clean police record, freedom from chronic disease, insanity, imbecility, etc. The result of such a scheme would probably be to cut away entirely contract labor, for it would no longer pay; and it would put an end to peonage.

This is no revolutionary proposal. Indeed the present immigration law provides an entering wedge with a working principle

which apparently is accepted on all sides, since it was also a part of the law of 1907. Section 3 of the law includes this proviso: "That skilled labor, if otherwise admissible, may be imported if labor of like kind unemployed cannot be found in this country, and the question of the necessity of importing such skilled labor in any particular instance may be determined by the Secretary of Labor. . . . ." This proviso, slightly amended to make it applicable to unskilled as well as skilled labor, would offer not only a really workable test for immigration, but in my judgment a satisfactory adjustment of the immigration problem. The case becomes all the clearer if we are allowed to read into it another proviso of the same act and the administrative rules based upon it. The Secretary of Labor issued in May, 1917, a bulletin of instructions to his immigration staff of which the following is the substance:

> The ninth proviso to Section 3 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, reads: "*Provided further*, That the Commissioner-General of Immigration with the approval of the Secretary of Labor shall issue rules and prescribe conditions, including exaction of such bonds as may be necessary, to control and regulate the admission and return of otherwise inadmissible aliens applying for temporary admission." While, obviously, this special exception to general provisions of law should be construed strictly and should not be resorted to except with the object of meeting extraordinary situations or conditions, it can be and should be availed of whenever an emergent condition arises. With agricultural pursuits such a condition now exists in certain sections of the country and is likely to arise in other sections during the continuance of the war. The department therefore issues the following instructions for the information and guidance of all concerned: Aliens admitted under the provisions hereof are allowed to enter temporarily upon the understanding that they will engage in no other than agricultural labor; and any who fail to accept or after acceptance abandon employment of that kind and engage in the performance of labor in connection with other industries shall be promptly arrested and deported to the country whence they came.
>
> In cases arising under this circular, the aliens involved shall be ad ıitted without payment of head tax.

These rules were ordered to apply only to agricultural laborers from Mexico and Canada. But that they can be stretched on occasion is evident enough from a department order in July permitting several hundred illiterate Bravas from Cape de Verde Islands to land at New Bedford temporarily for farm work.[1]

[1] See *Christian Science Monitor*, July 11, 1917.

Immigration policy, then, reduces itself to two simple problems, namely, the determination of real economic demand at home and the technique of selecting candidates for admission. As I have said elsewhere:

> The latter problem need give us no special concern, for it would involve no new untried machinery. Our consular service is or could be organized for that purpose, as was long ago proposed by American consuls themselves. In addition to viséing certificates from police, poor-relief, and health authorities for the purpose of weeding out positive undesirables, consular offices might be authorized to receive from prospective immigrants their formal declarations of intention to migrate. Such declarations might or might not be accompanied by validations from the local administrative authorities. In all probability, with the huge tasks of reconstruction now facing European governments, they would co-operate heartily in the work of scrutinizing the papers of emigrants. The central point to the plan would be the filing of these declarations at American consulates. Suppose this done. When notice comes from the United States Department of Labor that an authentic demand exists for a certain number of laborers and that so many may be admitted from this or that locality, the consular authority to whom the notice is directed merely takes up the declarations in the order of their filing and certifies the proper number for admission. The immigration authorities at this end would be relieved of an enormous responsibility, which at best they can fulfil in only superficial fashion.

That is the gist of what I consider a rational plan for social control of immigration. Now for objections to it. They come from business men, doctrinaire radicals, farmers, and I.W.W.'s. I give them just as they have been fired at me. The first group of objections are based upon abstract notions. (1) I am told that no body or state or officer has a *right* to limit my *right* to go where I *please*. The answer to this, of course, is simple enough. Under an international or world state all bars would be down; neither my proposed restriction laws nor those that now exist would be necessary; we should have the fullest mobility of labor and goods. We are still, however, in a nationalistic era: I am dealing with things as they are, and as they may be expected to be for some time to come. (2) It is objected that it is not the immigrant but the machine which is the enemy of workingmen, through padding the labor force. The answer to this, of course, is that the machine should be the worker's best friend; as matters now stand it is a case of alienation of affections. Partnership must be restored

through co-operative industry; this in turn should come about through a better organization of the labor market, which can be effectuated more easily if it is made impossible to hold a reserve labor source as a club over the heads of the workers. (3) I am told that the world needs more, not fewer, people; that if civilization is a good thing, and if American civilization in particular is a good thing, then more people should be allowed to enjoy it. The answer may be made in either eugenic or economic terms. The economist says make men precious by conferring a scarcity value upon them. The eugenist is asking not for a bigger but for a better population. The question is not How many people can you pack into the state of Massachusetts or Minnesota? but the practical question, What are they able to do now toward insuring themselves a rational standard of living? (4) My single-tax friends object that America is big enough to house the world; that the trouble is not too many immigrants, but a faulty system of land ownership; therefore that single tax, not immigration restriction, is the remedy. But unrestricted immigration will not necessarily hasten the single tax, nor will restriction prevent its adoption as a social panacea if it has the real merit its apostles claim.

The second set of objections is based upon questions of economic fact. (5) It is objected that American industrial troubles probably result, not from immigration, but from lack of labor organization. There is no denying the lack of labor organization. We have dwelt upon that fact almost *ad nauseam*. Moreover, we have claimed that a heterogeneous, ignorant, illiterate mass of foreign workmen tends to hinder the effective development of labor organization. (6) I am told that the problem is not immigrant labor, but baby labor, that is to say, child labor. But child labor is growing less all the time, and the tendency is strongly toward its elimination. The objectors on this score should remember, moreover, that immigrants add babies to our population faster than the natives do. (7) I am told that what we want really to know is how to find men jobs, not how to keep men out of the country. I answer that public employment agencies under federal control can do this work more readily if not pressed upon by increasing masses of the unemployed to whose ranks the immigrant adds. (8) The objection is raised

that if there is no reserve labor there will be nobody left to do our farm work. But here again it is less a question of the immigrant than of effective labor organization. The problem of farm labor is admittedly difficult, but I cannot see that a policy of unrestricted immigration is going to aid in the solution, for careful investigators assure us that "it is clear that the tendency of the new immigration is toward industrial and city pursuits rather than toward agriculture."

The third group of objections lean to questions of administration. (9) We are told that if we do away with the contract-labor provision we let down the bars for exploiting the American laborer. But this is not at all the case if we safeguard it by the bonding and insurance plan which we have outlined. (10) Some critics are afraid that such a plan would create a condition of slavery or indentured servitude if every immigrant had to sign a bond to remain with his employer for a certain period at a certain wage. But I have nowhere contemplated that he would do any such thing. On the contrary, the contractor would have to assume and carry all the risks, including strikes, inefficiency, etc. (11) The question is asked, Who would fix wages under this plan? Undoubtedly they would be fixed by the United States Bureau of Labor upon the basis of the reports coming to the clearing-house. (12) Suppose, for example, that after five years an employer discharged his imported immigrants who had begun to demand higher wages, and had turned them loose, stranded, and out of work. Could he not then send and bring over an equal number of strike breakers? No, by hypothesis, not so long as any capable unemployed men were available. (13) How can you tell the true supply of or demand for labor when there are so many floaters and vagrants? The Bureau of Labor's plan for unemployment bureaus would take care of the real workers; the others would be sifted out and handled on penal farms for the vagrant. Just now several of our state councils for defense are trying such methods for conscripting the idle and the vagrant.

A far more serious objection (14) which goes to the root of the whole scheme crops out of the present war, to this effect: Now that we are in the war we cannot work such a scheme without

offending our Allies. But it is altogether possible to extend to our Allies preferential treatment in the matter of immigration as with other forms of reciprocity. Moreover, it is altogether possible that our Allies will prefer to encourage their people to remain at home or to go to their own colonies. At any rate there can be no charge of race discrimination under such a sliding scale.

Finally, the objection comes that the whole scheme is gratuitous and unnecessary, because at the end of the war the tide will be toward Europe and not from Europe. Here facts end and opinion begins; but in such an event we have done no harm, and we should enjoy the immense strategic advantage of having met the issue frankly, thought it through without subterfuge, and prepared ourselves for any emergency.

DISCUSSION

Hattie Plum Williams, University of Nebraska

Social control of immigration means more than restrictive legislation merely. As you watch, from the balcony of the immigrant station at Ellis Island, the masses of foreigners crowding upon our shores, you feel that the most effective agency of social control would be a properly constructed and nicely gauged filter which would automatically strain out all that is objectionable in the immigration stream, and which could be so adjusted as to shut off the current entirely at certain intervals. But return to your community, in which numbers of these foreigners have distributed themselves, and witness the clash between Old World and New World ideas, the travail of soul and body that is undergone by the alien in a new and strange environment, or the struggle caused at a time like the present crisis by suspicion, misunderstanding, and hatred between groups of different cultures—here you feel that the most vital agencies of social control are those which lie this side the threshold of our country.

Professor Fairchild has emphasized in his writings the fact that immigration is not a problem peculiar to the United States, but is a world-phenomenon of modern times. That being the case, none but uncivilized or hermit nations can remain wholly unaffected by it. Our own problem is bound up with the Zionist movement, the success of which will be a more potent restrictive measure than the crudely designed literacy test of 1917. It is connected closely with the problem of an outlet for overpopulated Japan, whether in South America, China, the Philippines, or our own western states; with the industrial and political development of Russia, which may be made

as attractive a field for immigrants as our own land; and with the rights of small nations and subject nationalities whose race consciousness has developed so remarkably in the past two decades.

As a modern phenomenon, immigration is an index of an advancing civilization. It results from the increased independence of men, from the spread of knowledge and the consequent growth of desires, from the breakdown or control of racial antipathy, and from the marvelous systems of transportation. Is it any wonder that immigration has been reduced so largely to an ecomonic question; that the "want of bread" should be sufficient in this day to start people on a journey half-way around the globe, and that the movement of population toward the food supply should be as common an incident as the transportation of food to a population?

Professor Fairchild is no doubt correct in his statement that "the basic force which lies back of immigration is hunger, which in its more developed form becomes a desire for wealth." The principle is demonstrated as clearly by the emigration of our western farmers to Canada as by the movement of immigrants from Italy and Russia to the United States. But when we have said this, what more does it signify than that immigration is one of the countless number of human activities based upon this fundamental desire? Can we not say as truly that the basic force which lies back of *war* or of *business* is hunger? Judging from the emphasis some educators are placing upon the money value of schooling, there are those who imply that the basic force which lies back of *education* and the *choice of occupation* is hunger. And with a similar meaning, can we not say that the basic force which lies back of your *conduct* and mine is hunger? In other words, the question raised is this: Does the ontogenetic force control immigration to an extent greater than it controls other activities of mankind at present? Is the immigrant a *whole man* played upon by all the social forces, physical and spiritual, with one predominating now and another then, but susceptible to a development of the higher desires when released from the primary pressure for food, which is common to us all?

If I correctly understand Professor Todd's plan of "a job for every alien," it proceeds upon the theory that the economic factor, in other words "cold business," is the only one necessary to consider. But the hysterical demands for admitting immigrants at the present time are no more an indication of the "awareness of the true nature" of the immigration problem than the hysterical demands for easing up the child-labor restrictions, for made-to-order Americanism, or for universal military service indicate an awareness of the true nature of the problems to which they relate. The reasons which from time to time prompt us of America to encourage or oppose immigration are no necessary indication of the motives which prompt the immigrant to come here.

Three questions occur immediately upon the proposal of Professor Todd's plan. How many employers would bond themselves to carry out a contract

which probably no American court would enforce against the other party, the immigrant, and which it certainly should not? The bonding provision of the "poor physique" clause of the 1907 statute has proved virtually unworkable. Possibly it would be easier to locate a rich capitalist than a poor immigrant, but one can be as elusive as the other.

Would the immigrant be willing to avail himself of such a plan? To say that "99 per cent of recent immigrants" come "seeking superior economic opportunities" is not to say that 99 per cent of the sum total of the desires of each immigrant are economic. Sociability, or consciousness of kind, or racial cohesion—call it what you will—is as vital a force with the alien as is any other, and its influence is doubled by the very fact of migration. Give the immigrant no credit whatever for being moved by sociogenetic forces, reduce him to the level of the animal kingdom, but do not forget that even the animals hunt their food in herds, especially outside the confines of home territory. The clan instinct is typified everywhere in the history of immigration to the United States, whether in western rural districts among the old immigrants or in eastern urban communities among the new. The average proportion who come on tickets prepaid by relatives or friends is about one-third, while practically three-fourths come to join relatives or friends. "Failure" is written over the ten years' effort of our government to distribute aliens solely by the lure of a job.

Granting the willingness of the employer to assume responsibility and his success in securing foreign laborers, would not many of the evils connected with immigration as it now exists be intensified? Would not social stratification be increased and assimilation be decreased? Would normal family life be insured? Would proper housing be provided? Would immigrants be encouraged to rise in the social scale, to join trade-unions, to educate their children above their own status? Would there be no temptation to capitalize the personal gratitude of the alien, to control his vote, to keep him in ignorance of the labor market and of better positions to which he might attain if encouraged? The railroads of the trans-Missouri states did much in the seventies to settle their lands with foreigners and performed a real service to the state. But these corporations also stayed in power much longer than they otherwise would by controlling, directly or indirectly, the foreigners whom they had befriended. It would be well to know in this connection the actual results of the experience of Australia with such a law since 1905, and whether or not its enforcement is as much of a farce as is her literacy test.

But the most perfectly conceived entrance tests, strictly enforced, will not insure safety to the United States after the foreigners are admitted, because this experience represents a crisis in the life of the immigrant—a crisis in respect to ideals. This should be more easily comprehensible to us today when we are made so conscious of the crisis in the lives of the men in the army, under the strain of which many are falling victims to insanity, tuberculosis, venereal disease, and minor ills.

The experience of the immigrant is intimated by the crisis in the life of the student, resulting from his readjustment from a home to a college environment. Anyone who tries to live close to student life is conscious of the tragedies and near-tragedies which result from this new experience. It involves at times the threatened virtue of a young woman, the ruined health of a thoughtless youth, the clash with the police who have interfered with a group which is carrying to excess the celebration of some student custom, the disappointment of many who come expecting democracy and find themselves shut out by caste and class lines drawn with unreasoning but rigid precision, and abandonment of religious restraints, due largely to a new attitude toward that means of social control. A recent article in an educational periodical on "The Troubles of College Freshmen"[1] enumerates a large number of *difficulties due to the nature of college life.* Two-thirds of these are exact counterparts of the *difficulties of immigrants due to the nature of American life:*

Confusion because college (American) life is so different from home life.

Lack of anyone to confide in or take counsel with.

Difficulties due to the new independence and consequent responsibility for one's own conduct.

Feeling of being lost in a miscellaneous crowd.

Difficulty of catching the spirit of the school (country).

Feeling of being looked down upon by members of higher classes.

Homesickness.

Not one of these could be eliminated from Freshman life by stricter entrance requirements or better training in preparatory schools. Not one of them could be avoided in immigrant life by more careful restriction or selection. This phase of the problem is one of readjustment and interpretation which ought not to be left to mere chance but should be intelligently provided for by the government and the community. To borrow a well-known figure, the immigrant upon his admission "stands at the junction of a crowded city thoroughfare," in constant danger of being injured himself, or, by his awkwardness, lack of agility, and ignorance of the rules of the road, retarding the flow of traffic, or injuring those with whom he unwittingly collides.

One cause for this crisis is the clash of illusions with reality—dreams which are so quickly dispelled by the immigrant's first experience in America. Through no fault of ours or of his, he comes with extravagant notions, not merely of the opportunities for wealth, concerning which many humorous and absurd stories are told, but of the size, beauty, impressiveness, and power of this country. The majority come from rural communities where the "Song of the Lark" compensates in large measure for the meagerness of their living. Think you there is no emotion felt in the exchange of such environment for the noise, confusion, and dirt of American cities, and that the immigrant can avoid invidious comparisons? He has an implicit and childlike

[1] Julian Boraas, "The Troubles of College Freshmen," *School and Society*, VI, 491.

faith in our government, whether it be in the power of the President to control the price of sugar or the willingness of the "city fathers" to grant his petition for protection to his children from the dangers of railroad traffic. This painful process of disillusionment ends for him only when he has learned, as men in all democracies must learn, that "the Kingdom is within you."

A second clash comes between ethical standards, old and new, and here is one of the greatest strains upon our confidence in the immigrant. One reason why the Oriental is so distasteful to the American is his different standard of life—not so much a minimum expenditure of money per family as different ideals of honesty, business integrity, and personal purity. The American manifests his impatience with foreigners over their unreliableness, which is due often to their inability to express themselves in English or to their ignorance of how to say "no" politely.

The moral standards of the immigrant must face a direct challenge. It is a disturbing fact that character not infrequently deteriorates with length of residence in America, as is seen in the records for crime and delinquency among the second generation. This is due less to the inferior quality of present-day immigration than to the breakdown of the "birch-rod stage of control" before a new system is substituted. The immigrant is particularly susceptible to social control by public opinion, and ridicule or shame is one of the most effective weapons of punishment. But even when segregated in foreign communities in our cities, the restraining influence of the opinion of his group is largely neutralized because he can so easily escape it. Girls leave their homes and board uptown on pretense of being near their work, but in reality to avoid the watchfulness of parents and to entertain company without discrimination or limit. Public opinion against such conduct is certainly as strong among Americans as among immigrants, but it does not act with the same degree of restraint because it is outside of the group, is more impersonal, and the punishment is less severe.[1] Social control by custom is far more important in the life of the immigrant than with us, furnishing standards which act as a restraining force upon conduct. Family customs involving ideals of personal purity, relation of parents to children, and methods of punishment are ruthlessly set aside and too often replaced by the grotesque, the superficial, and the evil in American life. Religion, which is chiefly formal and ceremonial, acts as a powerful deterrent to wrongdoing, but its frequent and sudden collapse too often leaves the individual without moral incentive.

Without minimizing the importance of adequate and wise selection, it is submitted that the successful treatment of the immigration problem, particularly during the crisis of readjustment, depends upon the development of certain means of social control as substitutes for those which have broken down. The most important of these are education, personality, and personal ideals. The chief means which the state has employed after admitting the

[1] The same thing occurs in Russia when Germans move from their "colonies" to the Russian cities—the illegitimacy rate is increased from 1.4 to 6.1.

immigrant has been compulsory education for children, and the best results have come from strict enforcement of this principle. But our broader views of education as a community force must lead us to extend it to the adults—to men, women, and young people prematurely withdrawn from school. It must pursue them into the homes, the camps, and the factories. It must provide not merely formal education but vocational and civic training. The government could do this with slight expense by using for adult immigrant education the millions of dollars collected as head taxes and naturalization fees, paid by the immigrants themselves.

The social force of personality upon the immigrant group has been demonstrated amply by the social settlement and the political boss. Both depend upon personal contact and strong leadership, and I hazard the opinion that in the majority of cases the immigrant succumbs to the influence which reaches him first. In every community where there is a foreign element, particularly if it is segregated, there should be a definite attempt to develop the right sort of personal ascendancy both within and without the group. The immigrant's power for good or evil depends as much upon this as upon any other one force, because his ignorance and lack of confidence in himself make him peculiarly susceptible to leadership.

But leadership itself is a transient force and merely paves the way for control by personal ideals which must replace custom and authority. The immigrant formulates his ideals partly from the types furnished by the heroes and prophets of our history, and there is no failure to respond to the great American who was the embodiment of democracy and the encouragement of the poor. The immigrant's standards of decency and privacy will approximate our own standards when we provide adequate housing facilities and thus furnish him a concrete example of American standards of living. His sense of personal worth will approximate our own ideal of the "equality of all men," providing we do not insist upon treating him merely as a cog in the wheel of our industries. One of the greatest compliments unconsciously paid to our democracy is the large number of immigrants who find life in the old land intolerable after a taste of the freedom and equality of America.

The fear is often expressed that the present immigrant is not capable of assimilating our political ideals, and thus menaces the future of our democracy. Our unique contribution to history has been a demonstration of the potential equality of men when given equal opportunities, and of the possibility of uniting their interests by unbreakable bonds. It is my own belief that there are no greater barriers between the new immigration and our present stage of progress than there were between the old immigrants and the period in which they predominated. Points of contact and means of communication upon which unity chiefly depends have increased enormously along with our greater knowledge of the principles controlling society.

Why should we lose faith in the power of our ideals to cope with the problem, or minimize the value of the more vital means of social control?

When we have once considered immigration as a world-phenomenon and as involving the whole man, played upon by all the social forces, we shall bring to bear upon it means of social control which will solve it, not merely for our country, but for the welfare of society as a whole. We shall need special protection in the near future to save us from shortsightedness, racial antipathy, and hysteria in order to avoid a "reconstruction" policy for immigration as unfortunate as our reconstruction policy at the close of the Civil War.

Herbert Adolphus Miller, Oberlin College

Synthesizing three papers aiming in three different directions is difficult unless one sidesteps and aims in still another direction. I feel that Professors Fairchild and Todd have drifted away from the proper meaning of social control, and have dealt more specifically with a secondary attribute, viz., legal control. Their real discussion has turned to the consideration of the principles that should underlie legal measures that may be necessary to meet certain present and possible future social situations. This does not lessen the value of their contributions, with which on the whole I must agree. If I had discussed these two papers four years ago I should have confined myself to their face value. Now, however, when revolutionary changes in both attitudes and practices take place so quickly that what we had hoped might come to pass in fifty years happens in a week, we are justified in approaching questions like these with an eye to the future and assuming that in many respects at least it will be quite unlike the past and present.

Both Professors Fairchild and Todd rightly assert that most immigrants come here for economic reasons, but, even so, they all come with or from groups that represent highly distinct examples of social control. In other words, they come with differentiated psychological backgrounds which make the immigrant problem, from the American point of view, not one but many. As Miss Abbott has suggested, each nationality has a relation from the inside which can be adequately dealt with only by a sympathetic understanding of that inside.

After the war we certainly shall not have the old problems of immigration. Not only will a large proportion of what would have been normal potential immigration be lost by death or disability, but we shall be, all the years of the duration of the war, behind in the normal supply. As was suggested by the two papers respectively, the Oriental and the Mexican is a potential immigrant who has hitherto not figured much. If "The True Demand for Labor" should be organized from these sources the supply might come. But for the Oriental there lies Russia, in whose fundamental revolutionary philosophy, no matter what else may happen, the humanitarian and other principles will make impossible for many years to come any successful exclusion policy.

Russia and Siberia are vast and, in a Western European sense, unpopulated countries. Siberia already is largely made up of non-Russian peoples,

and in Russia herself the Mongolian assimilation shows that the common people have a very imperfect consciousness of the danger of the "Yellow Peril." Less than two years before the war I was sitting on the bank of the Niemen in Russian Poland near a garrison town watching a Cossack troop take its horses into the river to wash them. Most of the men looked as genuine as the Cossacks in Buffalo Bill's show, but some of them looked just like the Japanese students we have in our colleges, but they were all Cossacks.

To Russia, all the Slavs, who have constituted our so-called undesirable Southeastern European immigration, have long looked as to their mother. Now they will go to undeveloped Russia, both because of the pull of sentiment and because of the economic opportunities, which soon will surpass those of America.

With regard to the Mexicans we may be sure that until they love us better their problem will be limited and local and will need special treatment.

I must confess that I think Miss Abbott has hit the issue more vitally, and though she has not used the term, she has actually discussed an aspect of the immigration question from the point of view of social control. At present the paramount immigration fact is the immigrant in our midst to the number of several millions. And they are not mere tables of statistics, but human groups with distinct psychological backgrounds which represent varying degrees of fusibility into the American type.

Professor Todd is right in saying that most of the advocates of the literacy test are not interested in literacy, but in restriction. The academic supporters of literacy also cry hardest about the "hyphen." From this last point of view I am convinced that the illiterates are the safest, for the control of such artificial values as are transmitted through literature has not affected them. The greater the education the more resistant the alien will be to a new environment, i.e., the freer from old world controls, while the illiterate, within rather narrow limits, will be adaptable. I am not advocating illiteracy, but calling attention to a popular ignorance of the method of social control.

On the side of American civilization, the most significant thing about the immigrant is the social control exerted by his political, religious, and economic backgrounds. It is the clearest example of social control I can imagine. The Russian Jew, the Russian Pole, and the Lithuanian may come from the same town, but in purposes and antipathies they are vastly different. The Bohemians are divided into the exclusive camps of Catholics and freethinkers, with the Socialists a subsidiary, but excluded, division of the freethinkers. The freethinkers are existent and active because John Hus was burned at the stake in 1415. The Poles on the other hand are most ardent Catholics because the church is the symbol around which they may rally in their antagonism to Prussia and Russia.

Both in the country of their origin and in America there has been very little clear analysis of the relation between religion and national aspirations. In the organization of primitive society religion played an important part

through its ceremonial and elemental precepts in the cohesion of the group. In recent times the relation has undergone a reversal. The state has become the elemental fact and religion has become its handmaiden. Bohemian life in America cannot possibly be understood unless one knows that the organized antipathy for religion has the form of a religion based on a reaction from Hapsburg misrule. It permeates in some way the life of every Bohemian in America. The Jews, both orthodox and liberal, are turning more and more to Zionism, and differences as wide as philosophy and practice can make them are bridged in the religious teachings which are used to support the aspiration for national integrity. The Ruthenians who come from Galicia are the only Slavs who have been pro-German. Their church is Uniate—acknowledging the Pope, but granted the privilege of keeping the form of the Orthodox Greek church to which they had belonged in Little Russia before they came into the possession of Austria. An outsider cannot tell the difference between their service and that of the Orthodox church, but their extreme bitterness toward the Russians is a nationalistic expression. The Irish, too, are certainly inherently no more adapted to Catholicism than the English, but they are Catholic because protestant England had dominated them. The church is a symbol of Irish nationalism. In some form either in adherence or antipathy a religious-nationalistic social control is found in every immigrant group.

The ascribed economic cause of immigration is only a partial explanation. People who are free may be contented though poor. It is an interesting fact that while there has been a tremendous immigration from Russia, almost no genuine Russians have come. And out of thousands of Roumanians all but a few come from Hungary. I think I have met only two from Roumania. There are many Serbians, but they come from Bosnia and Herzegovena, and have eagerly joined the armies of the allies. This list could be much extended, and there are many apparent exceptions, but it is enough to show that there is something besides economic interest that makes most immigrants come, even though they may claim they came to get a job. And it is this other pure product of social control that makes them significant to American life. Freedom is what they really want and this desire will unite the broadest chasms. Only last week I attended a Bohemian-Slovak meeting, where for the first time in centuries the representatives of groups which hitherto would not go together in the same hall were in perfect accord. The heartiest applause was given to a socialist and a priest. They were declaring their enthusiastic support of the United States in its declaration of war against Austria-Hungary. When raising money for national propaganda, a Catholic and a freethinker went together. I have heard no more earnest words about freedom and democracy than were uttered by a Catholic priest. And yet the church was more active than the state in the burning of Hus, and hitherto the church has taken less part in the national movement. But now these old controls are being fused into a new one, and the American type emerges,

not, however, from the Mayflower, but from Hapsburg oppression. No legal constraint nor economic organization could be devised which could have achieved such a result.

The most efficient restrictive control of immigration is political and religious freedom in the country of origin, and this is the avowed aim and purpose of our entrance into the war.

WARREN S. THOMPSON, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Granting the importance of controlling the flow of immigration into our country as urged in the papers of Professors Todd and Fairchild, I cannot but think that our most important problems of control begin after the immigrant has found his job and settled among us. From this time he begins to see America and Americans, and the prestige he is prepared to allow America to exert over him becomes effective.

We are all well aware that at the present time the great majority of our immigrants do not see the real America we should like them to see. We know that most of the Americans they meet in a more or less intimate fashion are the sediment of the older population that has sunk to the level of a permanent slum life or the lower grades of workmen and foremen. The former class aims to fleece the immigrant by chicane and trickery, the latter to exploit his laboring power. Thus the immigrant, instead of finding kindliness and helpfulness in the Americans he knows, finds that the only interest they have in him is to get as much as possible out of him, giving in exchange as little as possible. The very natural consequence is that he shuns even such contact with Americans as may be possible to him and withdraws himself more completely into the foreign community made up of his fellow-countrymen from the Old World. This experience of the immigrant in the very early days of his residence among us leads him to think that America—the land of much-vaunted opportunity and freedom—is not much better than his home land, except that one does get a better wage and is not burdened with certain vexatious taxes. He judges America from his tiny bit of experience and concludes that if it is going to try to get all it can out of him for as little as possible he is going to do likewise. He is in a frame of mind, therefore, to reject advances made in the spirit of true friendliness and to suspect the motives of those who show an interest in him. Because of this the initial prestige of America over him is lost and the process of re-establishing it is a slow one.

I am firmly convinced that if we were prepared to protect the immigrant from the flagrant abuses he now suffers and offer him opportunities to see and become acquainted with the real spirit of America he would respond to the better features of our life as positively and definitely as he does to the worse features he actually meets. Of course customs and habits cannot be changed with the ease of one's clothes, but there has never existed such a vast

body of men ready and anxious to replace a great part of their old customs and habits by adopting those of a strange people among whom they have elected to make their homes. If we would only encourage them and hold before them the best things of our life we could do almost as we would with these new neighbors. We have neglected to prepare for these people an environment in which they could become Americans, and yet we reproach them for not becoming like us.

Inasmuch as it is very generally recognized that most human conduct is an unconscious response to the conditions of environment we must acknowledge that we cannot expect to exercise any vital control over the lives of our immigrants unless we make their environment such that it will naturally call forth the conduct we desire. Merely formal laws will never secure more than external conformity and that only when they can be rigidly enforced. To make our control over immigrants vital we must create an atmosphere entirely enveloping them in which the ideals and standards of our democracy will be the very breath in their nostrils. We must place around them types of conduct we desire them to copy so that it will be the natural and easy thing for them to adopt the best we have to offer. So far as is humanly possible the continuous bombardment of suggestion to which immigrants are subject should be made to contribute to their confidence in America and Americans and to the desire to contribute their mite to make America worthy of the confidence of those to come after them.

I am not competent to outline a detailed plan for surrounding the immigrant with an atmosphere pregnant with the best things in our democracy. I may, however, suggest a few of the most obvious necessities of such a plan. *In the first place*, the economic exploitation of the immigrant must be stopped. The immigrant is in much the same position, as regards his ability to protect himself against his employer, as women and children. He is untutored in the ways of modern industry and falls an easy prey to its masters. We must recognize that the immigrant cannot take care of himself and that it is our duty to surround him with safeguards, so that he will not be made to bear an undue share of the costs of our system as he now does. Limitation of the hours of work, prescription of a reasonable minimum of safety and healthfulness in the mines and factories where he works, provision for decent housing, and a good system of employment exchanges are very clearly essentials in a program aiming at the ecomonic protection of the immigrant. A minimum wage which would prevent the employer from accumulating a large reserve of labor through a system of part-time employment also seems to me to be essential to such a program. I have no doubt that many other methods of protection are needed, but we need at least this much before we can make the immigrant feel that we are dealing with him in good faith in offering him an opportunity to make a living among us.

In the second place, we must extend the work of our public schools so that they will provide, not only for the education of the children of immigrants

in the common-school branches, but also for their vocational training. We should also make some provision for such schooling as the adult immigrant needs. Certainly if we expect to naturalize any considerable proportion of them we must teach them English, and I think, too, we must teach them something more about the organization and operation of our governmental institutions than they have been taught in the past. Furthermore, there is a wide field of general intellectual, social, and cultural interest to which the school should minister. In fact there is almost no limit to the possible extension of the school's activities in this direction, and they would all contribute to the making of better American citizens out of the immigrants and their children.

In the third place, community and personal service must be organized on such a large scale that they will reach the lives of practically all of our immigrants. I mean that such work as social settlements are doing, perhaps with certain additions, e.g., visiting housekeeping and visiting nursing departments, should be so extended that it will become a vital factor in the lives of all our immigrants. It is by such work as this through which personal contacts are established and the primary groups can be encouraged and directed that we may expect the creation of an atmosphere of kindliness and friendliness which will win the heart of the immigrant. Here, too, we may expect the very best ideals of our democracy to stand clearly before the immigrant, embodied in men and women with whom he comes into frequent personal contact. He will thus come to know America through some of its best types rather than through its worst only. Through such agencies we may also expect to keep continually before the immigrant higher standards of living—good standards of home-making and of providing for the home, good standards of personal cleanliness, high standards of treatment of women and children, and high standards of personal and public morality—because he can observe them in the lives of his American helpers and friends. There is no doubt but that effective community and personal service would also aid greatly in maintaining that unity of family life among immigrants which America so conspicuously destroys and which is the basis of strong personal character.

I think that we cannot possibly overemphasize the importance of establishing personal contact between Americans who embody the best things of our life and immigrants who are groping about blindly in their efforts to adjust themselves to a new world. It is by personal service rendered to the immigrant community that we can get a spiritual hold upon our immigrants and direct them, almost without their knowing it, into channels where they will feel the pull of our best ideals and consequently will uphold and support them.

If time allowed I should like to be more concrete; I should like to show how the immigrant family could be held together in the closest of moral unity, how the neighborhood could be made to stand for cleanliness—physical, moral, and political—and how healthy, puissant democratic ideals naturally

prevail in communities where the principal relations of life are governed by kindly personal service and a "square deal" is given to all.

I am of the opinion that if the whole cost of immigration were assessed against those who exploit the immigrant's labor power, that is to say, if the cost of such a program of control as I have so inadequately sketched were assessed against the employers of immigrants, we should have little need of artificial barriers erected against the entrance of European peoples. In the meantime some such scheme as Professor Todd proposes may be needed to give time to get a more fundamental program for the social control of immigrants into operation.

H. P. Fairchild, Yale University

If I may have a moment or two more of the time of this very patient audience, I wish to say that I agree with almost everything that Miss Abbott has said. Miss Abbott and I differ so fundamentally on a great many of our basic points of view that I always welcome an opportunity to agree with her and feel honored in so doing.

I agree with Miss Abbott that the United States at the present time hardly merits the name of nation. We are a disorganized, disunited, heterogeneous collection of diverse elements. I also concur in her feeling that we owe a duty to the foreigners who are resident in our midst and that we ought to do all that we can to assure to them the benefits for which they came. This duty rests upon the fact of our admission of them to the country. We might have kept them out, but we did not; consequently we are under obligation to give them special consideration now that they are here.

I intentionally restricted my discussion to the question of controlling immigration at the port of entry, partly for the reason that that is a big enough topic to be even summarily touched upon in the time allowed, and partly because I do not think that the question of what to do with the foreign-born in our midst is, strictly speaking, a question of immigration at all. Immigration is a movement from one country to another. When immigrants are once admitted to this country, the possibility of controlling immigration so far as they are concerned is over. The question now is what to do about the results of immigration.

The more I try to deal with social subjects in a scientific way the more I am impressed with the lamentable results of the existing lack of precision and definiteness in our use of our technical terms. I think this society might well take up the question at some future time of the methods of securing a greater conformity and accuracy in the use of sociological terminology.

But while the question of the foreign-born is not, strictly speaking, a question of immigration, it certainly is a matter of vital importance. Many of our middle western states are confronted with the problem of flood control in connection with the streams which flow through their territory. Flood

control is one thing, however, and the problem of the restoration of the devasted areas is another. Flood control involves the building of reservoirs and dams and other devices for preventing disastrous overflows. The other problem is that of remedying the results of floods by rebuilding and rehabilitating the devasted areas.

So with reference to the foreign-born, the problem of correcting the evil results of immigration is grave enough, but it is not a problem of the control of immigration. The latter problem has to do with expedients whereby these evil results may be prevented from arising.

FRANCIS TYSON, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

Perhaps there is no need to take up the cudgels for the economic interpretation that has been satirized by Professor Miller. Yet one might question how he draws any clear distinction between the political freedom which he overemphasizes so emotionally and the economic processes closely related to that freedom, which he ignores. The economic viewpoint claims only that the economic factor is likely to be the dynamic influence in group life; that racial and political traditions have developed out of past environments and are often in process of being adjusted to harmonize with new economic and social conditions.

That economic causes were important in our immigration movement is generally agreed. Again, with the falling off of immigration following the war, and the coming of a period of industrial boom, northern business turned to the low-priced labor supply of the South, and in eighteen months more than half a million Negro workers were brought or induced to come North. Even a cursory study of the migration asserts the unique significance of the economic factor. This population movement, by the way, now constitutes our most pressing immigration problem in industrial communities.

Professor Miller stresses the deepening feeling of nationalism among certain of our foreign people with the coming of war, and his Bohemian illustration is a graphic one. But it may be that the political education and cultural progress of such peoples in our midst would in the long run be best attained by a fuller identification of their aspirations with the economic and social welfare of the country which they have chosen as their new home. Will not waste of effort and enthusiasm characterize this earnest reversion to old loyalties and the following from afar the causes of nationalistic separatism in Europe? Is not the future of the Jews in America more intimately concerned with their remarkable contribution to the business and intellectual life of the new nation in which they are free than in the recrudescence of the lost hope of Zionism? The same question might be asked with even more pertinence of the Irish or German-Americans. The idealistic sentiment for the separate nationalism of minority groups living in federal economic areas takes its rise from past religious and racial persecutions and economic oppressions. These have not

existed to any degree in the United States and may even disappear from a reorganized Europe after the war. In our most difficult Negro problem, darkened as it is by prejudice, there is hope because the colored people have identified their interests with those of the white group and are struggling co-operatively for a more secure place in the economic order. This is the time to forward more effectively than ever before the claims of Americanism.

So far as the complicated European situation is concerned, is not Professor Miller's romantic interpretation again sadly inadequate? Was it the effort of a Bismarck or Cavour to bring order out of chaos by means of economic co-operation that caused the war, as he says, or the stubborn persistence of small competing nationalisms that interfered with the process of unification? There is perhaps a place in Europe for a half-dozen co-operating federal states, whose diverse population groups must be assured democracy and autonomy; but the future is black indeed if a hundred independent fighting states emerge. For illustration, will not the Finns, or Lithuanians, or Ukrainians, peoples whose development Professor Miller has so deeply at heart, find their freedom best as autonomous units co-operating in the economic expansion of a New Russia?

Edwin L. Earp, Drew Theological Seminary

One of the ways to secure social control of the immigrant population of a community is to use the leaders of the immigrant groups in promoting matters of patriotic concern, such as the selling of Liberty Bonds, the raising of funds for the Christian Associations and the Red Cross. In the town from which I come we have done this with the most satisfactory results.

The process of Americanizing these people is going on often unconsciously until some crisis like the present war comes upon us. As an associate member of the Local Board of Exemption, in filling out the questionnaires of the registrants for the draft, I discovered that in almost every case no alien in our town was willing to claim exemption from military service because he was *not* a citizen, nor was he willing to return to his own country to enter its military service, but rather in almost every case the registrant, if he had to fight, wanted to fight with the United States forces and for the American cause. I may say these were mostly Italians.

I wish also to give a personal illustration of the point Miss Williams has made about the importance of knowing the life of the immigrant from a study of his life in the old country, as well as from a study of his condition here: In October while I was picking apples from the top of one tree, I heard voices under an adjacent tree and, looking down, discovered an Italian woman with her daughter picking up apples from the ground without having first asked permission. I ordered them away, not because I cared for the apples, but because I objected to having them taken without asking. If they had been members of one of the professor's families, I no doubt would have acted dif-

ferently. It may be that had I understood the right of foraging in the old country I would have acted differently toward this Italian woman and her daughter, though they did not belong on the campus.

MARY C. WIGGIN, CONSUMERS' LEAGUE OF MASSACHUSETTS

I should like to ask Miss Abbott whether in her opinion any adequate scheme for co-ordinating the work on federal and state employment bureaus should not include also a plan for linking up the various social agencies conversant with conditions affecting the foreign worker. Some of the difficulties at present in the working of our federal and state employment bureaus in the various states seem to be directly due to the fact that appointments are political, and those conversant with the real needs of their community find little opportunity to be of service.

MISS ST. JOHN WILEMAN, NEW YORK CITY

In the issues dealt with so ably by the preceding speakers, no reference has been made to a most important question in limiting the difficulties of the problem, i.e., prompt action for securing the entire elimination of the commercial employment agency, the booking agent, and advertising transportation tout. Those with specific knowledge of actualities realize acutely what a deep-rooted evil exists in the perpetuation of these agencies for crookedness, extortion, fraud, and cruelty, the havoc they have played with the individual as well as with economic, labor, and industrial conditions. Of what use will it prove to establish a system of public labor exchanges, if you deliberately countenance the existence by existing state legislation of instruments which will perpetuate disastrous conditions, create friction between employers and workers, and by means of an unscrupulously clever underground campaign, will leave no stone unturned to prejudice the public and nullify and destroy the useful results of your public labor exchanges. When safeguarding the morale and well-being generally of your soldiers' camps, you do not permit hotbeds of vice, degradation, and unhealthiness to flourish side by side with constructive measures for promoting wholesome conditions and individual welfare. Can you not apply the same lesson in dealing with that complex, and delicate, fundamental problem of labor and employment.

I speak from many years of actual handling of these problems after careful study. The results of a coast-to-coast campaign carried on without a break for the past six years without committee or organization will materialize in early federal legislation in 1918 providing for a national organization for Canada, with executive and mandatory powers, to deal with all labor and immigration problems, and administer a public labor bureau system from coast to coast; the abolition of commercialized agencies will synchronize with this measure.

Further, in view of preparedness for after-war contingencies, I have secured from six governments already pledges of official readiness to take

concerted action in the near future, in regard to the total abolition of commercial agencies, booking agents, and transportation touts in dealing with distribution and placement of labor and immigration. In view of the thousands of commercial agencies plying their unholy trade throughout the length and breadth of the United States, and the public licensing of them by state laws, you stand in need of a great arousing of public opinion as to the iniquity and harmfulness of further allowing the perpetuation of a public evil and menace to your community: future drastic action should follow to eliminate these undesirable elements.

May I, in reply to the inquiries from the lady from Massachussetts, state that the Canadian legislation will take the form of a nonpartisan National Commission co-operating with federal, provincial, and municipal authorities, associations of employers and work people, aided in its work by the formation of representative boards attached to the public labor bureau throughout the country; provision for co-operation with the education authorities and agricultural organizations; the testing of all officials appointed to administer the system as to their vocational fitness to handle problems, as well as their business efficiency; special safeguards and attention to women and juvenile labor, the appointment of a woman as one of the commissioners, provision for placement of the disabled, discharged soldier in employment, and many other useful provisions and precautions.

SOCIAL CONTROL IN A DEMOCRACY

FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS
Columbia University

When it was decided that we should help make the world safe for democracy Governor McCall of Massachusetts offered a pertinent and well-received remark on making democracy safe for the world. Subsequent events have demonstrated that this phase of a seething world-conflict cannot be dissociated from the one that President Wilson proclaimed. Social revolution in Russia is running the course that historians and sociologists foresaw, and in the United States, as throughout Europe, the forces of anarchy and darkness are muttering their curses upon civilization. Civilization itself, caught between conspiring perils, fights militaristic absolutism without and disintegrating treachery within. It is to the problem of disintegration, the threatened failure of social control, that I ask attention in this brief word upon social control in a democracy.

It is a fact of everyday knowledge that the word "democracy," having acquired many meanings, has become an equivocal name for opposing tendencies. While casting about for phases to describe these tendencies I discovered that, as so often happens, expressive terms had crept into newspaper discussion. There is an incompetent democracy. We are unhappily familiar with it. There is also—or there may be—a competent democracy. We need not waste time in looking for social control in an incompetent democracy. Our problem, therefore, becomes, What are the traits and what is the structure of a competent democracy? What forces of social control does it command, and how does it organize and apply them?

Certain preliminaries may be assumed. Any democracy, competent or incompetent, by hypothesis and definition, includes

the so-called masses—the peasantry, if there be one, the wage-earners, the proletariat—in a word, the demos. There are democratic groups that avow their purpose to exclude the so-called classes—the possessors of wealth, the private owners of capital goods. Some of these groups go farther. They would exclude the so-called professional class, and the Bolsheviki, we are told, would exclude skilled workers on the ground that they are an aristocracy of labor. I shall not try to prove that these groups are attempting to create an incompetent democracy. I shall take that presumption for granted. A competent democracy, by contrast, necessarily includes men and women of more than average ability. While giving to all the elements in the population a chance to be heard and a voice in decisions, it accepts leadership and utilizes the intellectual and moral resources of the community. It, therefore, does not and cannot exclude those relatively successful persons who constitute the so-called classes. Competent democracy, accordingly, is comprehensive. It is an integral democracy. Moreover, its factors and forces are organized for efficient action. It is an organic democracy.

Organization, we are beginning to understand, is the work of organizers. Control is the work of controllers. In any organization there is a division of labor. Differing individuals perform different tasks. There is also, necessarily, a direction of activities and a more or less successful correlation of specialized efforts. This implies co-ordination. Some individuals must functionally stand in a higher rank than others. Some individuals must functionally stand in subordination to others. Social control, in like manner, is a phenomenon of interacting superiorities and inferiorities. Some men influence and command; other men are influenced, and they obey.

These facts, I believe, are not denied in any important democratic group. Differences of opinion and of practice arise when it becomes necessary to name the organizing and controlling individuals and to work with them. A radical democracy demands equality of circumstance, of opportunity, and of power—that is to say, an objective equality; and it proclaims, also, the natural or personal equality of all men—that is to say, a subjective equality.

Conservative democracy aims to achieve closer approximations to objective equality, but it denies subjective equality. It acknowledges that men are by nature, that is to say, by heredity, unequal in ability and in character.

Democracies of both kinds believe that all normal adults are competent to vote. A consistently radical democracy holds also that all normal adults are equally competent to discharge the duties of any office. Its ideal system is rotation in office. Conservative democracy looks for superior men in general, and, in particular, for men of special ability for specific tasks. It tries to put superior men in office and to keep them there.

In the earlier decades of our own national life one of these platforms found expression in the Jacksonian democracy. The other found incomplete expression and application in Jeffersonian democracy. The most pretentious and active exponents of the radical view at the present time are the Industrial Workers of the World.

Conforming to these two opposing conceptions and programs of democracy are two opposing methods of creating and running organizations. Incompetent democracy begins this business by calling a mass meeting. A slate may or may not have been prepared. The meeting talks. The talk gratifies the vanity of the talkers, but otherwise it achieves nothing. A constitution and by-laws are adopted. A president, a secretary, and a treasurer are elected in due parliamentary process. An executive committee is elected or appointed. Then special committees are constituted, numerous enough and large enough to provide places for as many of the individuals present as may wish to attend more meetings and to see their names printed on letterheads. If an organization of this kind accomplishes anything the marvel may safely be credited to the relatively intelligent effort of a few individuals who forget the by-laws, ignore the existence of their associates, and quietly do the things that have to be done, as occasion arises. Organizations of this type have become a public nuisance in American life.

Organization of the other kind comes not with observation. It grows. An individual sees a job that he thinks ought to be

done and that he thinks he can do. It may be a business enterprise, a charity, a religious or an educational work, or a scientific investigation. He takes off his coat and goes about it. Presently he finds the task too heavy for one man. He looks about and secures a competent assistant. As more help and yet more becomes imperative new lieutenants and subordinates are chosen. An effective working organization has now come into existence and it may grow to large dimensions. In this way our great business systems have grown. In this way our most efficient educational institutions have grown. Substantially this is the organization through which any competent democracy must work. If proof of this proposition is demanded it is at hand in the history of the radical organizations that deny personal superiority and try to submerge it. The I.W.W. itself revolves about the personalities of its Haywoods, its Giovanettis, and its Gurley-Flynns. No radical organization could live a week if in its own practice it did not deny the plan which it tries to impose upon society.

In these facts lie all the possibilities of social control in a democracy. The superior individuals that initiate and organize on one plan or the other and that run all organizations, the bad ones no less than the good ones, are the controllers. Other men imitate them or obey them as may happen. The fundamental assumption of radical democracy is false in fact; it breaks down the moment an attempt is made to apply it, and the impossibility of conducting collective effort in accordance with it explains the incompetency, notorious and scandalous, of all democracies of this type.

Successful social control by the superior few who organize competent democracy and administer its affairs is by no means fully explained, however, by the facts thus far set forth. There is a further phenomenon of procedure to take account of.

Actual social control by the competent is like the line of battle in modern trench warfare. It is pushed forward or it is driven back, as the fortunes of conflict favor the forces of competent democracy or the opposing legions of a democracy that is absurd and incompetent but nevertheless both obstructive and destructive. To gain ground and to hold it year by year competent democracy must master and successfully follow a particular strategy.

That strategy consists in buying support. Lest this assertion should give offense or be misunderstood, let me hasten to add that buying what one wants is not necessarily more objectionable in politics than it is in economics. It may be quite legitimate. Competent democracy buys, and must buy, the support of a great body of voters by offering to the community honest goods which the community wants. It must offer enlightened legislation and efficient administration. It must offer sanitation and education. It must offer improved living conditions. These wares of the political market are familiar. They are the stock in trade of habitual reformers. It is time to recognize, however, that they are not adequate. They do not constitute a sufficient tender to win and to hold the loyal co-operation of millions of men who are easily caught by the patent medicine advertisements of radical groups that make up our amorphous but vast incompetent democracy. If competent democracy is to push its political offensive it must offer and give to the wage-earning masses an increasing share of the economic, no less than of the intellectual and the moral, product of socially organized effort. How this shall be done, whether through agreement or through governmental intervention, whether through profit-sharing or through a more extensive public ownership of the means of production, is debatable; but the condition itself is a fact which debate can no longer affect. Competent democracy can win its way against incompetent democracy only on these terms.

On these terms it can win its way and make the world safe. But one thing more it must do before it can become, in Mr. Carnegie's grandiloquent words, triumphant. In final analysis, its power and effectiveness and its achievements through social control are determined by the ratio of gifted men and women to deficient or otherwise inadequate men and women in the population. This ratio, if we may believe the biologists, cannot be affected by education or ignorance, justice or injustice, religion or irreligion, nor any such thing, except as these, by influencing marriages, births, and deaths, selectively affect the various lines of good and bad heredity. Society is not yet ready—perhaps it never will be ready—for a radical eugenics program. But, let

us venture to hope, it is beginning to understand how enormously life might be ameliorated through an immediate adoption of one simple measure, namely, prevention of the reproduction of the feeble-minded. No one can study the relation of feeble-mindedness to vice, crime, pauperism, ineffectiveness, and political corruption in this country without asking himself the question whether these ancient ills, chief obstacles to human happiness and to the potential achievements of a competent democracy, could not largely be done away with in two or three generations by a little courageous application of common sense.

SOCIAL CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

CHARLES HORTON COOLEY
University of Michigan

What ground have we for hoping that a society of nations has become possible in our time, when all previous history shows failure to attain it? Mankind has always cherished this aspiration, and if it is at last to be realized, there must be some general change in conditions, making practicable what has heretofore been merely visionary. I wish, therefore, to recall certain developments in the social situation which have taken place during the past century and seem to me to justify our belief that the problem of international order may be not far from solution. They are in the nature of a general growth in that organization of human life of which international order is but one phase.

I may note first that there has been a revolutionary change in the social mechanism. The means of communication have been transformed, enlarging and animating social relations and making possible, so far as mechanism is concerned, any degree or kind of unity that we may be able to achieve. In this respect alone we have a new world since the failure of Prince Metternich's scheme of pacification after the Napoleonic Wars.

The second change is the growth, and what appears to be the establishment, of nationalism as the principle animating those members of which a world-organism must be composed. This change is bound up with the preceding, since nations are masses of men united by language, literature, tradition, and local associations, and it is through the growth of communication that they have come to feel their unity more and more and to demand expression for it in a political whole.

I know there are some who hold that the national spirit is hostile to world-organization and who picture the present state of things as a struggle between nationalism, on the one hand, and a

higher principle, such as internationalism, fraternalism, or socialism, on the other. It seems, however, that, although the national spirit must be chastened and regenerated before it is fit for the larger order, there is no possibility of dispensing with it. Sound theory calls for a type of organism intermediate between the individual or the family and the world-whole which we hope to see arise.

A ripe nationalism is favorable to international order for the same reason that a ripe individuality is favorable to order in a small group. It means that we have coherent, self-conscious, and more or less self-controlled elements out of which to build our system. To destroy nationality because it causes wars would be like killing people to get rid of their selfishness. Our selves are poor things, but they are all we have, and so with nations in the larger whole. So far as the world is nationalized it is organized up to the point where supernationalism must begin. Having achieved the substructure we are ready to add the upper stories. We seek a synthesis, and anything synthetic already achieved and not hopelessly unavailable is so much gain. It is only too obvious that, on account of their incoherence, those regions where a national consciousness has not yet developed are a peril to any system we may erect. The national state, supported by patriotism, is our central disciplinary institution, the backbone of historical structure, which could decay only at the cost of a vast collapse and disintegration involving the degradation of human character. Even intermittent war would be better than this.

And just as it takes ambitious and self-assertive persons to make a vigorous group, so we need national emulation and struggle in a greater society. A world-life that was altogether supernational, without aggressive differentiation, would, I believe, be enervating, and I agree with the militarists in so far as to find this an unsatisfying ideal. We sometimes think of the Commonwealth of Man as likely to resemble the United States on a greater scale; but it would not be well to have the nations of the world so much alike, or even so harmonious, as our states; nor is it likely that they will be. We need a more energetic difference.

Another favoring change is the rise of democracy. This has been contemporaneous with the rise of nationalism and is likewise

based upon the new communication and education that have made it possible to organize social consciousness on a great scale. Indeed nationalism and democracy, although they may at times conflict, are phases of the same development. In both the individual gets a congenial sphere of expression. The people, awakened by the new intercourse, are no longer inert and indifferent to the larger relations of life, but live more in these relations and aspire to feel themselves members of great sympathetic wholes. They find these in democratic groups united by the spiritual bonds of language, ideal, and tradition; and strive, accordingly, to make the actual organization correspond to such groups.

The view that democracy will insure international peace is, in my opinion, not so certainly true as many think. It is not impossible that a whole nation may become possessed by military ideals and passions, as has at times been measurably true of France. And democracy affords no guaranty that an energetic militant faction, even though a minority, may not grasp the lead and rush a nation into war. Something of this kind took place in the southern states at the outbreak of the rebellion. Would the world-war have been impossible if Germany had been as democratically organized as France? I do not see that it would, though it must, no doubt, have come on in a different way. The conflict of ideas and ambitions would still have been there, with no adequate way to settle it.

Yet there are practical reasons for thinking that democracy, on the whole, will be pacific. It gives power to the masses, who are the chief sufferers from war and normally the most kindly in sentiment. Homely and friendly ideals of life have always had their stronghold among the common people, and war has been fostered mainly by rulers and upper classes, not merely for aggrandizement, but as a kind of sport to which they were addicted for its own sake. It may safely be assumed that modern democracy will not share this taste, but, although still subject to martial excitement, will pursue, in the main, ideals more likely to promote everyday happiness.

Another reason why democracy tends to international peace is that under modern conditions it is necessary for content and equilibrium within a nation. One of the main causes of recent wars

has been the need of sovereigns and ruling classes to forestall internal revolution by the pressure of external conflict. Napoleon III, not only once but several times, sought war in the hope of supporting his power by the prestige of victory, and there is reason to believe that Russia, Germany, and Austria were all influenced by this motive in the year 1914. Extending radicalism was threatening to split these countries, and it was felt that conflict without would close the rift within. We all know how true, for the time at least, this proved to be.

As a fourth of these general changes favorable to the prospect of enduring peace I would reckon the diffusion of organizing capacity among the people, not only by education and political democracy, but quite as much through economic experience. The administration of business in its innumerable branches and the participation in labor unions and other economic groups have developed on a great scale that power of the individual to understand and create social machinery which is essential to any well-knit organization. The industrial nations, at least, are equipped with all kinds and degrees of organizing ability, and if they do not organize peace it will be because they do not want to.

The changes I have mentioned may all be summed up in the statement that the world has been taking on a larger and higher organization, which now demands expression in the international sphere. There is no doubt of the preparation, and the time seems fully ripe for achievement.

And, finally, we have the lessons of the Great War. I am far from presuming to expound these, but it is certain that there is scarcely anything in the way of social ideas and institutions that has not been tested and developed. We know the extent and disaster of modern war as we could not before, and a fierce light has been cast upon all its antecedents.

We believe that the war is establishing at least one great principle, fundamental to any tolerable plan of peace, namely, that no nation, however powerful, can hope to thrive by power alone, without the good will of its neighbors. From this point of view the main purpose of the war is to vindicate the moral unity of mankind against self-assertion. We are resolved that it shall register the

defeat of self-sufficiency and domination, and so point the way to an international group within which national struggle can go on under general control. In order that this may come to pass there are two great requirements regarding the issue of the war: first, that the chief aggressor against moral order shall be thoroughly beaten and humbled, not before other nations, but before the collective right; and, secondly, that no other nation shall take advantage of the situation for private aggrandizement. If the latter is done, or permitted, the whole moral outcome is vitiated.

Assuming that the general conditions have become favorable, I wish further to inquire whether it is reasonable to expect that a society of nations may be formed upon the same principles that we rely upon in the association of individuals. How far is a group of nations like a group of persons? Can we anticipate that the members will be guided, for better or worse, by the ordinary impulses of human nature, or must we have a new psychology for them?

Whether the behavior of a social whole will be personal or not depends upon whether the members identify themselves heartily with it. If they do, then, in times of aroused feeling, those sentiments and passions which are similar in all men and are easily communicated will inflame the whole group and be expressed in its behavior. It will act personally in the sense that it is ruled by the live impulses of human nature and not by mere routine or special interest. Most groups are far from answering to this description, which, as a rule, applies only to those that are small and intimate, like the family. But the case of the nation is peculiar, since it is known to evoke the emotion of patriotism, which has a special power to draw into itself the whole force of personality.

The psychological background of patriotism I take to be the need of human nature to escape from the limitations of individuality and to immerse the spirit in something felt to be larger, nobler, and more enduring. This need is expressed also in devotion to leaders, like Napoleon or Garibaldi; in the passion for causes, like socialism and the labor movement, and in many forms of religious service. Its main object in our time, however, is one's country; and it is because of the wholeness with which men put themselves into it

that a nation comes to have a collective self in which such sentiments as pride, resentment, and aspiration are fully alive. A self-conscious nation is a true *socius*, and consequently may unite with others in a social and moral group. The whole doctrine of international relations might well start from this point, that the units with which we deal are truly human and not mere corporations or sovereignties.

It is true that their relations have been mostly selfish or hostile in the past, but this is true also of persons except in so far as, by working together, they have acquired habits and sentiments of co-operation. And nations, even in their conflicts, confess their unity by seeking one another's admiration. Each wants to distinguish itself in the eyes of the international audience, and war itself is waged largely from this motive. We want our country to be glorious, to excel in the world-game; and the fact that the game is destructive does not destroy the social character of the impulse. If this were not present, we should not find our leaders instigating us by appeals to national honor, resentment, and pride. Perhaps there is no better proof of the personal nature of national feeling than the large part which "insults" play in arousing it. An entity that can be insulted is essentially human.

If the national spirit is truly human and social it should be capable of a moral development and of participating in a moral order similar to that which prevails in personal relations. And perhaps the surest proof that international social control is possible is that nations have shown themselves capable of feeling and acting upon a disinterested indignation at aggression upon other nations, as in the case of Belgium. Such indignation is in all societies the most active impulse making for the enforcement of justice. There is an incredible doctrine taught by some writers that the national self can feel greed and hate, but cannot rise to justice, friendship, and magnanimity. Why should its human nature be so one-sided? Is it not quite conceivable that we might come to demand an even higher standard of honor and conduct from our country than we do from ourselves, because the idea of country, like the idea of God, is the symbol of a higher kind of life? The gods have been in the mud too, and as they have risen from it to an ethical plane we may hope the same of the nations.

If this view is sound, it follows that if we can change the ruling ideal so that nations come to admire one another for being righteous, magnanimous, and just, as well as strong and successful, we shall find them as eager to live up to *this* ideal as they now are to conform to a lower one. It is all a matter of the standards of the group.

If there is a nation that has deliberately set out to be unsocial by adopting a theory of national aggrandizement by *Macht* alone, that nation is believed to be Germany; but even here, however unlovely the resulting type of self may appear to be, there can be little doubt that it is a social self, ambitious to shine in the eyes of the world. Strange as we may think it, the self-conscious part of Germany felt that she was doing a glorious thing when in 1914 she assailed two great nations and defied a third; and she looked confidently to others for admiration. Perhaps we may expect that, having learned where she misjudged the sentiment of the group, she will in the future conduct herself in a manner more acceptable to it.

Nations, then, are normally moral agents, subject to control by the ruling opinion of the period as to what is honorable and praiseworthy. The trouble has been, in great part, that this ruling opinion has set barbaric standards and approved a style of conduct such as prevails among savage tribes or lawless frontiersmen in a new country. A nation was held to be great in proportion as it extended its possessions, its rule, and the dread of its arms. The expression "national honor" in the history of the nineteenth century will be found to mean chiefly warlike prestige, a reputation for valor and success, the power to punish enemies or reward friends. It was sullied by failure to take revenge, by declining a challenge or deserting an ally, but not by lawlessness, arrogance, or greed. The ideal from which honor took its meaning was national prowess, not the welfare of a group of nations; there was no reference to a general right springing from organic unity. It was the honor of Achilles or Rob Roy, not the team-work honor of a modern soldier.

Temporary peace was obtained by a balance of power, that is, not by any real unity, but by the clans being so nearly matched that each hesitated to start a fight. Such hesitation might be expedient, but it was not in itself honorable. Honor was to be won mainly by victorious conflict, on no matter what occasion, and by

displaying the power which followed. Napoleon shone in this way and dazzled all Europe, including Goethe, who was in many things the wisest man of his time. His nephew tried to do the same and had no lack of honor so long as he seemed to succeed. Bismarck did succeed, and the German Empire became the standard-bearer of this type of honor, continuing to uphold it after it had been partly abandoned by other nations.

The organic unity of Europe, real as it had become, was slow to transform national idealism, and diplomacy as well as war remained a game for mutual injury and humiliation. England, who was in a position to lead the way, took some steps in a better path, but not enough to convince the world. The old ways were too strong upon her; she upheld Turkey and crushed the Boer Republics, giving an indifferent example to Germany, whose imperialism is largely an imitation, however distorted, of that of England. The accepted ideal continued to be one which implied war, open or covert, as the road to honor and success.

It is clear that this ideal is no longer congruous, as it once was, with the general state of the world, but is a pernicious survival, unfit, unevolutionary, and ripe for elimination. The obstacles to this are institutional, not inherent in human nature, and if the momentum of custom and the glamor of honor can be transferred from the ways of war to those of peace, the hardest of the work will be done.

The logical outcome is an organic international life, in which each nation and each national patriotism will be united, but not lost, as individuals are united in an intimate group. Our national individuality will subsist, but will derive its guidance and meaning from its relation to the common whole, finding its ambition, emulation, and honor in serving that, as a boy does in the play group or the soldier in his regiment. A spirit of team work will be substituted, we may hope, for that of unchastened self-assertion. There will be rivalry, not always of the highest kind, and even war may be possible until we have worked out the rules of the game and the means of applying them, but the moral whole will assert itself with increasing power. The new system means bringing the

national state under social discipline, making it a responsible member of a larger society. Its significance is, not to diminish, but to become of a somewhat different kind, like that of a woman when she marries. Hitherto not Germany alone but all the nations have clung to an individualism incompatible with any permanent international order and with any discipline except force.

I do not look for any disappearance of national selfishness, even of the grosser kinds. Human nature has various moods, most of them unedifying, and the everyday, grumbling, quarreling routine of life will no doubt go on among nations as among individuals. But in spite of this we have idealism and a social order among persons, and we may expect that nations will have them also. We must organize both ideals and selfish interest, so that the former may work with as little friction on account of the latter as possible. Fundamentally both depend for their gratification upon a social order.

The unity of the international whole will be of a different quality from that of the nation. It will be less intimate and passionate and will lack the bond of emulation and conflict with other wholes like itself. There is a kind of conflict, however, which even an all-inclusive whole must undergo, namely, that with rebellious elements within itself, and this struggle for unity will enhance self-consciousness, as the Civil War did for the United States. The league of nations will not be merely utilitarian, though its utility will be immense, but will appeal more and more to the imagination by the grandeur of its ideal and the sacrifices necessary to attain it; and, as it achieves concrete existence in institutions, symbols, literature, and art, human thought and sentiment will find a home in it. And just as patriotism is akin to the more militant and evangelistic type of religion, so international consciousness corresponds to religious feeling of a quieter and more universal sort, to the idea of a God in whom all nations and sects find a various unity.

I realize something of the immense importance and difficulty of the economic and political problems, involved with the question of an international social order, which I must leave to abler hands. We must do our best to provide equal economic opportunity for all

nations, to establish at least the beginnings of an international constitution, with judicial, legislative, and executive branches, and also to provide a process of orderly change by which the world may assimilate new conditions and thus avoid fresh disaster. I think, however, that all these questions need to be dealt with in view of the more general social problem. We shall not have an international society unless we have political and economic justice; but neither can these endure except as the fruits of a real international solidarity.

We are likely to overestimate the part that force can play in keeping international order. It will no doubt be necessary, especially at first, to have a reserve of force to impress the less civilized nations, and possibly the more civilized at times of exceptional tension. But our discipline will fail, as it does in schools and families, unless we can get good will to support it. Force cannot succeed except as the expression of general sentiment, and if we have that it will rarely be necessary. To exalt it by brandishing a club is to exalt an idea whose natural issue is war. A single powerful nation, whose heart remains hostile to the system, will probably be able to defeat it, and certainly will prevent its developing any spirit higher than that of a policeman. The Commonwealth of Man must have force, but must mainly be based on something higher; on tolerance, understanding, common ideals, common interests, and common work.

DISCUSSION

L. M. Bristol, West Virginia University

I desire to confine my discussion to Professor Cooley's paper, for one reason because it fits in so well with my own ways of thought and expression, and in the second place because the conception of nationalism and the relation of nationalism to peaceful internationalism are expressed in terms that need to be emphasized in these days when men are prone to think either in terms of a narrow, antagonistic nationalism, or in terms of a humanitarianism that fails to give due consideration to any type of social self-consciousness and activity. I find myself in such general agreement with the point of view and principles of social control set forth that my discussion will have to take the form largely of emphasizing certain aspects of the paper and developing

his thought somewhat further and in a way, I trust, which will meet his general approval.

There is one point in the paper, however, with which I find myself somewhat in disagreement, and that is the analysis of patriotism. Professor Cooley says: "The psychological background of patriotism I take to be the need of human nature to escape the limitations of individuality and to immerse the spirit in something felt to be larger, nobler, and more enduring." Now if we seek the psychological origin of patriotism we shall probably find that it is the sentiment connected with such co-operation within the group as has proven on the whole of adaptive value; or, again, it is loyalty to that political unity on which so much of personal welfare is felt, more or less consciously, to depend. Patriotism, in its earliest stages of development, is closely related to that type of religion which Ward characterizes as "the group sentiment of safety," but later it is confined, largely, to a certain kind of feeling and activity connected with a political unit. It seems to me that Professor Cooley gives a justification for patriotism rather than a psychological explanation.

The argument of the paper is based largely on the analogy of a nation among a group of nations, to an individual among a group of individuals. "How far is a group of nations like a group of persons?" he asks, and answers in a later paragraph, "A self-conscious nation is a true *socius*, and consequently may unite with others in a social and moral group." "The whole doctrine of international relations," he continues, "might well start from this point, that the units with which we deal [that is, nations] are truly human and not mere corporations or sovereignties."

Professor Cooley goes on to argue that social control in international relations will be much the same as social control of individuals in a society —largely a matter of restraint exercised by public opinion; in this case, the opinion of other nations forming some kind of a psychical unity. Now this method of reasoning by analogy, so prominent in the writings of Spencer, Lilienfeld, Schäffle, and a host of others, has been used little for some years until recently; but there seems to be a growing tendency to liken a social group, especially a nation, not to a biological organism, but to a person. While fully recognizing the dangers connected with the use of this method, and appreciating its limitations, its value is so unquestionable that I believe Professor Cooley is fully warranted in its use, and I propose to go a step further in the discussion of social control in international relations based on the conception of a nation as a social quasi-personality. I prefer this expression to "truly human" as used in the paper.

From this point of view, we may get some light on methods of social control in international relations, by a study of social control as actually exercised by a group on its members, and as it might be exercised still more effectively by rational social organization. But first we should note that as there are two general types of individuals, the one self-assertive, over against other individuals, the other assertive of self only as a member of a more inclusive

group, developing self by service, so there are two general types of nations, the one seeking self-aggrandizement at the expense of other nations, with emphasis on territorial expansion, wealth, and numbers, the other seeking self-enlargement and admiration chiefly through a reputation gained for its enlightened system of government and social policy, and for its influence over the ideas, ideals, and institutions of its fellow-nations, relying for success, not on physical force, but on the attractive power of example and peaceful propaganda.

The reason that nationalism is in such ill-repute in certain circles is that the world for the most part has seen but one type—the narrow, self-centered, antagonistic type. In the Spanish-American War and in the endeavor to solve the problems arising from it, the conduct of the United States has been a puzzle to nearly all the other nations because they have been accustomed to see nations acting for the most part only as selfish individuals. Our attitude toward our sister states of South America has been interpreted by them in accordance with this same principle—and unfortunately at times with good reason. But on the whole, in recent years, the United States has conducted herself as one among a family of nations. The action of our country in returning to China, with conditions, the indemnity awarded at the close of the Boxer uprising was in such conspicuous contrast with that of the other nations that it was not only misunderstood but interpreted in a way to cause resentment.

Now, as Professor Cooley has so well pointed out, social control among a family of nations will be largely by public sentiment. This may remain diffused; it may be formulated into an international code of ethics; it may be crystallized into international law; but in any event each nation will be responsive to restraint exercised by what might be called international public opinion. Of course, in so far as the selfish, aggressive, Prussian type of national egoism prevails, the only possible method of peaceful social control will be by some international organization backed by force—and peace might not reign even under such conditions. The present world-war in some of its aspects illustrates the possibilities of restraint exercised on a nation by the opinion of other nations. Germany's greatest blunder has been in her failure to estimate correctly the power of international public opinion. Surely "the wheels of the gods grind slowly, but they grind exceedingly small," and probably neither Germany nor any other enlightened state will make so serious a mistake again.

Professor Cooley has done well, also, to insist that nationalism of some type is essential to efficient internationalism. And here, again, our simile is suggestive. Individual self-consciousness is necessary to rational activity; nor is an intense consciousness of self as distinct from other selves inconsistent with the highest social service. Indeed much might be said in favor of a vivid self-consciousness as a prerequisite to the highest self-development and most efficient service. The same may be true of a nation in relation to other nations. The important question concerning an individual or a nation is as to its type,

whether it is antagonistic or co-operative, and the problem presents itself as to the development of a national self-consciousness of the co-operative type.

As many social psychologists have pointed out, the individual self and the social self develop together; but as to which shall be the more prominent in feeling and conduct depends somewhat on heredity, but even more on early training. Conditions surrounding the child in his plastic years determine largely whether he will become a self-centered, antagonistic individual, or a social, co-operative individual. Co-operative endeavor in the home, at school, on the playground, and in economic and social activity is the best training for altruism. Moreover, where this kind of endeavor is carried on under division of labor, especially where this is based on natural aptitudes and specialized training, the group unity based on consciousness of kind is intensified by a consciousness of supplementary difference. Under these conditions, too, the unity of the group approximates so much more the unity of personality. But a group made up of this type of co-operating individuals will not necessarily be a co-operative group in relation to other groups, for co-operation within the group may be fostered as a means of strengthening the group in antagonistic competition with other groups. There needs to be special training, then, to make for efficient membership in a nation that is to be a part of an international family. Of first importance in this training is a humanitarian as distinct from a mere national ideal, or, even better, a national ideal that somehow includes humanity. Under the stimulus of this ideal, the children will be taught concerning the virtues and historic achievements of other races in such a way that opprobrious terms like "hunky," "sheeny," and "nigger" will not be found in their vocabulary. A universal ethics needs to be developed to displace the national and double standard that has prevailed so generally since the very dawn of social life. As rapidly as possible there should be wrought out an international polity making for the widest possible geographic division of labor and relatively free exchange of goods. Just such division of labor, it was, and exchange, which made for peace instead of war among neighboring groups in primitive times—a fact overlooked all too often, especially by the so-called social-Darwinians. Education for peaceful, efficient internationalism must train the developing child to think and act in terms of an ever-enlarging self-consciousness and self-regarding sentiment, first including the family, then the community and various social organizations, as the public school and Sunday school, then including the state and nation, but eventually all humanity. But the most important factors in this training will be the social ideal of each successive group of which he becomes an active member, and the purposeful endeavor of each group to function as efficiently as possible in a more inclusive group. Every family should endeavor to find its place in the social life of the community and its social institutions. Every community should seek to fill its place in the work of the state and nation. Every nation should have a supreme ambition to fulfil its appointed mission in the development of the highest well-being of humanity.

Methods of social control making for an efficient democracy and for peaceful internationalism will develop with the development of such a type of education and social organization. There will function, in the interaction of groups, just such principles of social control as have been analyzed so ably by Professor Ross: sympathy, sociability, sense of justice, individual reaction, public opinion, customs, ideals, beliefs, ceremonials, education, personality, law, social religion; and although, as both Professor Ross and Professor Cooley point out, we have reason to believe that public opinion will function with increasing power, we may well be prepared to continue for many years yet under the sway of national selfishness and prejudice resulting in intergroup friction and calling for some organized method of enforcing peace.

The final outcome of the present dualistic movement for nationalism on the one hand, requiring some kind of intergroup rivalry as a means of securing national character and unity, and on the other hand the movement for internationalism and peace, is not so happily formulated by Professor Cooley, it seems to me, as by that great prophet of internationalism, Jacques Novicow, who looked forward to a time when bitter intergroup struggle for means of subsistence, for territory and political power would give way to a rivalry in excellence; and when the measure of group success would no longer be in terms of territory and wealth and population acquired by physical force or diplomatic strategy, but in terms of power to provoke imitation, to attract immigrants, and to induce annexations, all of these processes resulting in territorial expansion, wealth, and numbers. Had Germany been content to pursue a policy of peaceful expansion and to become the teacher of all nations by the efficiency of her school system, her municipal government, and her methods of social insurance, in thirty years, as Professor Giddings once remarked, she might have possessed some of the most important territory she has hoped in vain to secure by this awful world-carnage.

Rivalry in excellence between nations and between lesser social groups, I believe, is the kind that should be fostered by all sociologists who believe in nationalism as well as internationalism. This kind of rivalry has the potency of developing that unity and loyalty in the group that is so essential to purposeful endeavor. It will provide, also, an objective test for social progress so greatly needed in social science and social philosophy.

But I hear the oft-repeated criticism: a beautiful dream, but Utopian! We must keep our feet on the ground, deal with social forces and problems as we find them, and go only so far as we are warranted by inductive study. In reply let me suggest that the social dreamer may prove to be the social seer; that the social philosopher who endeavors to see the end, however distant, and tries to arouse human forces and correlate them in such a way as to bring about the end desired, has his place as well as the social scientist or the social engineer; indeed, that the idealist has inspired some of the greatest achievements in social progress. Every educational system is based on an educational ideal. Every thoroughgoing system of social amelioration or reconstruction

should be based on a social ideal that is the outgrowth of a consistent social philosophy.

We are at the dawn of a period of social reconstruction such as the world has never before seen, and the supreme need of the hour is for a social philosophy which will enable us to "see life steadily and see it whole." This is one great merit in the paper by Professor Cooley, for it is but the application to one subject of a thoroughgoing system which has found no finer expression, I believe, than in the paper under discussion, in which prominence is given to the concept of nations as quasi-personalities and to the social ideal of humanity organized ultimately into a family of nations.

Cecil C. North, Ohio State University

I have the same reason for not discussing Professor Cooley's paper that the previous speaker had for discussing it, namely, because I find myself in such hearty agreement with it. I choose to discuss Professor Giddings' paper because there are several things in it with which I wish to take issue. I agree entirely with Professor Giddings in his judgment of radical democracy, a kind of social organization that pretends that masses, or groups of people, are competent as masses to direct the affairs of group life.

But there are two points in which I cannot follow him. The first is his belief that social control depends vitally on the effort to increase by positive social action the proportion of gifted or exceptional individuals. Of course, we all believe in negative eugenics, that is, the elimination of the unfit. I doubt very much, however, that feeble-mindedness is much of a factor in political corruption. I do not see that our failure at political control is due, in very large measure, to the presence of subnormal individuals. But any attempt at positive eugenics, that is, efforts to increase the number of gifted individuals, has very definite limitations. To mention but one, we have no standard of the most desirable elements in a democracy. Being an organic whole, the democracy needs brawn and muscle and nervous energy and mechanical ability and artistic qualities and capacity for organization and leadership. To attempt to evaluate such different types of ability in comparison with one another is an extremely difficult task, and any program of positive eugenics must assume responsibility for such comparisons of worth. I think it has been well shown by Lester F. Ward and others that a program of education, considering that term in its broadest sense, and of distribution of the spiritual goods equally to all classes has much more hopefulness of increasing the available number of useful citizens than has any scheme of positive eugenics.

I do not care to argue this point at any length, however, since my difference with Professor Giddings on this point is a minor consideration. I think there is a more vital weakness in his theory of social control in a democracy than in his theory of eugenics.

He does indeed in the early part of his paper state an organic conception of the relation of leaders and lead in a competent democracy. He states a correct theory of leadership but ignores its implications when he describes its method of operation. Competent democracy must do more than purchase support for its leaders from the masses by competent legislation, administration, and justice in the distribution of goods. It must continually win their intellectual and moral support for the policies of the leaders. The people must always be convinced that what the leaders are doing is an expression of the people's own will.

I do not see that Professor Giddings has stated anything different from a benevolent despotism. What Germany was doing before the war for the masses of the people was to a considerable degree, at least, the sort of thing that Professor Giddings describes. If democracy means anything, it means power exercised by the whole organic people, and we must recognize the fact that the people are going to exercise it. Whether they do it wisely depends on how they are guided by their leaders. Any theory or practice of social organization that assumes that the masses are going to sit by content with enjoying the goods distributed to them, by however competent and benevolent controllers, is doomed to bitter disappointment. Only by carrying the people with them every step of the way and making the decision of the controllers identical with some expression of the will of the people can the leaders hope to maintain their position.

We have had a striking illustration of this in the recent election in the national metropolis. If the news comments have any foundation at all, this seems to have been clearly demonstrated: that no government, however efficient and honest and just, can continue in power which does not keep the people so informed that they intellectually and morally assent to the policies of the leaders.

Other examples are abundant. No one who has considered at all thoughtfully the labor movement of recent years can escape the fact that labor problems have been brought on by something more than an unfair distribution of goods. The laborer insists that the control of industry shall in some way express his own will and personality. The feminist movement is also significant. It has had its most pronounced expression in those countries where the women are already receiving at least their share of the goods of the community. The movement is especially an expression of a claim for the expression of personality and, as such, is a genuinely democratic movement.

To assert that the people must have a real voice in the shaping of social policies is not to say that that form of control which Professor Giddings calls "radical democracy" can be competent. He is entirely right in holding that leadership is absolutely necessary. There is no thinking in the mass. A university faculty meeting is generally an expression of disorganized incompetency, when questions of detail are to be settled and policies put into execution, and this is equally true of any attempt to think out details or execute

policies by any groups or masses of people. How then do the people rule? They rule by furnishing the fundamental convictions and sentiments and purposes. Professor Cooley and others have well stated this in their discussions of the relation of leader and lead. A leader must be an interpreter of those undefined and yet powerful convictions that well up from the souls and minds of the masses. The people are more liable to be right on fundamentals of social policy than are individual thinkers, and real competency on the part of leaders in a democracy consists in the ability to catch up and say for the people what is in the hearts and minds of the people to say, but for which they have not yet found a voice. These convictions and purposes and sentiments of the people, which in the long run must be the controlling factors, are indeed susceptible of modification and change through education. But in the last analysis the leaders in a democracy must take from them their cue.

This same theory of social control must apply to the control of the relation of one nation to another. I am sorry that we have not had presented a discussion of the question as to how far the foreign relations of a nation may be democratized. There is a party in the United States that seems to think that there is some way by which the people can directly deal with their relations to other nations. But there is no magic by which the people can directly control foreign relations when they are unable to do so in domestic affairs. It is preposterous, therefore, to assume that the people in any direct way can undertake to decide the issues of foreign relations. A direct submission to the people of a particular issue to be voted upon can never secure competent judgment unless it is an exceedingly simple and uncomplicated one. But if the leaders are really competent to express the will of the people in any affairs, there is no reason why they should not also express them in foreign relations. Popular control of international relations, therefore, must come by the same road as popular control of domestic affairs.

This all means that there is no short cut to democracy. We have made the mistake of regarding democracy as a form of government rather than as a spiritual attainment. Competent democracy can only be attained along the hard road of the education of the people, the inculcation of right ideals, and the keeping of the masses so informed of the activities of the government that they shall be able, intelligently, to decide whether or not this or that policy is to be followed. This spiritual attainment, which we call "democracy," lies, of course, still before us. Professor Giddings speaks truthfully when he says that it comes not by observation. He might well have added that it comes only by prayer and fasting.

L. L. Bernard, University of Minnesota

The contention of these few comments upon the papers of the afternoon is, briefly, that it will do little good to state what we want unless we know how to get it. We do want peace; we do desire to destroy autocracy in national

and international relations; we are fighting a war for democracy; we do hope that a better and more just social order will arise. But how are these things to be achieved? There seems to be too much blind faith that they will come through magic, as it were, regardless of effort and planning. I am not one of the optimists in this regard. I believe that just as our social order has largely degenerated into the present international crisis because we had no adequate plan, so will the social order after the war is over fall further into a condition of chaos unless we can evolve and plan an order which is more than a patchwork of the past.

Through the past hundred years or so we in America have made a religion of democracy, though our worship of it has been rather formal and lifeless. Since the war there are many people who do lip service to democracy because it is a popular term with which to appeal to those who contribute blood and sweat to war machines. But the fact remains that in great national and international crises democracy breaks down, becoming a phrase rather than a fact. Whether this shelving of democratic control in favor of autocracy is due to the defects and weaknesses of democracy itself or to the ever-watchful selfishness of the classes in strategic positions who are unfriendly to democratic society, the fact remains that democracy itself is not able to prevent it. This breakdown of historic democracy in crises is not different in kind from its failure in less critical times; it is merely more marked, more spectacular.

The difficulty is doubtless not with democracy as the ideal of placing the welfare of all above the welfare of the few. It consists in the failure of historic democracy (1) to keep consistently to this ideal, (2) to establish a criterion or method by means of which this ideal may be attained. Our democracy in America, and apparently elsewhere, has historically been but little conscious of the social welfare ideal. It has rather represented a tendency for the struggle for the satisfaction of interests to expand so as to include more people—all the people, all classes. The dominant aim of democracy is still distributive individualism, a free field for a hard fight, the hope of each being to obtain the largest possible share in distribution regardless of the rest of society. Localism, the theory of the class struggle (practiced by both labor and capital), reaction against restraining institutions whatever their social functions, have been the order of the day. All the way from capital's defense of the economic order as it is to the anarchist's blind reaction against external control in toto we have the same philosophy of democracy: an order in which I can satisfy my desires, caring little or nothing for this thing we call society. Political science, sociology, economics, ethics, have accepted the individual interest or group struggle theory of social control, not merely as what exists, but as the normal condition. Discreteness of activity, rather than synthesis of aim, has been preached everywhere from the field of religion to that of economics. We have had an apotheosis of individualism and because it was a free fight for all, in which everybody hoped to get at least his share, we have called it democracy.

We have had no consistent objective criterion of social action or control for common ends. Each one's own subjective desires, uneducated and unmolded, have been considered the legitimate motive forces in this pseudo democracy. We have reached a point in social disintegration where we are dazedly looking about and trying to take stock. We are talking about pulling together. We have been looking for a goat to bear the sins of the present world-catastrophe. A certain amount of the blame will have to come home to every civic fireside before we can arrive at a lasting solution. That solution must be found in an objective criterion of social welfare which will take the place of the old subjective criterion leading to distributive individualism upon which our present social order is based.

What is this objective criterion? It is simple. It consists of the application of the facts and principles of science to the control of social relationships, just as all other phenomena are normally regulated according to science. Industry, transportation, exchange, all the fundamental economic interests of life, are controlled through scientific method on their operative side. Shall not the great business of society on its operative side—social contacts, organizations, and controls—be subjected to the same methods? How, then, can the control of society through science be instituted? The method is simple enough, for it is the same method which is applied to those fields where science is already operative. (1) The pertinent facts in the other sciences must be applied in the social sciences. To illustrate: Wherever a fact of bacteriology, of physiology, of physiological chemistry, of psychology, or of any other science is found applicable to the better organization of human controls, that fact must be applied resolutely, regardless of personal preference, likes or dislikes, the cry of suppression of liberty or what not. Such applications are already being made slowly on a voluntary basis through the gradual discovery and dissemination of the facts of science among the masses. But we must go beyond voluntary application, if we are to turn from social disorganization to social control for welfare purposes. (2) Not all scientific facts can be tested in the laboratory and borrowed directly from the sciences antecedent to sociology. Some of them we must test out through a statistical study of results. The survey method, using statistics in order to standardize social facts and obtain an analytical appreciation of social values, often can do for us by way of enlightening us what the antecedent sciences cannot do. Together these two methods can provide us with the data on which we can build an objective social order, an organization of society dictated by science, instead of our present social disorganization based on individual preferences merely.

It may be objected that everybody knows this; that we take it for granted that we desire scientific social control; that the real question which requires an answer is, How can we secure the objective social control on the basis of science instead of the distributive individualism of the present? The first two contentions I deny. I do not know of any general textbook in sociology, political science, or economics which states the ideal society, the society which

we are striving for, as a society objectively organized on the basis of science. Furthermore, there is at the present day no textbook in these three sciences which develops its subject-matter wholeheartedly from this standpoint. The absolutism of religious, political, and metaphysical dogma has so frightened us that we are afraid to take advantage of the facts of science to construct a consistent social order for the common good. We are still for the most part in the descriptive stage of the social sciences and many of those among us are violently opposed to going beyond that stage. The social worker is often in bad odor because he has at points advanced from description to construction. And what is this description? The social sciences now describe primarily the techniques of present contacts or past organizations and institutions and these contacts are primarily those of individualism—a struggle for personal ends rather than organization for social welfare.

Not only do the social sciences hesitate short of constructive attempts. The great mass of opinion is yet almost entirely individualistic and opposed to an objective criterion. It accepts only the subjective test of moral worth based on intention or feeling and repudiates the objective criterion that all social and moral right must be objectively and scientifically determined on the basis of what will promote the common welfare. The fundamental conflict between public and private interest must be recognized before this criterion can be changed from an individualistic to a social welfare one.

Granted the desirability of this change of criterion, how can we secure its acceptance? Is not the old individualistic attitude innate, instinctive? Individualism is not instinctive, nor is altruism instinctive. Where man lives close to nature, as in savagery, where he takes his sustenance mainly directly from nature, where the mechanism of mutual aid is little developed in society —in other words, where the interdependence of man is little recognized because it little exists—individualism is common sense. It is the result of experience instead of instinct. The old type of farmer, self-sufficing, finding a competitor rather than a co-operator in a too-near neighbor, was individualistic. The modern farmer is a co-operator, just as the business man and the city dweller are co-operators. These old individualistic attitudes became institutionalized. They were *the* philosophy of life. They permeated every institution—religion, the state, the family, industry, education, everything. Like all traditional dogmas with unanimous institutional support they are difficult to choke off. They dominate our social science, our ethics, our everyday philosophy, and to a large extent our religion.

But society has evolved into a new era. The individual is no longer self-sufficing. He is but a cog in a complex industrial and social machine. It is the organization which counts, is directive, is dominant; the individual is an appendage, literally made and remade, exalted or depressed, to fit the needs of the great interdependent organization, society, in which he lives. Fret about it as we will, like it or hate it, that is the new order of things and such it will remain. Under such an order individualism is as anachronistic as

savagery and as dangerous as sabotage. Such being the case, the philosophers need but interpret the times, understand the world in which they live, and teach the social criterion in all affairs instead of the individualistic. All the teaching and molding institutions, especially religion, education, the family, government, will have to be worked over from the standpoint of the objective social criterion of science and made to preach its gospel. Neither the gospel of individualism nor of altruism (for both are alike subjectivistic and therefore individualistic), but the gospel of impersonal social control through science instead of through the subjective desires of the individual, whether these desires seek the happiness of self or of another, must be the guide. If the molding institutions teach this criterion it will be accepted. For nothing is truer—no lesson back of this war is more patent—than that people believe and act upon whatever they are persistently taught from the cradle up.

But how can the criterion be enforced, even when accepted? Can it be made more than an abstract philosophy? Can we secure legislatures which will use this method in making laws instead of the old individualistic method of balancing interests which is utterly repugnant to it? Doubtless this will be difficult, but we may be able to modify our legislative system in the direction of the utilization of the expert through legislative reference, submission to referendum, and intelligent public discussion. Perhaps there are other checks which we can utilize, such as the dissociation of the legislator from personal interest in the subject of his legislation. Can we secure an administrative personnel which will apply the scientific criterion to social welfare instead of playing politics for personal interests? Can we induce the courts to make decisions on the basis of science instead of tradition? We are making some progress in these directions, and we can make more, vastly more, when we have made up our minds to remove the temptations to individualistic interest struggles which promote partisan or class government by substituting collective welfare for individual interests. Our whole economic and social organization still places the premium upon individual satisfaction rather than upon social welfare, though the whole basis of our existences—economic and social—has changed to the latter.

But my task in this discussion is not so much to forecast political and other institutions as to point out the criterion which we must adopt and adopt in earnest, if we are to prevent the social disasters which we have in part come here to deplore. Individualism was not so dangerous in primitive society; it was often helpful. It has remained dominant into our day but can no longer continue so without destroying the social fabric.

It will be objected that such a system will destroy the democracy which we are struggling for and substitute the most repugnant type of autocracy; that liberty would disappear altogether. Liberty in the sense of license would disappear. The liberty of a man with dynamite which is harmless to others and possibly a source of pleasure to himself in a forty-acre field may become an intolerable license on Broadway. Such is the problem of individualism

in modern society. Indeed, there is every reason to suppose that men will have greater freedom of action and wider range of movement and expression if they act according to the facts of science than if they violate those facts and therefore continually run amuck socially. Will this shift to the objective criterion therefore destroy democracy? On the contrary, it is the only condition of effective democracy. A social order in which all things are decided from the standpoint of the public welfare, utilizing the experts in the sciences for the common welfare instead of the expert in intrigue for personal benefits, is the order in which all men can come nearest to a complete development of personality. The old democracy was, and is, an illusion. Its central principle causes it to play into the hands of autocracy and special interest. It is unable to defend itself, because its weapon is also the weapon of its foes and they wield it better.

C. J. Bushnell, Pennsylvania Military College

As I have sat through the sessions of this convention I have been reflecting that America is today asking several hundred thousand of her finest young men to go to France and die for democracy. In view of that fact, the country is facing a most important question: Are we Americans going to stand squarely for the democracy for which we are asking those boys to die? What is democracy? That is the supreme question before the world today; and it is a question which we who are supposed to be intellectual leaders are especially obligated to answer. We owe it to "the boys" to give an intelligent, honest, courageous, constructive answer—without any sham in it.

Democracy has been defined as government of, by, and for the people. It is that; and we know it is more than merely that. I think we shall not far miss the truth pertinent for the present time, if we say that democracy is a social order that does not legalize nor tolerate spoliation. In this great war the world is crying out for freedom from robbery, from graft, from spoliation, from enforced contributions. The watchwords of the Allies are becoming: "No forced annexations; no forced contributions; government by the consent of the governed."

What freedom from spoliation implies, there is no time to suggest here in detail. Much of what it means was indicated in the *Journal of Sociology* (November, 1917), in the article from the writings of Novicow, in which he described a normal society as a system of exchanges in which the values given and received are substantially equal. The important point at which Novicow leaves that description incomplete, and practically inadequate, is his failure to indicate what is meant by an equal, equivalent, or equitable exchange. If there were time I think it would be worth our while to try to define that conception more exactly and inquire from various points of view what it implies. But, after all, the idea refers to an experience that is familiar to everybody. We all know what it is to feel that we have given and received a "square deal"

and "good value" at the grocery store or at the concert or in our professional relations. This conception is the foundation of all law, as expressed in the contract; is the heart of all systems of morality, as expressed in the Golden Rule; and is, I take it, the most essential aspect of the question of democracy for our time.

Now, the practical question for us is: To what extent does American democracy measure up to the standard of a land of fair exchanges, free from legalized or tolerated spoliation? We know it does not fully measure up to that standard. It is not enough to point out that no country in the world is free from legalized spoliation. That does not excuse us from the effort to make America free. It only increases our obligation to make the effort. And surely, if we require thousands of our boys in uniform to die for democracy, we are under obligation honestly to live for it!

What, then, are some of the undemocratic conditions in America? During this convention several of the speakers have vigorously grappled with that question. This was the point of the papers of Professors Kelsey, Hayes, North, Miss Abbott, and others. On this point let me indicate just two or three important facts, now becoming well known to social students. The average working man in the United States does not receive a wage upon which he can support the average workingman's family of man, wife, and three children. Such researches as Lauk and Sydenstricker's recent book on *Conditions of Labor in American Industry* sum up conclusively the facts: that up to 1916, in the "free" states north of Mason and Dixon's line, at any rate, one-third of all male wage-workers, eighteen years of age and over, received less than $400 a year, and two-thirds received less than $600; while at least $800 was necessary to support the average family in bare "physical efficiency." So, of course, the women and children have been rapidly going into industry. But nearly three-fourths of women wage-earners toil for less than $8 a week, whereas more than $8 is necessary to support an independent woman in decency. Again, the total income of the wage- and salary-earners of the country has for years been hardly one-third of the total selling value of the products they produced. And yet there are powerful organizations in America whose avowed purpose is to break up all labor organizations, destroy collective bargaining, and prevent further increase of wages, or at least to govern workingmen by determining their wages without their voice or consent.

These conditions cannot last. The returning boys from France and their associates in industry here are going to demand a more real democracy. Nearly all informed people today realize we are "between eras," in a transition from capitalism to democracy. And it behoves us frankly to face the situation and clearly to define the steps in that transition, so we may guide our advance without great confusion and loss.

Already the rush of events is almost beyond our power of orderly control. The war itself is a huge warning that we have not understood the meaning of the coming democracy: we have not perceived that liberty is achieved through

union rather than through hostile disunion. In all nations the present rapid increase of collective ownership and control of public utilities is significant of a coming change of heart about this matter of union. Many of the new forms of intercourse thus established will be permanent. The growing mortality rate of business firms today under hostile competition has been pushing us in the same direction. If recent investigations published in *System* are correct, more than 50 per cent of business enterprises die within five years of the time they are started. There are other signs of the transition. The growing difficulty of paying dividends (often on watered stock) after paying the increasing wage bill; the opposition of organized labor to the inevitable new "scientific management," unless its standards be determined and applied by impartial "public" authorities; and the way in which increasing machine production in all lands is gradually limiting "foreign markets" for the "surplus" products of the periodic "hard times" of capitalistic countries—all are signs of the increasing necessity of more democratic union—in both national and international areas.

If we are to achieve a real democracy, then, let me suggest there are two distinctions we are being forced to make in regard to the distribution of income. If just exchange, as the heart of democracy, means giving a fair equivalent for what one gets, then to achieve democracy we are being compelled to ask: first, concerning the method of securing an individual income, is it derived by personal social service or merely by property ownership? and, secondly, concerning the method of using an individual income, is it to be used for personal consumption or is it to be used for controlling the lives of others in industry or elsewhere? With the increasing size of industrial units and area of industrial exchange, the latter use is clearly becoming governmental. Some time we may be able justly to say where personal or true individual income ends and governmental or collective income begins. At any rate, we must honestly face that problem if we are to do honor to the soldiers of democracy and give meaning to the motto on our dollar: E Pluribus Unum.

EDWIN L. EARP, DREW THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

It seems to me that Professor Giddings has made it very clear to us that there are two types of democracy, the incompetent and the competent type. We hear a great deal in these days from the small groups that represent incompetent democracy, the pacifists, the I.W.W., the Bolsheviki, and the like. I think it is high time that we as educators, and all high-minded patriotic citizens, should get busy with that propaganda which will make clear to the masses of the common people what *is* a competent democracy. If we are in this war to help make the world safe for democracy, we certainly ought to make it clear to every soldier who will be fighting over there as well as to every

citizen doing his bit over here that it is to be a competent democracy that we are to safeguard.

FRANK D. WATSON, HAVERFORD COLLEGE

There is one aspect of the subject of Professor Giddings' paper which I wish he had developed at greater length, if indeed he touched upon it at all, namely, how we are to know who are the superiors, the innately capable, the so-called "born leaders," in a world in which we have failed so miserably to equalize opportunity. In short, how are we to know our "mute inglorious Miltons"? We all, I am sure, sympathize with the conception of an efficient democracy. We cannot, however, sympathize with such a conception if its leadership is in the hands of those with more or less ability plus opportunity while the services of others with equal or even greater potential ability are lost to society and social progress, because of our present social organization with its handicap on many who could and would share in the responsibility and joy of leadership and service. Does not the study by Odin, familiar to all readers of Lester F. Ward, still stand? His researches established a definite correlation between opportunity and achievement which is the indispensable test of innate ability. In my judgment the conclusions of his study have not been challenged with success.

D. W. GARRIGUES, CAMDEN, N.J.

I have had very great pleasure in listening to the learned addresses this afternoon (by Professors Giddings, Cooley, Bristol, North, Bernard, and others), and through them all I see recognition of defects in our exemplification of what true democracy should be and for which errors no concrete remedies are seriously proposed.

A claim was made that leaders having the right motives are necessary. But nothing was said about the average political leaders of today who usually follow the olden methods, when "to the victor belonged the spoils" was always the first to be put into practice. Now the typical political leaders, ward, city, and state, become spoilers of the worst type and dominate the financial control where "pickings are the best."

We can trace the reasons for those dominant traits to the child beginning with marbles "for keeps." The exhilaration of the splendid exercise—in stooping and rising—is lost in the child's eagerness to win his playfellow's marbles without an equivalent exchange, thus learning his first lesson of deviation from playing "fair." A boy must learn to play "fair" and continue, or he will not become "fair" in any of his future doings.

On the ballground he will violate the rules "risking getting caught and disgraced," thus taking undue advantage of his opponent.

And should he become a professor, will ridicule his neighbor for some (as he thinks) defective argument, not thinking that his professional brother has spent possibly years in order to be able to give to the world his best work, and was thus robbed of his due reward.

In entering other walks of life his unfairness will crop out at every opportunity.

Will you, kind professors—teachers of the coming generation—take these thoughts home with you and instil a desire in the hearts of your students to "play fair," and you will then be helping to solve the problems and overcome the leading defects in our democracy, and we will all obey the golden rule as so ably referred to by our friend from the military academy, and ours will be the true democracy.

PROGRAM OF THE TWELFTH ANNUAL MEETING, PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, DECEMBER 27–29, 1917

General Subject: "Social Control"

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 27

1:00 P.M. Subscription Luncheon, all associations invited. $1.00. Speaker: PROFESSOR GUY S. FORD, "A Government Experiment in War Publicity."

8:00 P.M. Joint session with the American Economic Association and the American Political Science Association, Hotel Adelphia, Gold Room.

Chairman, PROFESSOR EDGAR F. SMITH, Provost of the University of Pennsylvania.

Presidential Addresses:

"Ideals as a Factor in the Future Control of International Society," PRESIDENT GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD, of the American Sociological Society.

"The Nature and Future of International Law," PRESIDENT MUNRO SMITH, of the American Political Science Association.

"Economic Reconstruction," PRESIDENT JOHN R. COMMONS, of the American Economic Association.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28

9:00 A.M. Meeting of the Executive Committee, Hotel Adelphia, Green Room.

10:00 A.M. Hotel Adelphia, Green Room. Chairman, PRESIDENT GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD.

General Topic: "Agencies and Fields of Social Control"

"Social Direction of Child Welfare," DR. SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE, University of Chicago.

"The War as a Crisis in Social Control," PROFESSOR CARL KELSEY, University of Pennsylvania.

Discussion: DR. LUCILE EAVES, Women's Educational and Industrial Union, Boston; PROFESSOR CHARLES W. COULTER, Western Reserve University; DR. EDITH ABBOTT, Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy.

1:00 P.M. Luncheon tendered by the University of Pennsylvania. Weightman Hall, University Gymnasium, 33d and Spruce streets.

2:00 P.M. Harrison Laboratory, University of Pennsylvania, 34th and Spruce streets. Chairman, PROFESSOR FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, Columbia University.

General Topic: "Primitive Social Control"

"Primitive Individual Ascendancy," PROFESSOR HUTTON WEBSTER, University of Nebraska.

"Primitive Social Ascendancy," PROFESSOR F. STUART CHAPIN, Smith College.

"Survival of Primitive Controls in Frontier or Retarded Communities," DEAN J. E. CUTLER, Western Reserve University.

"Social Structure among the Northern Algonkian," PROFESSOR FRANK G. SPECK, University of Pennsylvania.

Discussion: PROFESSOR A. E. JENKS, University of Minnesota; PROFESSOR MAX S. HANDMAN, University of Texas.

6:00 P.M. Supper-Smoker given by the University of Pennsylvania. Ladies invited. Weightman Hall, University Gymnasium, 33d and Spruce streets.

8:00 P.M. Hotel Adelphia, Green Room. Joint Session with the American Economic Association. Chairman, PROFESSOR JOHN R. COMMONS, University of Wisconsin.

General Topic: "Social Control of Wealth"

"Social Control of the Acquisition of Wealth," PROFESSOR E. C. HAYES, University of Illinois.

"Motives of Economic Life," PROFESSOR CARLETON H. PARKER, University of Washington.

Discussion: PROFESSOR BENJAMIN M. ANDERSON, JR., Harvard University; PROFESSOR WESLEY C. MITCHELL, Columbia University; PROFESSOR FRANK A. FETTER, Princeton University.

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 29

9:00 A.M. Annual Business Session of the American Sociological Society. Haverford College, The Union. Chairman, PRESIDENT GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD.

Report of the Special Committee on Government Statistics.

10:00 A.M. Haverford College, The Union. Chairman, PROFESSOR J. P. LICHTENBERGER, University of Pennsylvania.

General Topic: "Social Control of Immigration"

"Immigration as a Problem in Social Control," PROFESSOR HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD, Yale University.

"The Immigrant in America as a Factor in Community Planning," MISS GRACE ABBOTT, Federal Children's Bureau.

"Control of Immigration Based upon the True Demand for Labor," PROFESSOR A. J. TODD, University of Minnesota.

Discussion: PROFESSOR HATTIE P. WILLIAMS, University of Nebraska; PROFESSOR HERBERT A. MILLER, Oberlin College; DR. WARREN S. THOMPSON, University of Michigan.

1:00 P.M. Complimentary Luncheon, tendered by Haverford College at Founders Hall.

2:00 P.M. Haverford College, The Union. Chairman, PRESIDENT GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD.

General Topic: "Social Control of Political Relations"

"Social Control in a Democracy," PROFESSOR FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, Columbia University.

"Social Control in International Relations," PROFESSOR CHARLES H. COOLEY, University of Michigan.

Discussion: PROFESSOR LUCIUS M. BRISTOL, University of West Virginia; PROFESSOR CECIL C. NORTH, Ohio State University; PROFESSOR LUTHER L. BERNARD, University of Minnesota.

8:00 P.M. Bellevue-Stratford Hotel, Ballroom. Joint Session of the American Sociological Society with the American Economic Association, American Political Science Association, and American Historical Association.

"The British Commonwealth," R. H. BRAND, Deputy Vice-Chairman of the British War Mission.

"The Pan-German Use of History," PROFESSOR WALLACE NOTESTEIN, University of Minnesota.

"Economic Alliances," MR. EDWARD P. COSTIGAN, United States Tariff Commission.

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Annual Report of the Secretary for the Fiscal Year, December 20, 1916, to December 17, 1917

Free Distribution of the January "Journal of Sociology" Discontinued

For the first time in the history of the Society, in the year 1917, the January number of the *American Journal of Sociology* was not mailed to the persons who were members of the Society the previous calendar year, but only to those who were bona fide members and had paid their dues for the current calendar year of 1917. This meant a decided saving to the Society, namely, the cost of the January *Journal* to all those who either resigned or were dropped for 1917.

Membership Statement

The total membership of the American Sociological Society for the year 1917 numbers 817. The membership for 1916 was 808. This latter number has been altered by the following changes in our membership lists:

Members in 1916		808		
Members resigning	81			
Members dropped	112			
Members deceased	4			
Total lost		197		
Members renewing, ex officio			1	
Members renewing, exchange			6	
Members renewing, paid			614	
New members for 1917			196	
Total membership for 1917				817

An analysis of the membership by date of joining for the years such analysis was made, namely, 1912 to 1917, presents these results:

Year joining	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917
Prior to 1910	.....	.....	.....	141	133	124	114	106	99
1910	.....	.....	.....	47	44	37	33	31	31
1911	.....	.....	.....	114	94	75	67	61	50
1912	.....	.....	.....	101	72	53	38	37	35
1913	.....	.....	.....	.....	278	182	129	99	85
1914	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	108	70	53	40
1915	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	300	185	152
1916	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	236	129
1917	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	196
Total	187	256	357	403	621	597	751	808	817

Note.—The heavy line shows membership statement since the present secretary has been in office.

Reasons Why Members Do Not Renew

After the fourth notice had been sent at the first of the present calendar year, asking the 1916 members to renew; to those who still were on the list and had failed to send a remittance, the Secretary sent a letter asking if they were dissatisfied with our publications, or if they had any complaint. Needless to say, several did not reply. However, a number of persons answered, the majority of whom stated that financial stringency was the cause of their failure to renew.

Society Archives

The Secretary has prepared during the year manila-bound files of the printed forms, stationery, etc., used by the Society, and classified them into the following files: (1) descriptive leaflets; (2) membership lists; (3) recommendation forms for membership; (4) program of the annual meetings; (5) printed reports; (6) form letters for the collection of dues; (7) due-bill forms; (8) envelopes and post cards; (9) campaign materials; (10) data on the 1917 campaign; (11) miscellaneous. Inspection of these is invited with a view to their improvement. They are here at the annual meeting in the Secretary's room at the Adelphia Hotel. The Secretary urges the Executive Committee or a subcommittee to study carefully all these printed forms, due bills, etc., with a view of making them the most fitting for a learned society such as ours, and at the same time the most efficient in producing results.

Campaign for New Members

On September 15 the Secretary addressed a letter asking the expression of the Executive Committee regarding a campaign for new members, and also asking for suggestions on whom to invite, and what amount of money should be spent for this purpose. Five members of the committee made no reply, one was indefinite, and eight were favorable. Upon the basis of this, as well as the custom of the Society to have a joint campaign with its publishers every two years, thirty-seven hundred (3,700) invitations were issued. This list had been collected in the office covering a period of five years. A triplicate card was used in this campaign. The type of the reprinted Volume X was kept standing by our publishers until prospects had time to ask for reprints. These were mailed together with a personal letter on December 1. Seventy-six (76) persons asked for the Roosevelt paper; seventy-six (76) for the one by Miss Balch; sixty-eight (68) for the one by Mr. Adams; and seventy-one (71) for Mr. Baldwin's paper. One hundred seventy (170) different persons asked for reprints. Fifty-five (55) of these have joined and nineteen (19) have applied for membership, but had not remitted when this report was composed. One of the folders of the records of the Society here at this meeting gives complete data on this campaign: namely, items, cost, and results as

far as we were able to compile them when this report was written. The cost to the Society was $107.55. Our publishers paid one-half of the entire cost of the campaign.

In addition to this effort, President Howard prepared a letter, and the Secretary's office mailed it on October 20 to the 288 teachers of sociology in the United States, asking them to present the claims of the Society to their students. Up to the time of leaving Chicago the following teachers had responded with the number of paid-up members indicated, as follows: Professor Cooley, 3; Professor Chapin, 1; Professor Sumner, 3; Professor Lichtenberger, 3; Professor Small, 2; Professor Webster, 1; and Professor Todd, 1. Total additions from this source, 14. Of course others were recommended but had not yet paid. The money received from these fourteen new members does not pay the postage for sending out the letters. It seems to the Secretary that the teachers of sociology should take more interest in extending membership in the society which may be considered the principal group of their profession.

List of Teachers of Sociology

The Secretary has attempted during the last three years to keep in the office an up-to-date list of the teachers of sociology in American colleges. This has been secured by sending out a letter and return envelope to college presidents. This list has answered many calls of the government, societies, and individuals for a list of sociology teachers.

Membership Lists to Publishers

The Secretary sends each year reprints of the membership list in the *Proceedings* to about eighty (80) foreign and domestic publishers. This enables our members to receive announcements of new books and other publications.

Inactive Committees

The Secretary directs attention to two committees appointed at the meeting in Minneapolis in 1913, which have become inactive, and he suggests that in order to make the minutes of the Society complete, the committees be discharged. The committees referred to are: the Committee on Photographs of Sociologists (A. W. Small, *Chairman*); and the Committee on Translations of Sociological Works (C. A. Ellwood, *Chairman*).

Invitations for the 1918 Meeting

Invitations for the meeting next year have been received from Asbury Park, New Jersey (Board of Commissioners); St. Joseph, Missouri (Commercial Club); Cleveland, Ohio (Chamber of Commerce and the Mayor); San Francisco (Convention League); Chicago (Chamber of Commerce); Springfield, Massachusetts (Chambers of Commerce, Colleges of the Con-

necticut Valley, and Local Alumni Associations); New York City (The Merchants Association). This latter invitation has been supplemented by personal letters to the Secretary from fifteen of our members living in New York City.

Deaths

The Secretary reports with regret that he has learned of the death of the following 1917 members: W. K. Tate, Peabody College for Teachers, Nashville, Tennessee; Philo C. Hildreth, Parsons College, Fairfield, Iowa; and George Thompson, publisher and editor, St. Paul, Minnesota.

Respectfully submitted,

SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD, *Secretary*

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Annual Report of the Treasurer for the Fiscal Year, December 20, 1916, to December 17, 1917

An Error in the Published Financial Statement

A mistake was discovered in the Financial Report as published in the *Papers and Proceedings*, Volume XI, under "Receipts, Dues for 1917, $572.43." It should have read $100.00 more, namely, $672.43. This was a clerical error in transcribing from the ledger, and makes no difference in the balances.

Audit of the Accounts

The Executive Committee at its last meeting authorized the Treasurer to secure a public accountant to audit the accounts at the close of the present fiscal year, such services not to cost over $25.00. Inquiries were addressed to two Chicago certified public accountants. Ernest Reckitt & Co. were employed, and the result of the audit is shown in the accompanying financial statement. The original papers, signed by the Auditor, are in the hands of the Treasurer for the inspection of any one desiring to avail himself of the opportunity to do so.

STATEMENT OF THE AUDITOR

"Chicago, December 19, 1917

"*The American Sociological Society, Chicago, Illinois*

"Gentlemen: In accordance with the request of your Secretary-Treasurer, Mr. Scott E. W. Bedford, we have audited your Books of Account for the year ended December 17, 1917, and submit herewith our report thereon, together with Exhibits as follows:

Exhibit "A," Balance Sheet as at December 17, 1917.
Exhibit "B," Statement of Cash Receipts and Disbursements for the year ended December 17, 1917.

"We verified the accuracy of the total Cash Receipts and Disbursements with the Bank Statements of Deposits and Checks paid and found them correct.

"We verified the principal items of Cash Disbursements by the original invoices supporting them and tested the accuracy of the checks issued and entered on the Cash Disbursements.

"We cannot certify to the accuracy of the Membership Cash Receipts, as there is no system in force that would enable us to fully verify this account. In this connection, however, we tested the postings from the Cash Received on account of 1917 memberships with the last published List of Members and the Society's Trial Balance of the members' cards, and found the items examined to be correct. We examined the Minutes of Meetings, but found no special Resolutions within our province which require comment. We have given Mr. Bedford a sketch for permanent Membership Register which, if installed, as we recommend, will provide a much more satisfactory record than is at present maintained. The Register will also result in interesting comparative information regarding memberships.

"We examined a memorandum schedule showing 1,208 copies of *Papers and Proceedings* on hand and in storage with the University of Chicago Press. We did not verify this statement by a physical examination, but have received an Inventory Certificate from the University of Chicago Press to the effect that the copies mentioned are held in stock by them. The *Papers and Proceedings* above mentioned have been printed at the expense of the Society and when sold bring in a net amount of seventy-five cents per copy.

"We received the verbal assurance of Mr. Bedford that the Society had no unrecorded liabilities as at December 17, 1917.

"Respectfully submitted,

Ernest Reckitt & Co.,
Certified Public Accountants"

Exhibit "A"

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

BALANCE SHEET AS AT DECEMBER 17, 1917

(Subject to report herewith)

Assets

CASH IN BANK		$1,179.78
NORTHWESTERN ELECTRIC CO.		
6 per cent Sinking Fund Bond		500.00
OFFICE FURNITURE		
Remington Typewriter	$60.00	
Cabinet File	58.65	
		118.65
		$1,798.43

Liabilities

Surplus, including dues of $799.13 paid in 1917 on account of 1918 Memberships	$1,789.43

Exhibit "B"

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Statement of Cash Receipts and Disbursements Year Ending December 17, 1917

(Subject to report herewith)

Cash Receipts

Dues from members for 1918	$ 799.13	
Dues from members for 1917	1,760.84	
Exchange on checks received	11.16	
Royalties on publications	332.75	
Interest on bond owned	30.00	
Sale of papers on "Immigration"	2.76	
Total cash receipts		$2,936.64

Cash Disbursements

Publication expense of *American Journal of Sociology*	$1,026.96	
Publication expense of *Papers and Proceedings*	713.21	
Publication expense of reprinting *Papers and Proceedings*, Vol. X	300.67	
Office salaries—clerical and stenographic	273.70	
Campaign for new members, 1917	16.76	
Campaign for new members, 1918	107.55	
Secretary's expense to Columbus meeting	42.20	
Postage, telegrams, and express	190.61	
Printing	85.13	
Office equipment	26.00	
Stationery	64.80	
Exchange on checks	22.95	
Advertising	1.50	
Insurance on *Papers and Proceedings*	1.45	
Membership refund	3.00	
Total cash disbursements		$2,876.49
Cash receipts in excess of cash disbursements		$ 60.15

Cash Summary

Cash in bank December 20, 1916	$1,119.63
Total cash receipts for year ended December 17, 1917	2,936.64
	$4,056.27
Less total cash disbursements for the year ended December 17, 1917	2,876.49
	$1,179.78
Cash in bank, December 17, 1917 (See Exhibit "A")	1,179.78

Respectfully submitted,

Scott E. W. Bedford, *Treasurer*

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Annual Report of the Managing Editor for the Fiscal Year, December 20, 1916, to December 17, 1917

Cost of Printing Volume XI

The financial statement will show that the cost of printing the edition of thirteen hundred (1,300) copies of Volume XI (The Columbus Meeting) of the *Papers and Proceedings* was..... $713.21

Reprinting Volume X

In midsummer it became evident that the supply of Volume X of the *Papers and Proceedings* of the Society, "War and Militarism in Their Sociological Aspects," would soon be exhausted. Letters were sent to the Executive Committee, asking the advisability of reprinting the volume. The returns were as follows:

Unfavorable, but not necessarily opposed	2
Out of the country, no response	1
No response to the letter	1
Favorable	9

The number suggested ranged from 250 to 500. The editor, relying upon this vote and the advice of our publishers, had 250 copies reprinted. The cost of such reprinting amounted to.... $300.67

In view of this experience, the editor recommends that a certain number of complete sets of the papers be set aside and sold only in sets. This will avoid in the future exhausting the supply of one volume and being unable to sell complete sets to libraries, institutions, etc. This reserve rule should be applied probably only after current interest in the volume has had time to subside, possibly after the volume is three years old. The editor suggests a reserve of about twenty-five or thirty-five complete sets.

Proceedings in Stock on December 17, 1917

There were on hand at this date the numbers indicated of the different volumes of the *Proceedings:*

Vol. I, 134	Vol. VII, 105
Vol. II, 65	Vol. VIII, 140
Vol. III, 81	Vol. IX, 90
Vol. IV, 94	Vol. X, 261
Vol. V, 89	Vol. XI, 96
Vol. VI, 53	

Preprints to Discussors

The editor has made a serious effort this autumn to get preprints of the papers for this meeting into the hands of the discussors previous to their coming to Philadelphia. President Howard asked the writers to get their manuscripts to the editor as soon as possible, in a letter dated July 20, 1917. On October 12 the editor sent an urgent letter to all the writers asking for their manuscripts as soon as possible. On December 1 galley proofs of the five papers in hand were sent to the discussors concerned. To the eight other persons who were to write main papers, letters were sent asking them to send direct to the discussors typewritten copies. At the same time a letter was sent each person who was to have a prearranged discussion, explaining that the manuscript had not reached the editor's office, but that it was hoped the writer would send direct a typewritten copy in plenty of time before the meeting.

Professor Cooley raised the question as to whether copies of the papers could not be promised to all persons in advance of the meeting. It would be an easy matter for the editor to fulfil such a promise if the writers would get their manuscripts to him in time.

To this meeting the editor has brought sufficient galley proofs to furnish the Press with copies of the papers which had been sent to him.

Free Copies of the "Proceedings" to the Public Affairs Information Service

The Public Affairs Information Service, managed by the H. W. Wilson Company, has two or three times asked the Society to present it gratis with two (2) copies each year of the *Papers and Proceedings* for use in listing in its bibliography bulletins. This may be a valuable way of advertising our publications. Accordingly, the editor asks the instruction of the Executive Committee upon this point.

Printing Papers of the Joint Sessions

Another question which it is desired to raise is: Should the *Papers and Proceedings* publish the papers and discussions on Friday and Saturday evenings of this annual meeting? It will be noted that these are joint sessions with other societies. The editor asks the instruction of the Executive Committee.

Papers and Discussions of Persons Not Present at the Meeting

Another question raised this year is whether papers, and particularly the discussions, of persons who have been asked to participate in the meeting and who have prepared their manuscripts, but who are unable to attend the meeting in person, should be printed in the *Proceedings*. The editor asks the instruction of the Executive Committee.

General Questions Regarding the "Proceedings"

1. Should the complete program of our annual meeting be printed showing the hospitalities, rooms, buildings, and other details? We have not done this in the past.
2. Should a complete list of papers presented at each annual meeting from the date of the organization of the Society be printed in the back of each volume of the *Proceedings?* Recently we have printed only the latest of these lists.
3. Should the date of joining of each member be printed in the *Proceedings* after the name? We have been doing this. The question is whether its value justifies the clerical work and expense involved.
4. Should the table in the Annual Report of the Secretary, showing the membership classified by date of joining, be printed in the volume of the *Proceedings?* It has not been done heretofore.
5. Is the color of the binding on the *Papers and Proceedings* satisfactory?
6. Should the outside cover of the *Papers and Proceedings* contain simply the title or a complete list of the titles of the papers and their writers printed, including the name of the managing editor? We have done this the past three years.
7. Should a complete set of the *Papers and Proceedings* be brought each year for display at the annual meeting? Does the Society care to advertise to that extent?
8. Should the last six (6) issues of the *American Journal of Sociology* be brought to the annual meeting for display? Is such advertising desirable?
9. Is the editor allowed any copies of the *Papers and Proceedings* for per-personal distribution? If so, how many?

Respectfully submitted,

SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD, *Managing Editor*

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, December 28, 1917

The meeting of the committee was called to order by President Howard in the Green Room of the Adelphia Hotel. The following members were present: Professors Howard, Small, Hayes, Kelsey, Cutler, North, Cooley, Woolston, and Bedford.

The minutes of the last meeting were ordered approved and filed without reading.

The annual reports of the Secretary, Treasurer, and Managing Editor, which had been handed to the members in typewritten form previous to the meeting, were read in part and ordered filed.

It was moved and carried that the committee express a preference for holding the next annual meeting in Cleveland, Ohio.

It was moved and carried that two (2) complimentary copies of the *Papers and Proceedings* of the Society be given each year to the Public Affairs Information Service.

The following decisions regarding the details of the *Papers and Proceedings* were made:

1. The dates of members joining the Society should not be kept or printed in the *Proceedings*.

2. The complete program of the annual meeting should be printed in the *Proceedings*.

3. A complete list of the topics of papers presented at each meeting of the Society since its organization should be printed in the back of the *Papers and Proceedings*.

4. The table analyzing membership by date of joining should be omitted from the *Proceedings*.

5. The color of the paper used in binding the *Proceedings* is satisfactory.

6. The following points were left to the discretion of the editor:

a) The matter on the outside cover.

b) The number of copies of the *Papers and Proceedings* for personal distribution by the editor.

c) The display of *Papers and Proceedings* and also the *American Journal of Sociology* at the annual meeting, for advertising purposes.

The suggestions of the auditor regarding forms to be used in keeping the accounts of the Society were left to the discretion of the Treasurer.

The committee then adjourned.

Scott E. W. Bedford, *Secretary*

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Minutes of the Annual Business Meeting, Haverford, Pennsylvania, December 29, 1917

The annual business meeting of the Society was called to order by President Howard at The Union, at Haverford College. About twenty-five (25) persons were present.

The minutes of the last meeting were not read, but ordered approved and filed.

The annual reports of the Secretary, Treasurer, and Managing Editor were read in part. They were accepted and ordered filed.

President Howard made an oral report of his work for the year.

It was moved and carried that the Committee on Photographs of Sociologists be discharged, with the understanding as presented by the chairman of the committee, Professor Small, that photographs of certain sociologists would be distributed as inserts in the *American Journal of Sociology* in the future.

It was moved and carried that, in accordance with the letter from P. P. Claxton, Federal Commissioner of Education, the President appoint, to represent the Society, two (2) persons, who would co-operate with a similar committee from the other social science societies to form a joint committee to study the adaptation of present social science courses to war conditions.

The Society's members on this Committee are Professors F. H. Giddings and Carl Kelsey.

The Committee on Statistics, reporting through its chairman, Professor W. M. Adriance, said that it was working with similar committees from the Economic and Statistical Associations with a view of forming a co-ordinating committee to make suggestions regarding the forthcoming census. It was asked that the committee be increased by two (2) persons.

It was moved and carried that the preliminary report of this committee be accepted, the committee continued, and that the President add two (2) other persons to the committee, preferably persons now doing work in Washington, D.C.

The Committee on Nominations reported the following persons for the offices indicated: President, Charles H. Cooley, University of Michigan; First Vice-President, Frank W. Blackmar, University of Kansas; Second Vice-President, James Q. Dealey, Brown University; Secretary-Treasurer and Managing Editor, Scott E. W. Bedford, University of Chicago; for Executive Committee, F. Stuart Chapin, Smith College, and William J. Kerby, Catholic University.

Respectfully submitted,

J. P. Lichtenberger, *Chairman*
James E. Hagerty
U. G. Weatherly

The Secretary was instructed to cast the ballot of the Society for the persons for the offices indicated.

The Committee on Resolutions presented the following Report:

Resolved, That the American Sociological Society hereby expresses its hearty appreciation of the courtesies extended by the University of Pennsylvania, by Haverford College, and by the citizens of Philadelphia, and especially its appreciation of the efficient labors of the local committee on arrangements; and it hereby directs its Secretary to record this action in the minutes of the Society and to communicate it to the heads of the two institutions and of the committee above designated.

Respectfully submitted,

E. C. Hayes, *Chairman*
Hutton Webster
F. Stuart Chapin

It was moved and carried that the report of the Committee on Resolutions be adopted.

The following resolution was presented by Miss Lucile Eaves:

Whereas, (1) The Sociological Society about five years ago appointed a research committee for the purpose of securing the co-operation of its members in country-wide investigations, and

(2) The plans made at that time failed to mature because of the death of its chairman, Professor C. R. Henderson.

Be it resolved, That this committee be revived, and that the President be authorized to appoint such a committee, whose duties shall be the correspondence with college teachers and other members of the Society interested in such research, with a view to the collection of data which may be prepared for presentation at the next annual meeting of the Sociological Society.

It was moved and carried that the resolution be adopted and the President appoint the committee. The Society then adjourned.

The committee appointed consists of J. L. Gillin (Chairman), Miss Lucile Eaves, Eugene T. Lies, George B. Mangold, Robert S. Park, A. J. Todd, and Howard B. Woolston.

Scott E. W. Bedford, *Secretary*

CONSTITUTION OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

ARTICLE I—NAME

This Society shall be known as the American Sociological Society.

ARTICLE II—OBJECTS

The objects of this Society shall be the encouragement of sociological research and discussion and the promotion of intercourse between persons engaged in the scientific study of society.

ARTICLE III—MEMBERSHIP

Any person may become a member of this Society upon payment of Three Dollars and may continue such by paying thereafter annually a fee of Three Dollars.

By a single payment of Fifty Dollars any person may become a life member of the Society.

Each member is entitled to a copy of the current publications of the Society.

ARTICLE IV—OFFICERS

The officers of this Society shall be a President, two Vice-Presidents, a Secretary, a Treasurer—elected at each annual meeting—and an Executive Committee consisting of the officers above mentioned *ex officio*, together with six elected members whose terms of office shall be three years; except that of those chosen at the first election two shall serve for but one year and two for two years.

The offices of Secretary and of Treasurer may be filled by the same person.

ARTICLE V—ELECTION OF OFFICERS

All officers shall be elected only after nomination by a special committee of the Society appointed by the Executive Committee; except that the officers for the first year shall be nominated by a committee of three to be appointed by the chairman of the meeting at which this constitution is adopted.

All officers shall be elected by a majority vote of the members of the Society present at the annual meeting.

ARTICLE VI—DUTIES OF OFFICERS

The President of the Society shall preside at all meetings of the Society and of the Executive Committee, and shall perform such other duties as the Executive Committee may assign to him. In his absence his duties shall devolve,

successively, upon the Vice-Presidents in the order of their election, upon the Secretary, and upon the Treasurer.

The Secretary shall keep the records of the Society, and perform such other duties as the Executive Committee may assign to him.

The Treasurer shall receive and have the custody of the funds of the Society, subject to the rules of the Executive Committee.

The Executive Committee shall have charge of the general interests of the Society, shall call regular and special meetings of the Society, appropriate money, appoint committees and their chairmen, with suitable powers, and in general possess the governing power in the Society except as otherwise specifically provided in this constitution. The Executive Committee shall have power to fill vacancies in its membership occasioned by death, resignation, or failure to elect, such appointees to hold office until the next annual election.

Five members shall constitute a quorum of the Executive Committee, and a majority vote of those members in attendance shall control its decisions.

ARTICLE VII—RESOLUTIONS

All resolutions to which objection is made shall be referred to the Executive Committee for its approval before submission to the vote of the Society.

ARTICLE VIII—AMENDMENTS

Amendments to this constitution shall be proposed by the Executive Committee and adopted by a majority vote of the members present at any regular or special meeting of the Society.

AMENDMENT I

(Adopted in 1914)

The Executive Committee shall appoint each year a Managing Editor for the annual volume of *Papers and Proceedings*. It shall be his duty to collect, edit, and arrange the material for the *Papers and Proceedings* of the annual meeting.

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

MEMBERSHIP LIST FOR THE YEAR 1918

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TABLE OF CONTENTS OF VOLUMES I–XII

VOL. I. PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST ANNUAL MEETING

The American Sociological Society.....Editorial
The Establishment of Sociology.....Lester F. Ward
How Should Sociology Be Taught as a College or University Subject? Charles A. Ellwood
Western Civilization and the Birth-Rate.....Edward A. Ross
Points of Agreement among Sociologists.....Albion W. Small
The Fine Arts as a Dynamic Factor in Society.....Mrs. J. Oldenwald-Unger
Social Consciousness.....Charles H. Cooley
Social Darwinism.....D. Collin Wells

VOL. II. SOCIAL CONFLICTS. PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND ANNUAL MEETING

Social Classes in the Light of Modern Sociological Theory....Lester F. Ward
The Basis of Social Conflict.....Thomas N. Carver
Competition.....Lindley M. Keasbey
Is Sectionalism in America Dying Away?.....Frederick J. Turner
Is Race Friction between Blacks and Whites in the United States Growing and Inevitable?.....Alfred H. Stone
The Significance of the Orient for the Occident.....William I. Thomas
Is Class Conflict in America Growing and Inevitable?....John R. Commons
Are Contradictions of Ideas and Beliefs Likely to Play an Important Group-Making Rôle in the Future?.....Franklin H. Giddings

VOL. III. THE FAMILY. PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD ANNUAL MEETING

The Family and Social Change.....William G. Sumner
How Home Conditions React upon the Family....Charlotte Perkins Gilman
The Effect on Woman of Economic Dependence.....Charles Zueblin
The Relations of Social Diseases to the Family.....Prince A. Morrow
The Influence of Income on Standards of Life.....R. C. Chapin
The Family in a Typical Mill Town.....Margaret F. Byington
Results of the Pittsburgh Survey.....Edward T. Devine

Are Modern Industry and City Life Unfavorable to the Family? Charles Richmond Henderson
Rural Life and the Family ..... Kenyon L. Butterfield
Some Questions concerning the Higher Education of Women .. D. Collin Wells
How Does the Access of Women to Industrial Occupations React on the Family? ..... U. G. Weatherly
Is the Freer Granting of Divorce an Evil? ..... George Elliott Howard
How Far Should Members of the Family Be Individualized? James E. Hagerty
How Far Should Family Wealth Be Encouraged and Conserved? George K. Holmes

VOL. IV. PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING

Religion and the Mores ..... William G. Sumner
History of the American Social Science Association ..... F. B. Sanborn
Changes in the Census Methods for the Census of 1910 ..... E. Dana Durand
The Outlook for American Statistics ..... Walter F. Wilcox
The Social Marking System ..... Franklin H. Giddings
The Psychological View of Society ..... Charles A. Ellwood
Outline of a Theory of Social Motives ..... James M. Williams
The Study of Homeric Religion ..... Albert C. Keller
The Rôle of Magic ..... James Thomson Shotwell
Influence of Superstition on the Evolution of Property Rights Hutton Webster
Notes on the Recent Census of Religious Bodies ..... George A. Coe
The Teaching of Sociology ..... James Quayle Dealey
Sociology and the State ..... Lester F. Ward
The Sociological Stage in the Evolution of the Social Sciences Albion W. Small

VOL. V. PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING

The Relation of Social Theory to Public Policy ..... Franklin H. Giddings
Sociological Observations in Inner China ..... Edward A. Ross
Sociological Appraisal of Western Influence in the Orient Edward Warren Capen
The Racial Element in Social Assimilation ..... U. G. Weatherly
The "Social Forces" Error ..... Edward Cary Hayes
Some Suggestions regarding the Organization of a Department of Sociology in an Urban University ..... J. E. Cutler
Report on Questionnaire of Committee on Teaching ..... F. Stuart Chapin
The Drift to the City in Relation to the Rural Problem ..... John M. Gillette

Leadership in Reform.....Frank W. Blackmar
The Church and the Rural Community.....Warren H. Wilson
The Church and the City Community.....Walter Laidlaw
Social Control of the Domestic Relations.....George Elliott Howard
Sociology and Social Surveys.....Thomas J. Riley
The Rivalry of Social Groups.....George E. Vincent

VOL. VI. PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING

The Quality of Civilization.....Franklin H. Giddings
The City as a Socializing Agency.....Frederic C. Howe
The Urban Habit of Mind.....Howard B. Woolston
Recreation as a Public Function in Urban Communities.....Jane Addams
The Restriction of Immigration.....Henry Pratt Fairchild
The Application of the Social Survey to Small Communities..John Lewis Gillin
Agricultural Education and Its Relation to Rural Sociology.....A. F. Woods

VOL. VII. THE CONCEPTION OF HUMAN INTERRELATIONS AS A VARIANT OF SOCIAL THEORY. PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING

The Present Outlook of Social Science.....Albion W. Small
Social Phases of Psychology.....G. Stanley Hall
Influence of the Growing Perception of Human Interrelationship on Education.....Paul Monroe
Some Aspects of the Influence of Social Problems and Ideas upon the Study and Writing of History.....Carl Becker
Outlook for Social Politics in the United States.....Charles E. Merriam
The Background of Economic Theories.....Simon N. Patten
Legislation as a Social Function.....Roscoe Pound
Some Implications of Remedial and Preventive Legislation in the United States.....Eldon R. James
Social Ideas Implied in Present American Programs of Voluntary Philanthropy.....Edward T. Devine
The Socialization of Religion.....Francis G. Peabody

VOL. VIII. PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL ASSIMILATION. PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING

A Vision of Social Efficiency.....Albion W. Small
The Neighborhood in Social Reconstruction.....Robert A. Woods
The Assimilation of the American Indian.....Fayette Avery McKenzie
The Rising National Individualism.....Herbert Adolphus Miller
Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups.....Robert E. Park
The Prussian-Polish Situation: An Experiment in Assimilation
William I. Thomas

An Outline of Social Study for Elementary Schools.....John M. Gillette
Round Table: Sociology in the Normal School.
By F. R. Clow. Remarks as Chairman
F. R. Clow. Content of the Course of Sociology Given in the State Normal School at Oshkosh, Wisconsin
"Social Assimilation": America and China.....Charles R. Henderson
Assimilation in the Philippines, as Interpreted in Terms of Assimilation in America.....Albert E. Jenks
Informal Conference: Is It Possible for American Sociologists to Agree upon a Constructive Program?

VOL. IX. FREEDOM OF COMMUNICATION. PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH ANNUAL MEETING

Freedom of Communication and the Struggle for Right.....Edward A. Ross
Freedom of Assemblage and Public Security.....John Graham Brooks
Reasonable Restrictions upon Freedom of Assemblage.....Arthur Woods
Reasonable Restrictions upon Freedom of Speech...James Bronson Reynolds
Freedom of the Press in the United States.....Henry Schofield
Reasonable Restrictions upon Freedom of the Press.....Charles H. Grasty
Freedom of Teaching in the United States.....Ulysses G. Weatherly
Reasonable Restrictions upon the Scholar's Freedom.....Henry Pritchett
Reports of Committees:
Report of the Committee on Investigation and Research.
Preliminary Report of Joint Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure.
Report of the Committee on Sociology in the Training of Teachers.

VOL. X. WAR AND MILITARISM IN THEIR SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS. PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH ANNUAL MEETING

War as Determiner.....Edward Alsworth Ross
Social Values and National Existence.....Theodore Roosevelt
The Effect of War and Militarism on the Status of Women...Emily G. Balch
War and Militarism in Relation to Government and Politics
Simeon E. Baldwin
Nationalism and State Socialism.....William English Walling
Can War Be Done Away With?.....Brooks Adams

VOL. XI. THE SOCIOLOGY OF RURAL LIFE. PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING

Countryside and Nation.....George E. Vincent
Country versus City.....Warren H. Wilson
Folk Depletion as a Cause of Rural Decline.....Edward Alsworth Ross

The Non-Partisan League.....Charles Edward Russell
The Mind of the Farmer.....Ernest R. Groves
The Development of Rural Leadership.....G. Walter Fiske
The Land Problem and Rural Welfare.....Paul L. Vogt
The Consolidated School as a Community Center.....John H. Cook
Social Control: Rural Religion.....C. O. Gill
Co-operation and Community Spirit.....A. D. Wilson
Rural Surveys.....C. W. Thompson
The Results of Some Rural Social Surveys in Iowa...George H. von Tungeln
The Scope and Methods of Instruction in Rural Sociology...John M. Gillette
The Teaching of Rural Sociology: Particularly in the Land-Grant Colleges and Universities.....Dwight L. Sanderson

VOL. XII. SOCIAL CONTROL. PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWELFTH ANNUAL MEETING

Ideals as a Factor in the Future Control of International Society
George Elliott Howard
Social Control of Child Welfare.....Sophonisba P. Breckinridge
War as a Crisis in Social Control.....Carl Kelsey
Primitive Individual Ascendancy.....Hutton Webster
Primitive Social Ascendancy Viewed as an Agent of Selection in Society
F. Stuart Chapin
Survival of Primitive Controls in Frontier or Retarded Communities
James Elbert Cutler
Social Structrue of the Northern Algonkian.....Frank G. Speck
The Social Control of the Acquisition of Wealth.....E. C. Hayes
Motives of Economic Life.....Carleton H. Parker
Immigration as a Problem in Social Control.....Henry Pratt Fairchild
The Immigrant as a Problem in Community Planning.....Grace Abbott
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